It is only a matter of time before a G-2 of the United States and China is a reality, even if the term G-2 will never be used by these powers themselves. A G-2 exists from the moment the US and China, as the world's most influential actors, attempt to solve international issues together without involving - as equal partners - other countries. How Europe responds is of great consequence for the way the international system is structured, and for the position of the Western political-economic model. If Europe wants to keep up with the emerging G-2, it should respond by greatly enhancing its security role in the developing world.
The G-2's Potential
Recently there has been much debate about a possible G-2. The idea of the US and China jointly acting as the informal leaders of the world economy was introduced already some years ago by C. Fred Bergsten. In January of 2009 Zbigniew Brzezinski publicly proposed that this group of two would address not just economic issues but also problems in global security. Subsequently the G-2 concept attracted broad attention and - increasingly - also criticism. Chinese commentators pointed out that China supports a multipolar world order and that it will never want to be part of a G-2. The US government took care to emphasise that it will continue to regard long-standing allies such as Japan and Europe as its close partners. Various experts also argued that the world has too many centres of power for the US and China to dominate the world together, that China is still only an emerging power, and that there are too many fundamental difficulties between American and China to become close partners.
The tensions between the two countries that surfaced from December 2009 onwards gave extra weight to the latter argument. These signs of tensions include the US decision to approve new arms sales to Taiwan, President Obama meeting the Dalai Lama, the limited Chinese support for American pressure on Iran, and increasing American criticism on China's monetary policy. It is understandable that Europeans would like to believe that the G-2 will never materialise. Many European countries, and increasingly also the European Union, are Washington's close partner in managing global economic and security issues. But it would be premature to discard the possibility of joint Sino-American management of global affairs.
Washington and Beijing have already started coordinating their approaches to global issues. They began doing so on a regular basis in July 2009, when the first US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) was held in Washington. This was a two-day high-level meeting involving Secretary of State Clinton, Treasury Secretary Geithner, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, and Vice Premier Wang Qishan. The agenda included major security and economic issues that involve third countries, or even the world at large, including: the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues, stability in South Asia and Sudan, global economic stability, and climate change. The discussions from the first S&ED were followed up at subsequent high-level exchanges, including the meeting between Barack Obama and Hu Jintao in Beijing in November 2009.
The second annual S&ED meeting was held in Beijing and has just been concluded. The fact that at the second S&ED, China and the US did not manage to come up with a common approach to the South Korean Cheonan incident does not mean that there will not be an increasing need for the two great powers to discuss international issues. What is significant is that for Washington, the Chinese government is the most important party to discuss Korean security with, and that neither Japan or South Korea play a direct role in the US-Chinese dialogue on this issue. With the S&ED system, the basic elements for a G-2-like partnership are in place. For now it seems that the US has a greater need to discuss global issues with China than the other way around, but as China's global interests grow so will its need to work with the United States. At some point Beijing will feel the urge to address such issues as stability in the Middle East or global economic stability more actively than it is doing now. It will not be able to do so without involving the US.
The recent downturn in Sino-American relations is nothing new. Ever since the start of diplomatic relations between the two powers in 1979, periods of friction have followed periods of engagement and vice versa. There is a fundamental distrust between the two countries, but also a strong need to work together. This means that their relationship is unstable and is likely to continue going up and down. An end to the cyclical nature of the relationship is not probable unless a major armed conflict erupts between the two countries - which both try very hard to avoid - or until the positions of China and the US in the global system have become settled. The latter will not happen as long as China is still in a phase of rapid development.
As China continues to become more influential there will be a greater need for Washington to work closely with Beijing on an expanding set of issues. In the words of President Obama, as stated at the opening of the 2009 S&ED, 'the relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century'. Beijing, too, will feel a stronger urge to coordinate global policies with Washington. China already has a strong interest in all parts of the developing world and this interest will continue to increase. The Chinese government will find itself increasingly in a position comparable to the American one - with an immediate stake in security and economic issues across the world but with limited tools to manage the international order. Beijing's current strategy of balancing developed with developing countries, and balancing the US with other great powers, will likely come under great pressure as China acquires the status and interests of a superpower.
The term G-2 becomes appropriate from the moment the US and China are the two most influential powers and they coordinate global affairs exclusively among themselves. These two elements are closely related: the greater the distance between China and the United States on the hand and other actors on the other hand, the greater the tendency of the two leading actors to insert exclusivity into their mutual partnership. It seems only a matter of time before the G-2 is a reality.
