Introduction
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The search for peace in Syria is in deep crisis. The decade-long UN-led negotiation process, which was originally designed as a multilayered approach to facilitate a political transition, has been reduced to a single dimension. That dimension, the Constitutional Committee,[1] is made up of Syrian regime, opposition and civil society representatives who have held eight fruitless rounds of talks since 2019 to draft a new constitution.[2] The process has reached a dead end because President Bashar al-Assad and his backers, who consider themselves the war’s victors, do not see any need to compromise and because the negotiations in Geneva no longer bear any reality to events on the ground. However, since the Russian-backed Astana process has also ground to a halt, there are currently no alternative negotiation tracks.[3] Diplomatically, the search for peace in Syria is deadlocked.

The diplomatic stasis in Geneva is mirrored on the battlefield. The Turkish-Russian ceasefire signed in March 2020[4] in large part stabilised the conflict, although sporadic clashes persist. But Syria is now divided into three distinct areas: the Russia- and Iran-backed Assad regime controls 60 per cent of the country’s territory and population; the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)/ Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) controls 30 per cent of the territory and 15 per cent of its population, and the Turkey-backed opposition (Syrian National Army (SNA)/Syrian Interim Government (SIG)) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)/Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) control the remaining 10 per cent of the territory and 25 per cent of its population.[5] None of the conflict parties can conduct major military operations without risking defeat or a major regional, or even international, conflagration. As such, the conflict is frozen at the macro level.[6]

Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

While there are few serious prospects for overall change in Syria in the near to medium term, the conflict continues to evolve within the different areas of control in terms of the power relations between competing foreign and armed group interests. This paradox of national conflict stalemate and local conflict evolution represents a new reality that should act as a rallying point to recalibrate Western policy on Syria. If Brussels and Washington maintain their present approach of isolating and sanctioning Assad-held Syria while leaving the different areas of north and east Syria to their own devices, they risk enabling the country’s long-term partition, as well as short-term humanitarian emergencies and growing warlordism in the local war economies. Both of these outcomes run counter to EU and US stated policy objectives.

It is therefore imperative that Western policy makers consider a new conflict management strategy. This strategy must first put currently unsolvable questions of national legitimacy and power sharing on the back burner to focus on more practical issues that can be addressed productively and centre on improving the lives and prospects of Syrian civilians trapped in a frozen conflict. This can be accomplished through meaningful Western support for the development of northern and eastern Syria, beginning with the restoration of the flow of people, education, goods and trade/aid/investment across Syria’s three areas. This report outlines the contours of such a conflict management strategy based on the concept of a safe, calm and neutral environment (SCNE).

Box 1
The UN is clutching at the final straw

Since 2020, the UN Special Envoy for Syria – Geir Pedersen – has been trying to break the diplomatic deadlock by exploring ‘how a broader political process beyond the Constitutional Committee could be constructed’[7] based on a reciprocal set of concessions between the US and Russia. This so-called ‘step-for-step’ approach has yet to be clearly spelled out, although a European diplomat described it as a ‘bazaar’, referring to a lack of clear parameters that define the nature and scope of any concessions.[8] The Syrian Negotiation Commission, the UN-recognised opposition body that represents the opposition in UN talks, has rejected the initiative based on concerns that the regime would be offered structural concessions such as sanctions relief, in return for one-off gestures such as the release of small groups of political detainees or engaging half-heartedly in the Constitutional Committee process.[9] Although it has gained little momentum, the step-for-step approach is likely to live on if no alternatives are introduced.[10] Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has worsened the prospects for ‘step-for-step’ diplomacy, which relies heavily on trust and understanding between Moscow and Washington – something that is currently in scarce supply.[11] The poor performance of the Constitutional Committee process,[12] together with lackluster support for the step-for-step approach,[13] underscores one of the UN’s weaknesses: its inability to devise a meaningful and pragmatic conflict management mechanism. Indeed, in some ways the UN has been given an impossible task of facilitating a peace process without leverage at a time when the Security Council is deadlocked.

We would like to thank Dara Conduit (University of Melbourne) and Erwin van Veen (Clingendael) for their constructive review of this paper. Its contents naturally remain our own responsibility.
For background on the Constitutional Committee, see: Hauch, L., Syria’s Constitutional Committee in Review, The Hague: Clingendael, 2020.
See: link (accessed 8 May 2022).
Hashem, A., Variables of Demographic Identity and How they Affect the Social Fabric, Property Rights and the Return of Refugees, The Day After Association, 2021, p.28.
This status quo is susceptible to external pressures, such as the fallout from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Turkish domestic politics that recently saw the renewal of threats of further incursion into northern Syria. Nevertheless, at this moment in time, a major change in the balance of power seems unlikely. See: Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), 2018, (accessed 4 April 2022), link
See: link (accessed 29 March 2022).
Interview with EU diplomat, 13 January 2022. In a similar fashion, representatives of the EU, the League of Arab States, the US and Turkey did not voice open support for the step-for-step initiative in a joint statement on 3 March 2022, but instead said only that they ‘took note’ of it. See: link (accessed: 22 March 2022).
link (accessed 6 April 202)
One Arab diplomat described ‘steps-for-step’ as a ‘zombie initiative that won’t die until someone kills it’. Interview with Arab diplomat, 19 April 2022.
For example, a European External Action Service (EEAS) diplomat noted that progress on step-for-step diplomacy is unlikely considering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine during the Clingendael event ‘Stabilizing northern Syria: Try for a pragmatic & gradual approach’ on 3 May 2022.
Due to political and legal obstacles, the Constitutional Committee will not be able to produce an amended constitution that can serve as a positive milestone for negotiations. Even though it was aware of that fact early on, the UN nevertheless proceeded with the Committee, hoping that it could become a forum for dialogue capable of producing fresh ideas. This hope has not yet materialised.
Except for the UK and the EU, which have voiced open support for step-for-step, the rest of the Syria Small Group members are quietly doubtful that the approach will work. Few governments have voiced open criticism though for fear of being accused of undermining the UN process.
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Mitigating the risk of drifting from division to partition