A final interesting dynamic worth a deeper look is that of the powers that avoid making either/or-choices and manage to balance their approach across the geopolitical divides with some success.[36] Türkiye and China present a case in point in our mapping (figures 13 and 14 respectively).
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Türkiye’s strategic balancing
Türkiye occupies a unique position in the mapping overview, as the only country that has managed to retain generally good, or at least ambiguous - rather than adversarial - relations with all regional actors involved. Turkish foreign policy has gone through some iterations in the past decade(s). The “zero problems with neighbours” policy, as articulated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in the early 2000s, eventually coalesced into quite the opposite: an assertiveness that increasingly used military means to secure Türkiye’s strategic interests in the Middle East and South-Caucasus.[37] However, this also caused friction with other (major) powers, increasingly risking deteriorating relationships. In the 2020s, Ankara began to moderate its official rhetoric and seek rapprochement with traditional rivals in the Middle East, and repair relationships in the mediterranean and the South Caucasus.[38] The importance of a working strategic relationship with Russia, despite their differences, had already become clear following the failed coup of 2016, when Moscow offered its support at a crucial moment in modern Turkish history and for President Erdogan personally.[39]
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Türkiye's efforts at balancing its relationships with all actors involved fit well within its described general foreign policy course. With some countries, specific circumstances allowed for a closer engagement, like the historic and cultural ties with the Gagauz minority in Moldova or the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine.[40] The approach has also put Ankara in a position to play a central role at certain important junctures, like its mediation efforts that brought about the 2023 Black Sea Grain Initiative.[41] Türkiye’s geopolitical balancing and its position as the only significant power in the region with a working relationship with all actors involved puts the country in a position to play a mediating role in the future as well.
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China’s pragmatism
China’s relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus have largely been dominated by economic considerations. China became Ukraine’s largest trading partner in 2019, overtaking Russia.[42] For Moldova, it is a wine importer and exporter of various goods, and Belarus was starting to play an important role as a transit country towards (Western) Europe in China’s Belt and Road initiative before 2022. However, as some observers argue, China’s intrinsic interest in the region should not be exaggerated, and it is that (physical and political) distance that allows Beijing to apply a highly pragmatic approach.[43]
Although Russia’s turn towards the East and its special interest in China can be dated back years before the war in Ukraine, the Russian invasions in 2014 and 2022 accelerated this tendency out of sheer necessity, with Moscow facing increasing isolation from the West after 2022.[44] With Russia’s limited options post-February 2022, the Sino-Russian relationship became increasingly asymmetric, pushing Moscow into the position of junior partner. Beijing, in turn, while seemingly surprised by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as well as Russia’s subsequent failure to ensure a quick victory, has refused to abandon Moscow, instead adopting what some observers refer to as a “pro-Russia neutrality.” [45] This is probably driven by a set of contradictory Chinese interests. On the one hand, Russia constitutes a strategic partner in pushing back US influence in the world. On the other, China’s trade relations with the US and EU are of a crucial strategic value as well. The result is a Chinese balancing act, where Beijing does not want to see Russia lose its war, but is also intent on retaining its economic ties with the US and EU as much as possible. In practice, this translates in Beijing’s continued declared support for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity (including not recognising Russia’s annexations of Ukrainian territories), but also an abstention from condemning Russia’s aggression and deliveries of dual-use goods for the Russian war effort. It also includes calls for a peaceful resolution to the conflict (including a 12-point peace plan in 2023), and an attempt to separate China’s relations with the EU from the Russia-Ukraine conflict as well as from the US-China dealings.[46]