Executive summary | Central Asia emerging from the shadows

Since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a strong increased interest in the five Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. But contrary to the ‘new Great Game’ narratives that present the region as just a battlefield for larger powers, Central Asian states are demonstrating that they are taking the initiative in diversifying their international relations with their own agendas.

All this takes place in a rapidly evolving geopolitical context, which this report outlines through six dynamics in an interactive mapping:

Slumbering conflicts over water, land, and borders. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, conflicts in Central Asia have simmered in the background and escalated once in a while, yet the situation has vastly improved over the previous years.

The water-energy-food nexus. There is tension between water, energy, and food security in Central Asia. While the region is rich in water and energy resources in general, both are scarce at national levels as they are unequally distributed.

Russia as a systemic factor. The Russian influence in the region appears to be weakening but is still very present, and Russia can be considered to be a systemic factor in the region.

China’s consolidated position. China has made a remarkable rise over the past two decades and has consolidated its position as one of the most important partners for Central Asia – particularly in economic terms, but increasingly in security, too.

Re-establishment of relations with Afghanistan. Since the US left Afghanistan, Central Asia has strengthened its ties with the Taliban. This is in the interest of the republics – either for stability or practical concerns such as water flows and security.

Other interested actors. Many other parties are interested in working with Central Asia as well: Türkiye and Azerbaijan through connectivity and the Turkic world, Iran due to its strategic location and ethnic and linguistic ties to Tajikistan, and the Arab Gulf states are investing in the energy sector.

Amid this quickly evolving geopolitical context of Eurasia, the EU can also play a role. As Central Asian states value European engagement, both should use the momentum of increased attention for the region to further strengthen the relationship.

The EU has argued it wants to take a more geopolitical approach in its dealings worldwide since 2019. If the EU wishes to succeed, this policy should be backed up by tangible engagement that goes beyond energy and trade, for instance by including education, regional cooperation, and other elements in its policy as well. This report identifies eight of such areas for the EU, in line with the EU strategy for Central Asia. While all points are important, the ones related to water management and agriculture should be of particular relevance to the Netherlands in “doing its bit”.

First, Europe has a strategic interest in supporting Central Asia in the energy sector to develop further alternatives to Russian oil and gas, diversify imports of green energy and Critical Raw Materials (CRM), and to mitigate the impact of climate change. Second, another key issue directly linked to this is water availability, accelerated by the impact of climate change and growing populations. Among the EU Member States, the Netherlands is a recognized world leader in water management and is interested in sharing its experience with the region.

Third, agriculture is a key sector in which the EU and Central Asia could strengthen cooperation. The EU has an interest in facilitating agricultural trade and contributing to Central Asian countries’ export diversification and sustainable growth. It is also perceived as a reliable actor with technical expertise and technology. Historically, agriculture has been one of the most important sectors for the relationship between the Netherlands and Central Asian countries.

Fourth, the region has recently regained its relevance for global trade routes and found itself in the spotlight. Since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in fact, there is growing attention to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) – or the Middle Corridor - as an alternative trade route linking China to the EU via Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Although there are risks, such as increased Chinese influence over the region and leverage over the EU from countries on the TITR route, the benefits of intensifying EU connections with Central Asia outweigh the risks.

Fifth, education is an area in which all five Central Asian partners are interested in cooperating more closely with the EU. Increased cooperation in this area would bring positive results for all other mentioned key sectors for cooperation, and opens possibilities for the EU to play a bigger role. Sixth, terrorism, drug trafficking, extremism, radicalisation, and illegal migration all form internal security risks for Central Asia and the EU. Contributing to regional security is a long-standing EU priority and could offer an opportunity for dialogue between the EU and Central Asia.

Seventh, the EU has traditionally been a partner for strengthening human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Central Asia. Yet, this no longer seems to be a top priority in Brussels as the focus is on energy and trade, and the EU engages with the region through a balancing act of ‘principled pragmatism’. Eighth, Central Asian countries face many challenges that are regional in nature, but are not ready to face them as a region. With its vast experience in bringing together countries with different cultures and histories, the EU is a natural partner to support regional cooperation efforts in Central Asia.

Towards further strengthening EU – Central Asia relations in line with the EU’s geopolitical ambitions, we put forward the following recommendations:

Improve the positive presence of the European Union in Central Asia

Showcase the long-term commitment of the EU to Central Asia by deepening the bilateral relationship in the above-mentioned areas;

Prioritize the EU-Central Asia Summit;

EU member states like the Netherlands should also have an embassy in other countries of the region besides Kazakhstan, first and foremost in Uzbekistan;

Central Asian countries should also strengthen their presence and visibility in the EU, although this is rather a recommendation for the Central Asian governments.

Focus on concrete projects that offer opportunities in a wide range of sectors

Considering the geopolitics of the region, the EU does not need to compete with Russia or China in Central Asia as this will be a losing battle anyway. Rather, the EU should act more geopolitical by increasing its cooperation with Central Asia through concrete projects in a wide range of sectors;

The Commission and the EU Delegation to Kazakhstan could facilitate a Team Europe Initiative on green hydrogen with Kazakhstan, as suggested in earlier Clingendael work;[1]

The Netherlands should consider collaborating more in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

The Netherlands should consider extending the Matra Grant Policy Framework to its embassy in Astana, for all five countries of Central Asia;

When further deepening the EU-Central Asia relationship, the EU should consider connecting this to doing more projects in the area of human rights, democracy, good governance, and the rule of law.

Take stock of further opportunities

In setting out a long-term vision for cooperation with Central Asia, projects with the youth are a best practice;

The EU should further stimulate exchanges between EU and Central Asian universities;

It would also be worthwhile for the EU to stimulate educational exchanges within Central Asia, so that Central Asian students meet in their own region as well, instead of in Moscow or Beijing;

The EU should consider investing in strengthening primary and secondary education as well.