Despite a shared history, over the past 20-30 years the paths of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova have diverged dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Belarus, under Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian leadership, aligned with Russia, jointly creating their Union State in 1999 and engaging in far-reaching cooperation in various spheres. Belarus remained closely aligned with Russia based on similarities in their personalistic, authoritarian ruling systems, and Belarus’ dependence on Russia for energy, export and financial support. At the same time, Minsk’s relationship with the EU and its member-states remained an important instrument to counterbalance these dependencies on Russia and create economic development perspectives. The result has been Lukashenka’s attempted balancing act, occasionally playing East and West against each other. Following the January 2020 uprising in Belarus, however, Russia’s support in ensuring Lukashenka’s continued rule, combined with Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation, narrowed Minsk’s space for manoeuvring and tied it in with Moscow more securely. [5] Russia’s use of Belarus territory in launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 locked Lukashenka in further. Some experts in our survey noted increased risks for the loss of the already limited Belarus – and the Lukashenka regime’s – sovereignty. [6] This may have led to Lukashenka’s recent attempt at re-engagement with the West (see below). [7]
Ukraine has undergone several revolutions driven by internal demands – a fight against corruption, calls for democratic reforms – and a geopolitical choice favouring the EU.[8] Several experts in our survey noted the historic nature of the Russia-Ukraine tensions, rooted in Russia’s attempts to keep Ukraine within what it considers its sphere of influence.[9] While segments of the Ukrainian society have already long viewed Russia as an existential threat, the full-scale invasion has erased any remaining pro-Russian sympathies in the Ukrainian public debate, at least in the non-occupied part of the country. Ukraine has tied its fate and future to the West and its supranational structures, like NATO and the EU. The strength of that alignment is largely dictated by the Russian threat, but may also be prone to fluctuation in the longer term, depending, for instance, on the success and speed of Ukraine’s integration into the EU, the state of play at the end of the war, Ukraine’s security and the extent to which Western powers play a role in it.
Historically, Moldova has experienced alternating pro-Russian and pro-European governments, all plagued by the problem of corruption and oligarchic influences. With the rise to power of the current president, Maia Sandu, and her PAS party, the cycle seemed to break in 2019, with a president that not only built her platform around the fight against corruption, but also uniquely boasted a “squeaky clean” reputation. Since then, the Sandu government has been plagued by crises - including the global COVID19 pandemic and several energy crises - peaking with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While Sandu had already set Moldova on a pro-European course, the invasion served as a catalyst, crystallising Chisinau’s position squarely behind Ukraine, in clear condemnation of Russia’s aggression. This stance has caused difficulties in the form of a more hostile Russia, exacerbating the existing complexities of Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria effectively being under Russian protection. Experts in our survey also noted major Russian interference in Moldovan politics, attempts at destabilisation and more. But these developments also accelerated Moldova’s efforts to cut dependencies on Russia, which Chisinau had already been working on, especially in economy and energy.[10] The changes were not without pain, as the cost of the transition added to the economic burden of one of the poorest countries in Europe.
The choices made by the three countries, and especially their roles and attitudes following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, have played a decisive role in shaping their mutual relations. With Moldova and Ukraine forming a strong bond over their shared experience with Russian interference and hostility, Belarus finds itself on the other side of this divide.
While there have always been differences between them, the stark division is a relatively new development: relations between these countries previously largely lacked a strong normative vector. The countries had their common interests as well as irritants, but largely stayed out of each other’s way in their foreign relations, which is perhaps why the region largely lacks an overall cohesion that can be found in other regional contexts, like the Western Balkans.[11] The Eastern European countries’ trajectories had been relatively autonomous and largely unencumbered by their relationships with each other, until the war crystallised their positions.