Visualising the various relationships between countries in Eastern Europe, as well as their ties with regional and global powers, creates an interesting overview of their interrelation and allows for several conclusions.
It immediately becomes clear that the war in Ukraine and Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 form a pivotal point for the geopolitical dynamics surrounding the region but especially for the core countries of our analysis. Before it, their trajectories had been relatively autonomous; it was the post-2022 war that truly crystallised their positions. Understandably, the effects are strongest closer to the epicentre - the Russia-Ukraine war. The consequences of the war and the divide it has caused in Europe are present on a regional and even the global level, sometimes constituting the defining characteristic of certain countries’ attitudes towards not only Russia and Ukraine, but also their perceived allies.
The geopolitical divide has also had its consequences within regional and global political formations. Cooperation across the EU-Russia enmity has become difficult, or even impossible, within forums and organisations – or within regions or themes - that include both, like the Black Sea region discussed in this brief. A result of the rift between Russia and its allies (mainly Belarus) on the one hand, and Ukraine and its supporters on the other has also been an attempted isolation of Russia on the world stage, which in turn led to Moscow’s search for other, alternative, non-Western-led formats. In this regard, Russia found a natural partner in China, which has long been suspicious of Western formats and initiatives and has promoted alternative platforms.
Nevertheless, there are regional and global powers that reject the dichotomy of the Russia-West divide and opt instead for a balancing act between the two, to varying degrees of success. One example within the EU is Hungary. Prime minister Orbán has carved out a space for himself to, at times, remain outside of EU policies regarding Russia and Ukraine, and use this obstructive stance in his own dealings and negotiations with the bloc. Our mapping shows, however, that the benefits of this approach have been somewhat limited. While Hungary’s relations with Russia can be seen as relatively positive and bring some benefits, Budapest’s dealings with Brussels and other European capitals – arguably much more significant for an EU-member state - have suffered.
Two other - external - actors engaging in a similar approach have fared better. Türkiye managed to retain a working relationship with both Russia and Ukraine and thus finds itself in a strategic position that allows for a key role in (past but also potential future) negotiations and mediation. Whether or not such a role materialises depends on more factors than Türkiye’s positioning alone, but that position remains a rare one, as our mapping demonstrates. China, in turn, has also retained some extent of a working relationship with all parties, despite seemingly deepening ties with Russia. It is perhaps China’s physical and political distance to Eastern Europe that allows for this balancing.
Based on this analysis we can offer the following recommendations to EU policymakers:
Continue support for Ukraine and Moldova. Considering EU’s current policy choices, this may seem quite obvious, but it bears repeating: as the clearest and staunchest allies of the EU in the region – as our mapping illustrates - that face the brunt of Russian hybrid and, in Ukraine’s case, military aggression, it is important to secure Ukraine’s and Moldova’s partnership and continued development in terms of democracy and security, for the longer term. Especially considering the potentially shifting US interest in the region, EU’s support becomes crucial. The loss of either country to the Russian influence would potentially be cause for significant concern for the EU in terms of security and reputational damage.
Be aware of the EU’s span of control and influence, and adjust goals, expectations and approaches accordingly. While the EU’s strategy of supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression should be a constant, its tactics in doing so – including the use of various relationships – should be agile and dynamic, differentiating between different actors. The EU has plenty of leverage on a member-state like Hungary, and can and should use it to get an obstructionist member in line. The leverage or influence on some other regional or global actors like Türkiye and China is either much more limited or even non-existent. There should therefore be a differentiated approach and tailormade goals per actor. It is important to acknowledge the unlikeliness of convincing every single capital to join a certain camp. Many “in-between” powers can nevertheless play a positive role in future developments and scenarios.
Point out the risks of a (less successful) balancing act. As discussed in this policy brief, some actors are more successful than others in balancing their different relationships. With those that are less successful – like, for instance, the US and Hungary – the EU is advised to point out the risks of such an approach to steer the actor in question more towards an EU-friendly choice. The way in – and force with - which this is done depends on the actor in question and may require diplomatic skill and finesse.
Consider what constructive role the more successful “balancers” can play in any given scenario and approach them as such. EU policymakers should consider the optimal roles for the actors that do succeed in balancing – like Türkiye and China - including roles like mediator, intermediary and others. Actors that cannot be expected to be greatly influenced by the EU, or forced to choose sides, can still play a constructive role in any number of scenarios and occasions, depending on their strengths and specific relationships to the key powers, and the EU should be aware of this at all times. Agility and flexibility in identifying such opportunities is key. At the same time, it is important to keep track of the extent to which the actor in question is still, in fact, balancing, and not leaning towards Russia. Naturally, such strategies should also include other relevant considerations, like a value-based assessment of any given cooperation format.
Continuously recalibrate EU’s approach to a key Russian ally like Belarus. The country finds itself in a complex position, with contradictory interests: its ever-closer alliance with Russia presents a challenge in terms of securing the country’s autonomy and a modicum of independence. Depending on developments in the region, the EU’s strategic interest towards Belarus can fluctuate between having the country completely isolated, to engaging in some level of rapprochement to peel it away from Russia. The analysis of the EU’s best strategic interest at any given time should not be static, but rather dynamic, depending on factors like the progress of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s strength and stability, US-EU relations, but also internal political developments in Belarus. It is important to keep the entire spectre of instruments at the ready – from complete isolation to rapprochement – and not be afraid to use them instantly if the situation calls for it.
Explore ways in which one country’s positive relationships can play a role in improving others. For instance, Moldova’s positive relationships with practically all EU actors, including Hungary is striking and quite unique, especially when contrasted with Ukraine’s more complex relationships with for example Hungary. Considering Moldova’s complete alignment with Ukraine, it may be worth exploring whether Chisinau can play any sort of mediational or intermediary role in improving Kyiv’s relations with some of the more difficult EU-members. While it is far from given that Chisinau would be accepted in such a role by the actors involved, depending on further developments in terms of Moldova’s security, stability and democracy, as well as its progress on the EU integration path, some space for this may emerge in the future.