Normalisation with the Assad regime continues to be broadly off-limits for major stakeholders like the US, the EU and some members of the Arab League,[14] but cracks in this consensus have nevertheless emerged. The battlefield stalemate, shifts in regional priorities, perceived US disengagement from the region and Assad’s stubborn grip on power have caused some Arab capitals to pursue a cautious re-accommodation with Damascus. This was illustrated most recently by Assad’s trip to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where he was welcomed by the Emirates’ Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum and Abu Dhabi’s then-Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan.[15] Although tangible outcomes, such as the Egypt-to-Lebanon gas deal,[16] remain elusive, Damascus is likely to see such developments as proof that its isolation has a regional expiry date that will eventually both supersede Western demands and the provisions of UNSCR 2254. Indeed, obstinance has proved a useful principle for Assad and his regime in repressing a domestic uprising and fighting an internationalised civil war. But it is less suited to generating stability and development in a conflict frozen at the macro level. Ultimately, obstinance will not enable Assad to reunify Syria or help him address the economic problems that loom large for many Syrians.

Economic and humanitarian hardship[17] in Syria are linked to the country’s territorial division. The separation of the three main areas of control aggravates an already profound socioeconomic crisis by fragmenting the resources, trade flows and initiatives that could help reduce it. [18] In turn, the crisis further solidifies existing divisions because people are forced to turn to the limited services and governance provided by the patchwork of state/semi-state/non-state armed groups present in the places where they live, which reinforces the control of such forces. This dynamic risks turning the de facto division of Syria into a permanent partition, a situation that is seemingly in nobody’s interest given that maintaining Syria’s unity and territorial integrity is one of the few issues on which all conflict stakeholders agree.

In other words, there is a strong political (preventing permanent partition), diplomatic (developing pathways for conflict resolution) and humanitarian (better crisis response) case for prioritising a practical and more local conflict management strategy over a normative and national one. Big-ticket items of identity, national legitimacy and power sharing can be put on the back burner for now: they are important, but not urgent and, anyhow, not resolvable at present. Instead, a practical strategy can structurally alleviate the desperate humanitarian situation in northern Syria, durably improve livelihood prospects, and prevent a further slide towards permanent partition.

The key to a new pragmatic conflict management strategy lies in enabling the movement of aid, goods and people across internal borders in a regulated manner that allows for volume growth, greater transparency in the distribution of revenues, more predictability, and simple collaborative practices between different (armed) groups and parties. It can be designed in a manner that is in the interest of all conflict parties and their backers (see Table 1 below).

Until now, crossline activities have taken place largely in the shadows because they are politically delicate for the warring sides. Any form of engagement with ‘the other’ runs counter to predominant friend-foe patterns and the public rhetoric of those in power. But, of course, such activities already exist and crossline trade constitutes an integral element of the war economy.[19] In its current form, however, crossline trade tends to benefit only those who control frontlines, internal border crossings and smuggling points. Trade volumes and efficiency are constrained by the same dynamics of control that inflate prices for consumers and make doing business a preserve of those ‘connected’ to armed actors.

Take for instance the HTS-affiliated Watad fuel company, which in June 2019 made US$1.67m in net profit selling petrol to consumers in Idlib.[20] Imports from Turkey provide part of what it sells, the rest comes from crude oil purchased from SDF-controlled oil wells in the northeast. On 22 January 2022, it was reported that representatives of Watad met with SDF officials at the Um Julud crossing near Manbij to discuss importing 600 tonnes of crude oil per day at a price of US$120,000.[21] A logistics company affiliated with the Levant Front, the SNA group acting as middleman, will ensure smooth transit through the Euphrates Shield area,[22] for which it will be paid US$500,000 per month. All sides publicly deny the existence of such a deal, but it was nevertheless confirmed by an HTS security source.[23]

Trade relations like this demonstrate that conflict parties can cooperate if the expected pay-off is high enough.[24] But, due to political sensitivities, corruption and the vagaries of the war economy, such deals are shrouded in secrecy and hidden in layers of middlemen who raise costs and pass prices on to consumers, aid agencies or businesses. It also means that the price of fuel in Idlib is high compared with the regime-held areas or even SNA-controlled northern Aleppo.[25] The regime moreover regularly conducts aerial attacks on such crossline trade, most recently in February 2022, which resulted in the destruction of a Watad fuel storage facility west of Aleppo city.[26] Such attacks underscore the need for deals that all conflict parties feel serve their interests. In addition to meeting the ‘self-interest test’ of conflict parties, such deals require negotiation and enforcement mechanisms that are guaranteed by external stakeholders. It is also important that neither the content nor the scope of such deals should undermine UNSCR 2254 as basis for a future political settlement. Bringing deals out into the open through transparent discussions on crossline movement would facilitate greater international scrutiny and would also give civilians on the ground access to information on decisions that affect their livelihoods.