This section inventories factors that influence the effectiveness of mission activities aiming to strengthen civilian police and state justice systems in (post-)conflict societies at the level of the conflict context. Specific mission activities pertaining to rule of law elements, such as capacity building for civilian police forces, are only one dimension of the activity portfolio of a mission, which is susceptible in its entirety to developments in the conflict that the mission was deployed to mitigate. The exact nature of the interdependence between conflict developments and mission performance is influenced by variables such as type of conflict, country size, number of conflict parties, volume of peacekeeping resources deployed, levels of inter- and transnational support for conflict parties, sources of revenue, conflict legacy and types of grievance.[7] In most cases, however, the interaction between conflict and mission is unbalanced in the sense that conflict developments will have a major impact on mission effectiveness, while mission activities usually have a more modest impact on conflict.[8]

Contemporary intrastate conflicts are typically: volatile in terms of the intensity and geography of the violence they exhibit; feature a vast and diverse array of conflict parties with loyalties that can rapidly change; tend to recur; and are often domestic, transnational and international at the same time. In terms of their drivers, they often share the presence of repressive or kleptocratic ruling elites.[9] Examples include present-day conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Burundi, Somalia, the DR Congo and Afghanistan. Governance in such places typically consists of a mix of formal procedures and state institutions on the one hand, and informal and/or traditional networks, powerbrokers and armed groups on the other. Together, these produce hybrid authority systems that usually feature intensive linkages with existing war economies.[10] This means that working with ‘the state’ in these types of settings is far from a benign, progressive or neutral course of action. It also means that governance intentions and administrative capabilities are often radically – and purposefully – different from the imagined Weberian state bureaucracy.[11]

It is in these settings that the international community – multidimensional peacekeeping missions in particular – has long sought to initiate wholesale socio-political transformations through prolonged statebuilding efforts focused on (re-)establishing state institutions via pre-set policy templates in areas such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Rule of Law (RoL) reform once a government of national unity has been established through classic mediation processes.[12] Arguably, such an approach has generally had little success in bringing the intended transformations about – Iraq and Afghanistan represent the most obvious failures – and appears to be of declining utility in contemporary intrastate conflict, as exemplified by recent UN peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in South Sudan (UNMISS), Mali (MINUSMA) and Libya (UNSMIL).[13] This is the case for several reasons:

While the UN’s ‘HIPPO’ report, as well as the UN Secretary-General’s response to this report and subsequent implementation efforts have all set out new strategic directions, increased political awareness and triggered capability reforms, the struggles, tensions and issues outlined above are likely to remain pertinent for a good while longer. This is because reforming the UN system, with its 193 political stakeholders and many principals, is a difficult and slow process.[20] As a result, the UN’s approach to peacekeeping will only change slowly. Quick change – including greater effectiveness of UN-missions – should not be expected.

Meanwhile, geopolitical tensions have risen to new levels as the global agenda-setting and enforcement power of the United States has both diminished and is being used differently. Russia seeks to re-assert itself on the global stage, China claims its own global and regional spheres of influence and, importantly, regional powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and India have become increasingly assertive.[21] As a consequence, missions, when authorised, are likely to operate in a tenser and more crowded geopolitical situation. Traditionally, missions manage their diplomatic relations via the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, but the complex demands and fast tempo of contemporary intrastate conflict also require that this is done in real-time and locally.[22]

Against this background sketch, which emerged from our literature review, we have identified key conflict context factors that influence the likely effectiveness of the entire portfolio of mission activities, including those seeking to strengthen civilian police and state justice systems (see Table 1).