Political attractiveness: Why the SCNE agenda might work | A new conflict management strategy for Syria

The SCNE agenda offers key external stakeholders a way out of the present stalemate. This includes the UN, which can use the agenda as an opportunity to enable backdoor progress on two of the four Geneva negotiation ‘baskets’,[30] namely those on governance and terrorism.[31] This will in turn reduce pressure on the Constitutional Committee to produce quick results and could even revitalise it as a national dialogue forum operating under the legal mandate of UNSCR 2254.

For the US and EU, the SCNE agenda provides an opportunity to develop a more coherent policy on Syria – one that addresses their actual interests rather than their aspirational goals. The SCNE agenda provides a framework that is also likely to resonate with Russia, Iran and Turkey, whose engagement in the Astana process illustrates their tendency to favour pragmatic understandings that do not take normative questions of legitimacy as a starting point. Consultation with actors that are sanctioned, designated terrorist organisations or known for their human rights abuses is politically sensitive. But the intention of SCNE-based strategic engagement and diplomacy is to transform realities that already shape daily life in Syria in a constructive manner. While regional and international concerns need to be addressed, experience shows that pragmatic necessities often outweigh ideological considerations as demonstrated by Washington’s de facto non-aggression approach to HTS, or Ankara’s tolerance of oil exports from SDF-controlled northeast to areas under Turkish control. There is also the bigger picture to consider, since an SCNE agenda can create new conditions in Syria that advance and align major long-term political objectives of key stakeholders, namely refugee returns, stabilisation and more effective governance.

Table 1

A provisional mapping of stakeholder interests in creating an SCNE-based strategy

