Having looked at the regional shifts, it is time to turn to the global dynamics and the role of great powers like the US and China, as well as the international blocs they lead.
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East vs. West
From the perspective of Eastern Europe and the core countries in our analysis, the war in Ukraine plays an important, but not always decisive role within the global geopolitical dynamic (see figure 8). As the US and China are added to the equation of great power competition, another factor appears: the shifting US position on the global political scene. Under the Trump administration, US foreign policy has been changing in two important directions: from normative to transactional, and from globalist to protectionist. In combination with the unpredictability and volatility emanating from the White House, this has brought uncertainty to the foundations of longtime alliances and blocs. The trans-Atlantic relationship has suffered from this uncertainty, with European leaders engaging in a visible effort to retain the alignment with the US on issues varying from security and defence to the economy and broader diplomacy, especially when it comes to containing or deterring Russia.[24]
The Trump administration seemed to seek a quick end to the war in Ukraine for an increased focus on China.[25] However, with the former proving more difficult than anticipated, and the tariffs introduced in 2025 against almost the entire world driving many (potential) allies into China’s arms, the US seemed to weaken its alliances in Europe and squander (potential) alliances elsewhere.[26] This is reflected in our mapping, with the deteriorating US-China relations, somewhat adversarial US-Russia relations, and only somewhat friendly US-EU relations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the relations between the Western-oriented core countries Ukraine and Moldova are stronger with the EU than with the US. In addition to the physical proximity and naturally more intensive neighbourly relations, Trump’s volatility, especially vis-à-vis Ukraine and its president Zelensky, has undoubtedly played a role.
In this regard, Belarus presents an interesting case. After we conducted the survey underlying the mapping, and as of the time of this writing, the US-Belarus relationship seems to be undergoing a thaw. Just before the August 15 Alaska summit with Putin, Trump called Lukashenka – an unprecedented event – afterwards referring to him as “highly respected president” and “a powerful leader.” The call followed the June release of prominent Belarus opposition leader Syarhei Tsikhanouski after US envoy Keith Kellogg visited Minsk. In September 2025, Belarus released a further 52 political prisoners, including foreign nationals, in return for easing US sanctions on Belavia, the Belarusian national airline.[27] The positive trajectory of the US-Belarus relations bears benefits for both sides, with Lukashenka gaining unprecedented legitimisation by a previously antagonistic world power, and the Trump administration perhaps seeking quick wins and a positive momentum for negotiations with Putin.[28] If this tendency continues, the US-Belarus relationship could enter a more positive era. Here as well, however, the volatility of the Trump administration causes a great degree of unpredictability.
The Blocs
To explore the great power dynamic a bit deeper, it helps to consider the region, and specifically the core countries of this study, from the perspective of the various relevant international blocs.
On the Western side of the equation, the most relevant and prominent international organisations are the EU and NATO. In general, the NATO members’ relationship with the core countries reflects the bigger Russia-US/EU rift over the war in Ukraine. An interesting aspect concerns the relations between neighbouring Belarus and Poland, featuring the only border between NATO and a Russian ally represented in this mapping. The geopolitical alignment undoubtedly plays a role in the strongly adversarial and quite intense relationship between Belarus and Poland, along with their more concrete friction related to the migrant crisis of 2021,[29] the September 2025 incidents involving Russian drones flying into Polish airspace from Belarus territory[30] and the Polish military buildup in a tense climate surrounding the Zapad 2025 Russian-Belarus military exercises.
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When it comes to EU integration, the relations of the EU and its members with Moldova and Ukraine generally reflect the alignment of the latter two with the West and against Russia that largely precedes 2022 but was intensified by the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. An interesting context is the Ukraine-Moldova-Hungary triangle. The Ukrainian-Hungarian relationship has long been prone to friction and irritations, mostly related to the issue of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, regularly brought up by Hungary’s Orbán, and the latter’s obstructing of EU support for Ukraine, Kyiv’s EU membership bid and EU sanctions against Russia.[31] Interestingly, however, this does not seem to affect the Moldovan-Hungarian relationship, despite Moldova’s far-reaching alignment with Ukraine on issues of security and EU integration. In fact, in contrast to his stance vis-à-vis Ukraine, Orbán has been a vocal supporter of Moldova’s EU-bid. In general, many experts in our survey noted the enormous positive momentum in Moldova’s relationship with the EU, strongly connected to the war in Ukraine, with some pointing to the possibility that this momentum could pass.[32]
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Turning to the Eastern side of the equation, Russia seems to be in search of alternative supranational formats that could counter the influence of the Western-led ones. Regionally, this effort has resulted in the development of the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Belarus is the only other member represented in our mapping. Globally, this search for alternatives occurs in the context of Russia’s efforts at deepening relations with non-Western actors of some weight in the international arena, China being the most important one. As some of those actors are considered to be spoilers of the Western-led international rules-based order, the term “axis of upheaval” has been used to describe their cooperation, mainly referring to Russia, China, Iran and North-Korea.[33]
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While there is certainly a varying degree of cooperation among the four countries, at least bilaterally, the term perhaps implies more coherence than can really be observed. Our mapping demonstrates this to some extent, when looking specifically at the Russian and Chinese relationships with Eastern Europe (see figure 11). Despite the outward signalling of a warm Sino-Russian friendship, it does not entirely translate into corresponding attitudes towards Eastern Europe and our core countries. China’s relationship with Eastern Europe will be discussed in more detail below, but the difference is undoubtedly at least partly due to the actual physical and political distance involved.
A more tangible supranational format pushed by both Russia and China, is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO, see figure 12). According to the Mercator Institute for China Studies, institutions like the SCO present a useful platform for Moscow and Beijing “to strengthen their strategic coordination and build a new narrative to reshape global order.”[34] Since its establishment in 2001, the SCO has broadened its membership base and external engagement. With Türkiye as an observer member and the addition of Belarus as a full member in 2024, the organisation’s reach now extends into Europe and its neighbourhood. At the same time, some observers question the platform’s effectiveness and relevance.[35]