After a large-scale Russian invasion from the north, east and south simultaneously, the conflict is now concentrated predominantly in the east and south of the country, with severe losses on both sides. While President Zelensky and the West continue to strive for a complete and quick victory for Ukraine, and the Kremlin still hopes to militarily impose its will on Kyiv, it seems more likely that the conflict will develop into a stalemate and a protracted war that could last for years.[2] If the pattern of the Donbas conflict of 2014-2022 is followed, temporary ceasefires, during which the forces of both sides regroup, will be alternated by periods of renewed intense hostilities. Possibilities for a temporary truce – being something different from a peace treaty – deminish, and it will not solve the underlying causes of the conflict. In this scenario, the Russian Federation will continue to fight in the east and along the southern coast, with the intention of formalizing its hold on a defensible area and in due course taking new territory – and possibly dividing up Ukraine. Ukraine will also continue to try to recover its own territory through counter-offensives, making use of advanced western weaponry such as long-range artillery to disrupt Russian logistics and supply routes and mobilizing additional military personnel to locally outnumber the Russian occupying forces. Given the military capacities of both parties, the absence of air superiority, and the nature of the terrain (including various rivers), the defending party has a significant advantage. This increases the chance of an eventual stalemate occuring. Much will depend on the degree of western support to Ukraine, given its dependency on western weaponry and financial assistance to cover budget shortfalls.[3] In addition, given Russia’s military strategy, the fighting is associated with large-scale destruction of cities and infrastructure, and with the continuing threat of missile attacks on all of Ukraine.

Consequences for refugee flows

At present, Russia is occupying an estimated 20% of Ukrainian territory, an area roughly three times the size of the Netherlands. The eastern area that sees some of the heaviest fighting is the most densely populated part of Ukraine after the capital Kyiv (see Figure 1). In February 2022, around 11.3 million people lived in the most heavily affected and by now occupied province of Luhansk and partially occupied provinces of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhiya and Kherson.[4] The majority of the present estimated 7 million internally displaced persons and 6.9 million international refugees come from these provinces. Besides these, another 1.1 million people are considering leaving due to the war.[5]

Concerning the factor occupied territory, there are broadly speaking five scenarios that can be distinguished for the ‘end state’ of the conflict.[6] The maps in Figure 1 show the occupied area for each scenario marked in red, with the population density for each oblast prior to the war in shades of green. In the most probable scenario described above, a stalemate with protracted conflict, many refugees will not want to go back to an area occupied by Russia, not least due to the severe Russian repression and reported forced mobilisation of male inhabitants. The persistence of hostilities and the continuing threat of destructive missile strikes on the whole of Ukraine, which undermine attempts to reconstruct, offer other refugees little perspective for return either. Many refugees do want, if in any way possible, to travel back and forth to Ukraine, for example because women are separated from their husbands by the state of emergency and general mobilisation in Ukraine. After a war of attrition lasting for years, it is also possible that men will want to join their spouses outside Ukraine, either if there is a temporary truce and Zelensky cancels the state of emergency, or possibly in defiance of it if the war lasts even longer. The final number of border crossings of this category of men is a very important variable since the number of refugees could rise significantly if the restrictions for this group were removed, making the final number of refugees difficult to predict.

Given the expectations about the course of the war and the most probable final situation, account must be taken of the limited possibilities for large-scale return to conflict-affected areas and of possible new refugee flows from Ukraine.