Long regarded as a technical afterthought, standardisation has evolved into a central lever of geopolitical influence and element of industrial strategy. As is often remarked in standardisation circles, ‘whoever owns the standard, owns the market’.[75] China’s deliberate integration of standardisation into its technology, industrial and foreign policies is elevating the country from a standards-taker to a standards-maker. This transition is facilitated by the orchestration of public and private actors, strategically coordinated interventions in international standard-setting bodies and concentrated investments in sectors such as telecommunications and EV chips.

By contrast, Europe all too often treats standardisation as a predominantly technical matter. Despite a strong industrial base, deep experience in international standardisation and renewed political attention by way of the 2022 European Standardisation Strategy, the EU and its Member States lack a coordinated, strategic and long-term approach. The result is a fragmented landscape marked by reactive behaviour and underinvestment – both in terms of material resources and institutional capacity. This undermines Europe’s ability to shape the global rules of tomorrow’s industrial and digital economies. If standards define the playing field, then failing to shape them means competing on terms set by others.

The answer does not lie in isolationism. The right balance between asserting the interests of European countries and companies and ensuring interoperability and interdependence with other countries and regions differs between sectors. Strengthening Europe’s influence means deepening alliances with countries that share normative interests and concerns – such as Japan, South Korea and the UK – while simultaneously investing in domestic capabilities, aligning EU Member State efforts, and stepping up engagement in global standard-setting bodies.

For the Netherlands and the EU alike, reclaiming leadership in standardisation demands a shift in mindset. Standardisation must be seen not as an isolated technical task but as a core element of technological, industrial and foreign policy. This requires long-term planning, robust public–private coordination, and the political will to focus on areas where Europe has the capacity to lead and define the standards of the future.

Five interconnected levers for action can be drawn from the insights from this analysis of the evolving dynamics of standardisation – particularly China’s strategic approach – and two industry snapshots on telecommunications and the internet and on EV chips. These levers offer a framework to rebalance European influence by: setting clear priorities (programming); advocating European positions globally (promoting); defending against adverse norms (protecting); forming strategic alliances (partnering); and improving internal mechanisms (process).

The proposed Blueprint for Action on Standardisation calls for:

Time is of the essence. By making standardisation a foundational pillar of its geopolitical and industrial agendas, Europe still has the agency to influence the global technological order – rather than to be shaped by it.