Western Dominance Challenged
Since the establishment of the International Telegraph Union (ITU) in 1865,[1] countries have sought to coordinate and cooperate on standardisation in multilateral settings. From the outset, these international standardisation bodies were largely dominated by Western powers. The development of the internet, for example, was led by the United States (US), while Europe dominated mobile communication networks, up until their fourth generation (4G).[2]
A country’s position in standardisation is largely defined by its technological capabilities. China’s emergence in recent decades as a technological powerhouse was thus set to redefine the balance of power in standardisation. Beyond this natural shift, China’s shaking of the system is strengthened by its unique approach of state-directed strategic planning and company-level engagement, anchored in its comprehensive ‘China Standards 2035’ strategy, announced in 2018 – and adopted three years later with the National Standardisation Outline.[3] The Chinese government’s strategic push is further reinforced by its ‘Made in China 2025’ industrial policy and promoted internationally through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – and in particular, its Digital Silk Road (DSR).
China, once only a follower in technology development, played a decisive role in contributing to 5G standards in the 2010s. With Huawei as a leader in the sector, China actively participated in the main international collaboration body for mobile network standardisation: the 3GPP.[4] Huawei’s global market share in 4G and 5G networks has grown significantly, supported by the Chinese government’s foreign push through the BRI. Huawei’s substantial contributions to 3GPP standards have enhanced its influence in the telecommunications sector and reinforced its capacity to reinvest in research and development for future technologies, such as 6G.
The cooperative nature of telecommunications has historically required alignment among global competitors. Nonetheless, China’s efforts to weigh in more strongly are notable, and the increased presence of Chinese officials and companies has deepened competitive and normative differences between participants. The standardisation bodies that were mostly regarded as technical in nature have thereby gradually become seen more and more as political organisations too.
The Structure of this Report
This report examines the growing significance of standardisation and the shifts in standardisation governance that have occurred over the past decade. It starts with a brief history of standardisation, to explain how the issue has been increasingly politicised and why the European Union (EU) and the Netherlands need to act to protect and promote their interests. This is especially urgent given that the EU’s 2022 Standardisation Strategy, while commendable for elevating the political relevance of standards, still lacks robust mechanisms for enforcement and coordination. Its success largely depends on the actions of EU Member States, many of which have yet to develop comprehensive national approaches to technical standardisation.
The report starts from a discussion of the role of international standard-setting organisations, governments and industry stakeholders in developing standards; the balance between regulatory frameworks and market-driven approaches; and how the great powers have influenced standard-setting. It then turns to two industry snapshots of the domains of telecommunications and the internet, and electric vehicle (EV) chips. These testify to China’s emergence in the global arena of standards-setting, given the strategic value and geopolitical, economic and technological implications of these domains. After all, telecommunications and the internet form the backbone of critical infrastructure, underpinning today’s digital economy and even our modern way of living. EV chips underscore the role of supply chains, green industrial policy and technological ecosystems. Developments in EV chips are of particular relevance to the Netherlands, given the country’s strong industrial base: with the global leader of semiconductor machinery equipment (ASML) and several EV chip manufacturers (notably NXP). Drawing on these insights and lessons from the industry snapshots, this report offers a targeted roadmap for Dutch and European policymakers and standardisation bodies. It provides concrete policy recommendations aimed at strengthening Europe’s strategic approach to standardisation – linking it more directly to recent industrial policy goals and economic security priorities.
The State of Play in Europe
The European Commission’s 2022 Standardisation Strategy marked a shift in the EU’s view of standardisation. The strategy responds to a growing awareness that Europe is falling behind in shaping international standards, particularly in comparison to assertive moves by China. The strategy lays out five core priorities: anticipating standard needs in key tech sectors like chips, data interoperability and hydrogen; improving the governance and inclusiveness of the European standardisation system; reinforcing international leadership in key technologies, while promoting EU core values; better linking research and innovation to standard-setting; and cultivating the next generation of experts. While its ambition is clear, the strategy’s success largely depends on effective action by EU Member States – an area where progress so far has been limited.[5]
Important changes have followed since 2022, including the launch of a High-Level Forum to steer EU priorities, updates to Regulation (EU) 1025/2012 to enhance public control over harmonised standards, leading to the changes in the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) governance mentioned above, a ‘standardisation booster’ initiative to link EU-funded research to European Standards Organisations (ESOs) technical committees, and a code of practice to raise awareness about and engagement with standardisation.[6]
While the strategy has aligned standardisation efforts with the EU’s broader policy goals, Europe’s ability to act strategically remains hindered by fragmented participation in international standardisation organisations and limited representation in global technical leadership roles. Unlike China’s state-coordinated mirror committee system, which allows for fast alignment on international positions, the EU’s bottom–up, consensus-based approach, while democratically robust, can lack agility and coherence.
The role of EU Member States is particularly pivotal but underdeveloped. Although the European Commission has urged national governments to adopt dedicated standardisation strategies and better support the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), academia and civil society, most countries have yet to respond with substantive plans or investments. This leaves insufficient implementation and risks deepening the disconnect between EU policy ambitions and on-the-ground influence in standard-setting forums. Without addressing these coordination and capacity gaps, the EU’s geopolitical aspirations in standardisation will remain unrealised.
In the recently released Competitiveness Compass, the European Commission only briefly mentions the importance of accelerating and improving access to the standard-setting process. The Compass offers no concrete policy initiative or investment plan to address the rapidly evolving global standardisation landscape. Once a leader in global standard-setting, the EU must revive its position in global standardisation.