A new conflict management strategy that is based on SCNE can be implemented gradually along two main dimensions:

First, put pragmatic crossline arrangements in place that ease civilian trade and travel, bolster local economies, meet basic educational needs, improve security, and facilitate aid flows. Despite their potential, the manifold dimensions of crossline relations have not been the subject of concerted political discussion. Expanding trade between opposition areas of northwest Syria, the SDF-held north and east, and regime areas would stimulate the economies of each area and will go some way to meet, for example, significant food security challenges. This requires steps such as:

Agreement on the formalisation and expansion of trade by:

1.
Licensing traders to do business across the north and east, regime areas and Turkey, and eliminating dependency on smuggling routes and middlemen
2.
Negotiating arrangements for maintaining storage facilities and truck stops at crossline transit points, including security coordination to ensure smooth operations
3.
Agreeing a simplified and transparent customs/taxation scheme that offers benefits to all parties but is also commercially viable for traders.

Agreement on agricultural cooperation and exchange. Meeting the increasing challenge of food security is hindered by the obstacles to investment in — and trading of — agricultural produce and livestock between areas of control. Establishing markets at suitable locations along the frontlines and easing restrictions on farmers will enhance complementarity and boost local food production.

Agreement on mutual recognition of school certificates. One of the main areas of divergence between the different areas of control is education. School certificates issued by one authority are not recognised by the other, and vice versa. Education authorities can initiate talks on mutually recognising certificates, beginning with the primary level, which could be the first step towards integration of the most basic services.

Agreement on facilitating civilian travel. One of the main challenges faced by civilians in Syria is crossing the frontlines to carry out trade or visit relatives. Currently, this process is at best needlessly slow, unreliable and subject to constantly shifting policies and the whims of military actors on the border. At worst, it can be dangerous, exposing civilians to the risk of unscrupulous smugglers and arbitrary arrest or execution. Over time, security authorities in all areas of control can negotiate the issuance of time-limited entry passes for civilians wishing to enter an area of control with the necessary guarantees that they will not be arrested or hindered if they abide by local laws.

Second, improve governance within the different areas of control. The SCNE agenda is not limited to relations between areas of control but can also address key issues within them. Crossline arrangements will inevitably extend into local area administrations due to their technical and governance requirements, and this will necessitate authorities to improve their capabilities and organisation. Such entry points can then be used to explore where a broader administrative support agenda might come into being. For example, the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) technical directorates and local councils in the Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring areas of northern Syria underperform due to a lack of expertise and capacity. The administrative involvement of Turkish personnel, who are paid double for serving in Syria to plug the gap,[32] has become a financial burden for Ankara. Internationally supported capacity building based on accountable governance principles provides an entry point to negotiate the gradual replacement of Turkish administrators with Syrian counterparts. Such an effort would increase Syrian agency as well as the capacity and legitimacy of local governance.

Similarly, HTS and the SDF have considerable interest in improving local governance in the areas they control in terms of quality (planning and implementation capacity) and legitimacy (representation, perception and social contracts) as a means of stabilisation and attracting aid.[33] Diplomacy based on pragmatic necessities can nudge the calculus of armed groups and their political institutions, hopefully to the point where more legitimate and capable local governance serves their overall goal of self-preservation. While not ideal, such improvements constitute realistic objectives in a complex conflict environment.

It is important to acknowledge that there is less opportunity to enhance local governance and accountability in regime areas. Nonetheless, the regime is still likely to welcome SCNE initiatives that focus primarily on crossline arrangements because it will increase the availability of food and consumer goods from Turkey, secure more robust imports of oil and wheat from the north and east, and create channels for agricultural exports from areas it considers critical to its support base. In the medium term, carefully designed early recovery projects in regime areas and SCNE progress in other parts of Syria might trigger fresh dynamics that can invite the regime to support aspects of the broader SCNE agenda.

Interview with a Turkish researcher, 7 April 2022.
In any case, pragmatic dialogue with HTS is necessary to improve the humanitarian situation in areas under its control and to initiate SCNE-informed projects that empower civil society.