	Why is SCNE attractive to this party?	Does pursuing it require a change of policy?	Are there specific factors to consider?
United States	Stabilisation and convergence between NW and NE Syria can help de-escalate tensions with Turkey, stabilise NE Syria and strengthen NATO. Ease humanitarian access to, and make developmental assistance and private investment in, NE Syria possible. Maintains relevance of UNSCR 2254 as a basis for future political solution. Reduces pressure to lift sanctions against Assad.	US policy already recognises Syria’s de facto division by virtue of its selective sanctions waivers. It could go further by indicating its willingness to sit alongside Russia, Iran and Turkey in a forum that maps out areas of crossline cooperation based on respective red lines.	Allaying Turkey’s fears about the SDF will require reciprocal and genuine confidence-building measures. The US needs to do more to ensure that Arab allies do not undercut its position by unilaterally normalising their relations with Assad. Linking Ukraine with Syria will not help Syria. The two conflicts are separate and should be treated as such.
European Union	Creates room for convergence between NW and NE Syria, leading to de-escalation of tensions with Turkey. Cooperation with Turkey on refugee resettlement will stem future migration. Provides entry points for dialogue with Turkey and Syrian actors on housing, land and property (HLP) and human rights issues. Enables early recovery programmes with a crossline focus. Maintains relevance of UNSCR 2254 as a basis for future political solution. Reduces pressure to lift sanctions against Assad.	The EU will need to improve relations with Turkey to make any progress on the question of IDP/refugee resettlement. This includes moving beyond stated positions on Turkey’s ‘illegal’ occupation in Syria to something more pragmatic.	The EU’s low-visibility approach to Syria on anything other than humanitarian assistance risks it being left out by the big four (US, Russia, Iran, Turkey). A more political stance is needed. The EU should not allow its position on HLP issues and human rights to slide. This might require a larger diplomatic presence in southern Turkey and possibly northern Syria.
Russia	Provides a practical pathway to negotiations with the US on ceasefires/spheres of influence that recognise Russia’s military investment. Can help unlock EU early recovery funding to regime-held areas, reducing the financial burden of maintaining Assad-held areas. Could become a means of future de-escalation with the West following a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine.	Russia should consider moving away from a military-focused policy in Syria run by army generals and embrace diplomacy that recognises the limits of Moscow's ability to shape the conflict environment and that appreciates the net gains possible from cooperating with other external powers.	A perception of weakness in Syria could encourage the West to escalate in Ukraine. This impression could be counteracted by strong diplomatic engagement by Moscow. Pressurising Assad to make concessions on crossline issues will make Moscow vulnerable to Iranian interests. Moscow should ensure Tehran’s good faith cooperation.
Iran	Provides a means of improving Iran’s relations with the West by demonstrating pragmatism and positive regional influence. Provides a forum that recognises and potentially legitimises Iran’s interests in Syria.	Recent electoral defeats for Iran’s allies in Iraq and Lebanon have shown that Tehran cannot overcome the laws of economics. Its projects in the region cannot thrive by force of arms alone.	Experiences of freezing Iran out of UN talks are negative. Iran is willing and able to spoil deals it is excluded from. Iran has considerable experience in negotiating ceasefires, prisoner swaps and humanitarian access with the armed opposition. Iran is likely to remain distrustful of any international convergence of interest.
Turkey	Unlocks EU financial assistance for Ankara’s stated plans to resettle 1 million Syrian refugees in northern Syria. Recognises Turkey’s sphere of influence in Syria. Reduces and possibly ends YPG/SDF guerrilla attacks against the Turkish military. Provides leverage to Ankara on discussions with the US on the future of the NE. Boosts Turkey’s economy by re-opening land access to Gulf markets.	Turkey’s pursuit of a zero-sum victory against the YPG has paradoxically led to the strengthening of the group. Turkey may want to review this policy as it grapples with a Syria file that is becoming as much domestic as regional. Maintaining a peaceful and prosperous enclave in Syria might present a more realistic goal for Turkish policy.	Turkey’s economic difficulties present opportunities for creative diplomacy. But grand bargains should be avoided in favour of incremental and verifiable transactions. Turkey’s detente with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE has shown Ankara’s reduced room for manoeuver and its need for support. Turkey will hold on to NW Syria until a solution is found that addresses its security concerns.
Assad regime	Provides relief from economic woes. Likely to encourage greater UN humanitarian and early recovery assistance. Potential to develop goodwill with the West that might develop into constructive dialogue. Opportunity to rebuild ties with Arab states.	Assad's declared goal of taking back every inch of Syria militarily is not realistic and should be dropped. The policy priority should be to alleviate humanitarian and economic conditions while working to reunify Syria through political means.	Recognition of, and dealing with, non-state armed actors such as HTS, the SNA and SDF will be highly problematic for Assad, who jealously guards his ‘sovereignty’. Mechanisms to ensure that international funds do not line the pockets of cronies are likely to be rejected.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham	Enhances HTS' standing as a political actor by becoming a partner in multi-stakeholder deals. Improves prospect of more aid to areas of control. Provides opportunity for economic growth in Idlib through commerce and private investment.	Replicating the Gaza model in Idlib is a poor idea that risks further isolating civilians from essential trade and aid. HTS should work to create or contribute to an opposition administration more palatable to Turkey and the West.	The transition of HTS from Al-Qaeda to Sunni Syrian nationalism reflects the determined power-seeking nature of its leader. As long as he remains an agent of stability, he can be constructively worked with in principle.
Syrian Democratic Forces	Enhances SDF as a political actor by becoming a partner in multi-stakeholder deals. Enhances prospect of more aid to its areas of control. Provides opportunity for economic growth in NE Syria through commerce and private investment. Greater ability to push back against a resurgent Islamic State.	Waiting out Erdogan in the expectation that he will lose the 2023 election is not a policy, but a gamble. It would be smarter to offer Turkey a ceasefire and bank on US support to rebuild economic linkages with the rest of Syria.	NW/NE convergence is likely to be resisted by the regime and its backers. A strategy should be in place to confront spoiler tactics. SDF-regime trade, civilian travel and minimum-level security coordination already exists, albeit not formalised.
Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), Syrian Interim Government (SIG), Syrian National Army (SNA)	Opens the door to once again receiving EU/US stabilisation support. Provides a workable political programme to unify the three wings of the Syrian opposition (political, armed, civil society). Makes the goal of merging Idlib into a wider Syrian Opposition Coalition aligned government more likely.	The opposition’s legitimacy should no longer be just about negotiating a political solution in Geneva. Instead, the public narrative should focus on consolidation of opposition-held areas and good governance. Expanding civil society space and promoting democracy, dialogue and human rights are goals in themselves.	Lack of confidence in official opposition bodies is dangerous for the peace process and requires urgent attention. Turkey needs to invest in Syrian agency and allow the SIG to take on more authority. SNA groups should be offered carrots to become responsible security and political actors. Local elections could be one vehicle to accomplish this.