During the last few years, internationally operating armed forces have experienced a - at first sight - new kind of operation. Military operations in, for example, Iraq and Afghanistan are characterized by a combination of military warfare with a high level of violence, on the one hand, and reconstruction and aid activities that seem rather uncommon to the normal military tasks on the other hand. These kinds of missions, with a combination of hard (violent) and soft (reconstruction) tasks, are often called stabilisation operations or stability operations.There is little unanimity among the military and scholars about the effectiveness of these operations. Both civil and military experts have written articles and books on this subject during the last few years, presenting research results or personal experiences that could be useful when looking at the effectiveness of stabilisation operations. Because of the considerable amount of publications on the subject, combined with unclear terms and definitions, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the wood from the trees.
This paper aims to provide an overview of literature, thereby focusing on the factors for the success and failure of stabilisation operations from the military point of view. By comparing selected books and articles, the paper will combine the most mentioned factors that influence the success or failure of stabilisation operations and they will be listed in a table that can be used, for example, by policy makers preparing or evaluating a stabilisation operation. The paper will not only conclude by categorising the different factors, both quantitative and qualitative, but also by comparing the conclusions reached by civilian authors with those of military authors. Some remarks on the practical value of the outcomes of this research will also be made.
