The call for a ‘safe, calm and neutral environment’ (SCNE) has its roots in the Geneva Communiqué of 2012 and UNSCR 2254 of 2015, the latter of which endows the notion with a degree of international legitimacy. However, to this day, SCNE has not been conceptualised by the UN.[27] The twin merit of using SCNE [28] as the basis for a new conflict management strategy is first that it acknowledges UNSCR 2254 as the most internationally legitimate formula for the future reunification of Syria by reconfiguring and upgrading national governance under a new constitution, and second that it recognises that this formula is not feasible at present.
The SCNE agenda is therefore a framework that acknowledges the current reality of Syria’s de facto division, but attempts to develop pragmatic arrangements concerning security, trade and travel that can initiate a transition period ahead of ‘final status’ negotiations that reunify Syria under a reformed government as envisaged in UNSCR 2254. Stimulating crossline aid, trade and movement can advance UNSCR 2254 if it operates from clear normative parameters such as those outlined in Box 3 below.
Syrian negotiated, externally guaranteed, UN endorsed. While guarantees by external stakeholders are required, and the endorsement of the UN is crucial, crossline deals should be negotiated between Syrian parties in direct talks. The experience of the Astana process has shown the limitations of agreements that are negotiated between external actors without the meaningful participations of Syrian parties that have their own interests and red lines. Despite its deficiencies, however, the Astana format can serve as a basis for a wider, UN-endorsed process that includes the US and EU. A precedent already exists: the UN's Constitutional Committee was born out of the Russia-sponsored 2018 Sochi conference.
De-link practical issues from big ticket items. The mechanism for negotiating pragmatic deals to improve ground conditions should not be tied to the Constitutional Committee or any other negotiating format where questions of national legitimacy, state identity, power sharing and other highly contentious ‘big ticket items’ are discussed. Doing so risks conflation between practical concessions and those of high principle.
Like-for-like. While an improvement in ground conditions will involve negotiations between Syrian parties and their regional/international backers, these negotiations should not become an arena for trading concessions on issues that are not comparable. Structural concessions like sanctions relief should not be traded for one-off gestures or token concessions. Instead, baskets of issues should be identified (e.g. re-opening highways, facilitating trade, agricultural exchange, civilian travel) and discussed on their own merits.
Inclusivity and parity. Because of the pragmatic nature of the deals sought, no state or group should be excluded from negotiations, regardless of mutual perceptions. Without this principle, agreements will be inequitable and unlikely to last. Any negotiation mechanism should also assume parity between all sides, including HTS and the SDF. This will go some way towards resolving chronic deficiencies in the current UN-led political process on questions of integrating non-state actors in a future peace process.
Technical proposals first, political agreement later. The starting point of SCNE negotiations should be the initiation of technical talks to identify baskets of crossline issues that can be discussed. Each basket can be addressed separately by a team of experts nominated by each party, after which agreement will be sought from the external stakeholders and relevant local political and security authorities from the Assad regime, the recognised Syrian opposition’s Interim Government, the HTS-affiliated Salvation Government and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. A precedent for this approach exists in Libya where the UN-facilitated 5+5 Joint Military Commission managed to reopen major highways.[29]
International normalisation with Assad is off the table. Bringing the regime back into the international community is outside the scope of a pragmatic conflict management strategy because it is inextricably linked with the more profound question of national legitimacy. Operational engagement with the regime should nevertheless be tolerated for the greater good of improving conditions for civilians.