This section inventories factors that influence the effectiveness of mission activities aiming to strengthen civilian police and state justice systems in (post-)conflict societies at the level of mission design. Mission activities are developed within the broader framework of overall mission design, meaning that any flaws and limitations in that design will inherently influence activity effectiveness.
To start out with, it is important to note that there has been a noticeable shift in the set-up of peacekeeping missions over the last decade-and-a-half. Missions in the 1990s and early 2000s were fielded on the basis of narrower mandates and characterised by fairly large military and police components relative to the territories and populations they served. They also featured longer-term commitments to anchoring peace in post-conflict states (like the UN missions in Liberia and Ivory Coast). Today’s missions have so-called ‘multi-dimensional’ mandates that are subject to confusion and tend to feature inherent trade-offs.[28] Increasingly, they also lack both the resources (in terms of personnel, equipment and finances) and political leverage necessary to promote ‘peace’.[29] The UN ‘HIPPO’ report defines this new generation of missions as ‘conflict management operations’ that do not support bringing about a new political settlement of sufficient strength to prevent conflict recurrence, but that rather aim to contain and mitigate conflict.[30] Briefly, the bottom line of this development is that pursuing broader and more demanding mandates with comparatively fewer resources reduces mission effectiveness and hence the ability to help bring about sustainable peace.
In particular, wide-ranging and ambitious mandates increase the risk of missions facing heavy and contradictory demands on their operations. Such mandates also reduce the ability of missions to make progress on issues that require sustained political focus over time.[31] For example, there is little international political agreement on how to deal with the plethora of today’s non-state armed groups in the context of ‘getting to peace’ (linked to varying definitions of terrorism). In the DR Congo, the Force Intervention Brigade aggressively pursues M23, while in Mali MINUSMA struggles to deal with the country’s varied landscape of rebel, terrorist and criminal groups.[32] Such lack of strategic direction undermines the possibility for missions to address a major driver of modern-day conflict and instability.
In addition, the increase in large-scale conflict-induced humanitarian crises means that missions become increasingly intertwined with humanitarian relief (i.e. providing security for humanitarian efforts). As a result, reviews[33] suggest that multidimensional peacekeeping missions, as well as special political missions, are increasingly involved in efforts to mitigate human suffering and create access for humanitarian interventions. This comes at the cost of working on complex peace- and statebuilding tasks that can only be advanced incrementally, such as promoting the rule of law.[34]
Meanwhile, there has nevertheless been no shortage of missions that include training and support functions, incorporating civilian, police and/or military components, to support longer peace- and statebuilding efforts.[35] Typically, such missions do not undertake the full spectrum of training and support tasks (such as the rule of law) in their area of engagement. This makes coordination and cooperation with other international organisations and bilateral donors engaged in the same area of critical importance in achieving full spectrum coverage – and hence the success of individual activities. Our literature review suggests that key issues include:
The level of alignment of mandates, strategies and plans between a mission and relevant other actors engaged in the same area influences effectiveness. While there has been an increase in terms of joint programming over recent years (both between e.g. EU and UN missions, as well as between missions and other, mostly developmental, actors), reviews have shown that in many cases ‘jointness’ means operational entities aligning their respective existing programmes rather than developing a truly joint programme from scratch.[36] Good practices – like early integrated mission planning, joint contingency planning, joint monitoring and reporting, and having dedicated liaison staff – are well-known[37] but remain rare in practice due to the various ‘pillars’ of the international peace and aid architecture still being driven by their own set of incentives and demands, and competing for the same scarce resources.[38]
If there is alignment, continuous coordination is the next factor that makes a difference.[39] As is the case for all integrated and comprehensive efforts, effective coordination requires a lead organisation that sets the strategic direction of international action in a particular area of activity. It also demands shared recognition of the fact that not all organisations are equal in their contribution.[40]
The provision of technical expertise has to be aligned with political processes because technical support missions (e.g. carrying out justice and police training) cannot be successful without respecting and engaging with the political settlement in which they are expected to bring about progressive change. This means, among other things, that rule of law support has to be sequenced to transition from the finite timeline of peacekeeping missions to the more open-ended timeline of development efforts. Insofar as international support is concerned, political leadership over such a transition should lie with the international development organisation that is key in the particular context at hand and not necessarily with a mission.[41]
Reviews find that missions often lack civilian capacity for highly technical justice and security sector positions. In combination with a lack of predictable resources, missions can often not deliver on all aspects of their rule of law mandate. There is a need for ‘smarter’ missions that are well staffed and can prioritise activities based on political and practical feasibility. What is feasible depends at least in part on the quality of analysis and local insight discussed in the previous section, as well as the ability of a mission to identify and work flexibly with partners.[42]
Against this background sketch, we have inventoried key mission design factors that have an influence on the likely effectiveness of the entire mission, including activities seeking to strengthen civilian police and state justice systems (see Table 2).
| Factor |
Indicator(s) |
What is the issue? |
|---|---|---|
| 1. The mission has a clear, i.e. sequenced and prioritised, mandate to realise its objectives.[43] |
The mission mandate is based on a set of prioritised needs, including benchmarks to guide transitions between priorities and activities.[44] Mission-mandated tasks are clearly linked with the mission’s political strategy. The mission’s work plan is regularly tested and updated. This happens in large part in function of modifications to the mission’s conflict transformation strategy that result from better insight into the local political economy (see Table 1). |
Pursuing too many priorities at the same time means pursuing none. Often this means that short-term, urgent priorities take precedence, and this does not normally include rule of law type activities. |
| 2. The mission is embedded in the wider aid architecture to assure continuity of its longer-term efforts.[45] |
Mission design/mandate are based on a mapping of the focus and activities of key mission partners and stakeholders, using the principle of ‘value added’. A strategic forum exists in which key international partners, the host country and mission leadership discuss planning and prioritisation of activities. Coordination arrangements with leading rule of law development actors (e.g. UNCT or UNDP) provide for an integrated approach. The mission has developed a transition plan for strengthening of the rule of law beyond its expiry date. |
Despite its high political profile, a mission is typically only one player among many actors in similar areas. Alignment and coordination are essential to ensure leverage and avoid duplication of efforts. Also, missions typically have a short-term, extendable timeframe of operations that will usually end before its more complex tasks are completed. Avoiding the loss of investments made until that point requires a smooth handover of activities. This requires alignment from the start. |
| 3. The mission has dedicated and sufficient resources for alignment and coordination.[46] |
There is dedicated and qualified staff capacity to focus on institutional coordination between major international organisations, the mission and large donors on issues like country strategy, programmes and political messaging (lynchpin actors). The mission sets benchmarks for inter-institutional coordination and for the development of joint planning and programmes, and monitors progress. The mission has access to predictable funding for coordination and alignment. |
Integrated or joint planning is often done in isolation in missions, international organisations and aid agencies. Such planning is hampered by the lack of dedicated resources, differing lengths of mandates and work plans, claims of planning fatigue and, at times, a culture of autonomy/resistance. |