The report of the Future of Europe Group could be an impulse for the weak global role of the EU, calling for more coherence and efficiency. Henning Riecke, expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the attitude of the member states is the most important factor in strengthening EU foreign policy.
Last September, eleven Foreign Ministers of EU member states have issued recommendations about the future of the European Union- in the face of an internal crisis of financial stability and outside shifts of power away from Europe. The group, formed after a German initiative, comprised a mix of integrationist yet heterogeneous countries with France on board only recently. The report is both a sign of the anxiety that the strategic positioning of the EU might falter in times of the Euro crisis, and of the divisions about how much the members are willing to invest to make the Union globally relevant. And the member states are what counts for that purpose.
The more visionary elements are a political union with two chambers or a stronger Commission with a directly elected President of the Commission as well as demands on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union. In a section on the improvement of the EU's governing structure, a few proposals seek to build up Europe's global role: Strengthening of the European External Action Service and of the High Representative, more majority voting and constructive abstention in CFSP; more ambitious cooperation in CSDP, including a European Armaments Market. Here, as on other issues, the report states differences: "For some members of this group, this could eventually involve a European Army". One would hope the deliberations took the "shock and awe" out of this expression, to make way for pragmatic cooperation in the area of defence.
EU foreign policy is less relevant for the EU as a global player and even for countries in the vicinity than its economic and political weight would suggest. There are institutional deficiencies to repair. A review of the EEAS is due in 2013. There will be a time to discuss its flaws as well as its potential. The ministers did well to demand changes to improve the services improvement - aware of the fact that it is a nerve system for communication, the most crucial tool and backbone of a working EU foreign policy. The report might even provide a boost for Ashton or her successor for the next term after 2014 to be more visible inside Europe, creating popular support for the European action abroad. Also in 2014, a new Commission will take up work, an opportunity to reorganise its activities in external relations. The report demands better division of labour, clear authorities and a stronger role of the high representative to direct debates within the Commission - this impulse should bear fruit. Yet the cause for the EU's weak outside relevance is not lack of coherence and efficiency alone. The report should talk more about what the members could do for global prominence of the EU.
The member states are not willing to accept that an ever deepening Union means giving up one thing to gain another. A strong EEAS with a quasi-EU foreign minister was rebuffed during the reform debate ten years ago. Some states still fear the pressure that such an office could create. Handing the dossier of strategic partnerships to the Brussels diplomats, when business opportunities are at stake? Well, just not this time... ! Military build-up in a budgetary crisis? Its way cheaper to talk about strategy once more (The report's most painful proposal is "We should consider reviewing the European Security Strategy"). Easing parliamentary co-decision for foreign missions to make way for multinational units ready to be deployed? Sorry, this cow is too holy to kill. Opening borders for young people from Arab countries? No thanks, most members want to block immigration, not to invite it. A European Border Police, by the way, is one of the reports proposals.
How and when will the member states change their attitude to make the EU foreign policy strong globally? The slow procedures of the EU and constant exchange of the representatives might create an environment where the members find it more and more natural to fall in line with European Foreign Policy. Helpful would be an understanding that security inside the EU is indivisible, crises in the Mediterranean can also affect the Northern members, Eastern Europe must be France's or Spain's concern. The ministers could have explicitly welcomed political dynamism, even if it means additional pressure for the member states national decision-making. Germany, sometimes hesitant when it comes to building military capacities in the EU, should be aware that the ministers' report could unleash such a development.
Would these mechanisms establish a strategic culture over time that is based on a self-image of the EU as global security actor? The participating ministers have possibly equalled out diverging conceptions of how the CFSP instruments should be used. Next to a stronger HR and EEAS, that could lead to a reviving of the instrument of permanent structured cooperation, as demanded. Germany has not been overly ambitious to start projects under this label maybe to avoid rushing into patterns that they fear might lead to a two speed Europe. Successful cooperation, though, could have a rallying effect that would foster consensus about defence, a chance not to be missed. The report should be the initial step of a more regular sequence of follow-up revisions what has come out of its recommendations.
HENNING RIECKE is head of the transatlantic relations program at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).