Assessing the effectiveness of non-executive, international peacekeeping missions’ efforts to strengthen civilian police and state justice systems in (post-)conflict societies is a complex endeavour because there are several ways in which ‘success’ can be measured:
Operational success: Effectiveness of mission activities suggests operational success (level 3 in our analytical framework). It means that mission activities are implemented in line with existing good content and design practice. However, if this happens in a context of poor overall mission design (level 2) and a mission that is not sensitive, adaptable and responsive to the conflict in which it operates (level 1), results will lack coherence and be limited in scope. This is akin to ‘the battle was won, but the war was lost’.
Bureaucratic success: Effectiveness of mission design indicates bureaucratic success (level 2 in our analytical framework). It means that a mission smoothly delivers on its mandate. Inputs will have been translated into outputs in accordance with mandate and resources. Yet, if this happens in a mission that is not sensitive, adaptable and responsive to the conflict in which it operates, its bureaucratic success may be irrelevant. This is similar to ‘the war was won, but it was the previous one’.
Strategic success: Effectiveness of a mission in its conflict context suggests strategic success (level 1 in our analytical framework). It is arguably the true measure of success. It means the mission is sensitive, adaptable and responsive to the conflict in which it operates, delivers on its mandate and implements its activities in line with existing good practice. In all likelihood, this amounts to a meaningful contribution to sustainable conflict management/resolution. Of course, if the conflict deteriorates in the same period, the net result might still be limited.
On the basis of a broad review of existing conflict, peacebuilding, statebuilding, peacekeeping, security sector reform and political-economy literature, this report identifies 17 factors across three analytical levels that influence the effectiveness of missions intending to strengthen civilian police and state justice systems in (post-)conflict societies (summarised in Table 4 below).
A number of these factors can undoubtedly be framed differently, split, combined or added to. The evidence base is significant for some factors and more limited for others, which creates room for discussion. Yet, by and large there is adequate evidence for each of these seventeen factors. In consequence, they offer a solid basis for assessing the effectiveness of mission efforts to strengthen civilian police and state justice.
Finally, it must be noted that if all of the factors listed would be assessed positively for a particular mission and/or activity, this only means that effectiveness of its police and justice-enhancing activities in that conflict setting is likely to be more significant, ceteris paribus, compared with a case in which these factors are assessed more negatively.
| Level 1: Conflict context |
Level 2: Mission design |
Level 3: Mission activities |
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|---|---|---|---|
| Content |
Design |
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| (1) The mission has a clear conflict transformation strategy grounded in a sound understanding of the domestic political economy. |
(4) The mission has a clear, i.e. sequenced and prioritised, mandate to realise its objectives. |
(7) Mission activity objectives reflect security (police) and justice priorities of the people that are tolerable to elites. |
(12) Mission activities are part of a long-term programmatic engagement in terms of time and funding. |
| (2) The mission has an effective mechanism to track and influence regional conflict drivers. |
(5) The mission is embedded in the wider aid architecture to enable continuity of its longer-term efforts. |
(8) Mission activities include significant engagement with informal and formal justice actors. |
(13) Mission activities are organised adaptively so that they can learn from experience and adjust to environmental change. |
| (3) Mission capabilities are designed to adapt to changing conflict conditions during deployment. |
(6) The mission has dedicated and sufficient resources for alignment and coordination. |
(9) Mission training activities are part of integrated capacity-building programmes. |
(14) International police and justice staff conducting mission activities are competent and demonstrate behaviour/coaching skills that are locally relevant. |
| (10) Mission activities are guided by a uniform policing/justice concept that is locally relevant. |
(15) Mission activities are based on an assessment of likely political resistance against particular rule of law reforms. |
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| (11) Mission activities that work on specific policing/justice aspects are embedded in more comprehensive reform efforts. |
(16) Mission activities address key sources of popular mistrust in police/ justice behaviour and performance. |
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