The EU's Response Matters
In the coming decades, the European Union is the most likely candidate to fill the gap between the emerging G-2 and other influential and emerging actors - such as Russia, Japan, India, and Brazil. It therefore matters how Europe responds to China's rise, not just for Europe's own future but also for the future of the international system. If the EU can operate on a level close to that of the United States and China, the effects of a G-2 will be less pronounced. Should this happen, or should the EU even be part of a G-3, then this would narrow the distance between formal multilateral systems, such as the United Nations, and the informal reality of superpower dominance.
Moreover, Europe's position also matters for the further development of international political and economic norms. During the twentieth century the communist political-economic model of the USSR, as well as the fascist models of Italy and Germany, exerted a major influence throughout the world. China, which itself during the 1950s looked to the Soviet model rather than to the West, is now becoming an example and a source of inspiration for other countries. Also, because China has an authoritarian government and a state-dominated economy, multinational institutions in which China plays a dominant role cannot anymore be expected to promote liberal democracy and economic liberalism. Due to China's rise Western political and economic norms will therefore be adopted by fewer countries. This process of ever increasing pressure on Western norms cannot be halted, but the more prominent the international role of the EU, the stronger the appeal will be of its own political-economic model for the rest of the world. Irrespective of whether or not a diminishment in the appeal of Western norms is a desirable development, it would have a great impact.
A Focus on Stability in the Developing World
To begin with, there is a need for Europeans to be clear about their options. To attain a great power status comparable to that of the United States would require, above all, centralised policy-making on both economic and security issues, and - assuming that the transatlantic alliance is to continue - a security alliance with the US based on equality. This clearly is not feasible in the foreseeable future. The European integration process takes time, and for various reasons Europe is set to continue to be a junior security partner of the United States. A genuine G-3 is therefore not likely for the time being. The options that are currently available are either to settle for a regional role or to operate - in a modest role, as a junior partner of the US and China - at the global level. It is by no means clear whether there is broad support within the EU for developing a global role. However, should the EU wish to fill the gap between the coming G-2 and other main actors, then there are two basic implications.
First, the EU should not just be an economic power, but a major actor in both economic and security issues. This means that the EU needs to raise its profile as a security actor. Second, the EU should not just be a relevant player in its own neighbourhood, but also globally. This becomes more important as the world economy is no longer centred primarily on the North Atlantic region. Specifically, the EU should have a distinct presence - both economically and in security matters - in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
These considerations signify that the European Union would need to invest in enhancing its contribution to stability in the developing world. There are various avenues to approach this target: closer coordination between the EU and its member states in the UN Security Council, improved economic and diplomatic bilateral ties with (preferably all) developing countries, increased support for UN peace operations, a greater military expeditionary capability that is deployed separately from NATO and that focuses on non-traditional security contributions (such as counter-piracy and disaster relief operations), and strong support for regional security organisations. However, there will be no significant progress if the aim to contribute to greater stability is mixed with other aims, notably actively promoting the adoption of Western values by non-Western countries in their domestic policies, advancing short-term interests at the local level, or merely strengthening the relationship with the US, if these run counter to the purpose of local stability. All these aspects cannot be ignored, but should not be leading in the EU's external security policy. This applies also to the sphere of development cooperation. The stronger the focus on contributing to stability, the more relevant the EU becomes as a major actor.
A greater strategic focus on the developing world should be combined with improved coordination within the EU, and economic and security dialogues not only with the US and China, but also with other important global and regional actors - including such actors as Japan, India, Russia, Australia, South-Korea, Brazil, Canada, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, and the African Union. The more the EU is relevant in economic and security issues throughout the world, the more Washington and Beijing will be triggered to take the EU into account in their approaches to managing global affairs. A clearly profiled role for the EU as a global actor would be beneficial for multilateralism and would contribute to counterbalancing the appeal - as a source of inspiration for developing countries - of China's political-economic model and Chinese norms on international relations. An additional role that the EU, as a junior partner to the US and China as global actors, could play is to help stabilise US-China relations in the developing world. In this way it could also contribute to greater stability also at the superpower level. The EU's aims at the global level should be set at a modest level, and even that will be very demanding on Europe's resources. But although Europe will not be able to keep up with China or catch up with the US, it may still be possible for it to be more than a regional actor in the coming decades.
This article was originally published on Europe's World.
