In January 2018, the BBC noted that c. 70% of Afghanistan was once more under the control of the Taliban.[1] Despite their courage and sacrifices, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) proved incapable of discharging their constitutionally mandated duties. This situation arose after eight years (2006–2014) of support for the ANSF from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and four more years of support from NATO’s Operation Resolute Support.[2] While it is reductionist to conclude that such efforts to support the rebuilding of the ANSF have been ineffective, the current state of affairs nevertheless demands examination. This is especially so because many analyses find UN-mandated peacekeeping to be effective in producing ‘peace’, i.e. bringing about a reduction in or cessation of hostilities, in a cost-effective manner, for at least some time.[3] Although this is clearly not the case in Afghanistan at present, there are good examples of relative success like the UN missions to Liberia, Ivory Coast and Haiti.[4] Yet, assessing the effectiveness of international peacekeeping missions, including those with significant capacity-building components, is difficult for several reasons:

Contemporary intrastate conflicts are typically fragmented and inter- and transnational, as well as volatile, which means that violence can abruptly change in intensity, duration and location. Missions operating in such a dynamic situation regularly shift between stabilisation, warfighting and peace/statebuilding. This makes it hard to assess how much ‘peace’ a mission has brought and whether this was ‘effective’.

Missions are to violence what a pressure bandage is to injury – temporary interventions that may stabilise the environment and create time for more complex mechanisms to kick in that can sustain peace. The longer-term effectiveness of missions depends on what happens politically, diplomatically and developmentally before, during and after deployment.

Mission mandates seek to deliver on an increasing number and complexity of objectives. Some are contradictory, such as maintaining peace and building the state when the latter’s policies are a source of conflict. The delivery of other objectives requires programmatic approaches, but typically missions are not equipped with the required experience or resources.[5]

This report examines a particular dimension of the picture just outlined, namely the effectiveness of international peacekeeping missions in strengthening civilian police and state justice systems in (post-)conflict societies. While these tasks have become increasingly common in mission mandates over the past 15 years, they form only a subset of the broader effectiveness issue raised above. More specifically, the report inventories and analyses key factors that influence the effectiveness of mission activities that intend to strengthen civilian police and state justice systems in (post-)conflict societies. The insights generated can help improve the evaluation of past missions, operational methods of present missions and design of future missions.

See: link (accessed 22 October 2018).
ISAF started operations in 2001 but only established nation-wide command and operations in 2006. It was authorised by United Nations (UN) resolution no. 1386 and Operation Resolute Support by resolution no. 2189.
Gowan, R. and R. Rappa, Global peace operations review: Peace operations 2018, CIC: New York, 2018.
United Nations, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people (‘HIPPO report’), New York: United Nations, A/70/95, 2015.