Standards are documented and reproducible technical specifications that are typically adopted voluntarily, produced in a described procedural manner and accessible under defined conditions. They enable the organisation of production and the exchange of goods and services.[7] Technical standards ensure interoperability between networks and devices, allow for their quality control and safety when using them. In telecommunications, for instance, they define the processes that enable different technologies to connect with each other, facilitating communication and data exchange.

In some countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, the term ‘normalisation’ (in Dutch: normalisatie) is used to refer to the standardisation process when this is conducted and facilitated at the national level by a national standardisation body (NSB), such as NEN in the Netherlands or DIN in Germany. The outcome of such processes is referred to as a norm. For consistency with common English usage, this report uses the term ‘standardisation’ rather than ‘normalisation’.

Multilateral Collaboration

International coordination and collaboration by states and companies on standardisation take place in dedicated bodies, best known as standards development organisations (SDOs). At the international level, they are traditionally led by states in so-called formal SDOs, like the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Formal SDOs produce or adopt technical standards that have formal recognition by the states that endorse those bodies. The voting rights in the ITU follow the principle of ‘one country, one vote’, which means that each member state has equal voting power, regardless of its size or technological capacity. In the case of the ISO and IEC, voting rights are exercised by NSBs that represent the states (one NSB per state), rather than by states per se. These organisations follow a more complex voting model: votes on standards are typically cast by NSBs designated as ‘participating members’ (P-members) or ‘observing members’ (O-members), with P-members having formal influence over the development of standards.

Since the 1980s, given the increasingly private nature of key tech sectors – including telecommunications and the internet – and the rise of an increasingly dynamic and powerful private sector, a parallel class of SDOs has emerged – known as quasi-formal SDOs. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), for instance, is a well-known quasi-formal organisation, recognised for its contribution to the development of the internet. Standards produced by quasi-formal SDOs are not officially endorsed by states, and individuals and companies can participate and vote directly. Nonetheless, the importance of quasi-formal SDOs is comparable to that of formal SDOs in terms of developing well-established technical standards that are recognised and followed by the private sector for reasons discussed below. Formal SDOs can – and often do – adopt standards developed by quasi-formal SDOs as their own.

When standards are incorporated into legislation at the national or regional level (such as the EU), they become de jure standards. The adoption of USB Type-C as a common charging port, as described in Box 1 below, illustrates how a widely used technical specification, developed by the private sector, can become legally required once incorporated into EU law.[8] There are also proprietary, de facto standards, which emerge when industry players widely adopt them.[9] Figure 1 clarifies these concepts and their interrelationship.

Source: Authors’ compilation.

In times of rapid technological development, de facto standards gain traction. They emerge as specific companies build (global) market share and set standards before regulatory frameworks are established. Microsoft’s operating system and Google’s search algorithms are examples of de facto standards. In practice, over the past four decades, the relative influence of (Western) states in standard-setting has declined as private sector actors have increasingly shaped quasi-formal and de facto standards.

The Rise of Private Actors

Amid the growing role and influence of private companies in standardisation, current standardisation mechanisms – both in formal and quasi-formal SDOs – may be said to lack democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy in this context refers to the inclusion of public-interest perspectives, transparent decision-making and accountability to citizens and consumers, who are ultimately affected by the standards in everyday technologies. Yet many standardisation processes are dominated by corporate actors, with limited involvement from civil society or governments. This argument is amplified by the rise of quasi-formal SDOs over the past four decades. But even NSBs, which represent states in international SDOs, are mostly funded by private-sector memberships.[10] As a result, both formal and quasi-formal organisations are essentially led by the private sector, rather than public mandates.

Industry and businesses generally prefer to work via quasi-formal bodies because they are quicker and more agile, while formal SDOs provide the political setting and procedural legitimacy that states seek. Formal and quasi-formal SDOs coexist and, at times, compete in developing standards.

The shift from traditional intergovernmental organisations to more flexible governance schemes, embodied by quasi-formal SDOs, reflects a broader trend towards new modes of governance. One such mode is orchestration,[11] where public actors coordinate intermediaries to achieve governance outcomes without direct control. This framework helps to describe China’s approach to standardisation, in which tech companies and industrial consortia play an active role in advancing policy objectives and carry out decision-making on behalf of the Chinese state.

Great powers, notably China, and the biggest private-sector companies have come to see standards as a strategic asset to introduce and enforce their worldview and economic power and preferences via technical means. China’s ‘New Internet Protocol’ (or New IP) proposal, discussed in Section 4.1 of this report on Telecommunications and the Internet, is a case in point.

As the so-called Global South increasingly demands a stronger voice in global decision-making, and new groupings such as BRICS and the G77 promote alternative models of global governance, it becomes essential to understand the role of standardisation – politically and technologically. Standardisation depends on international cooperation – between states, companies and institutions. From this point of view, China’s active participation in international SDOs can be seen as a constructive contribution. However, ongoing geopolitical shifts – with an increasingly affirmative China on the one hand and the US under President Trump II that looks more inwards on the other – make standardisation, often an overlooked theme, an important geopolitical arena. Amid such geopolitical change, standardisation adds an additional layer of complexity in power dynamics and in how those affect the Netherlands and Europe.

2.1 The International Landscape

This section offers a concise overview of the landscape of SDOs at the global, EU and national levels. Figure 2, below, presents a schematic overview, with a focus on the US and China, next to the EU and the Netherlands.

Global Standardisation Organisations

The three key formal SDOs with global membership are the ITU (for technical standardisation, incorporated into the UN in 1947 as its first specialised agency), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC, for electrical engineering and electronic technology) and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO, for industrial products and processes, excluding telecommunications and electrical/electronic fields, which are covered by the other two organisations).

When it comes to quasi-formal SDOs on telecommunications and internet-related matters, the key bodies include the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). While IEEE covers a broad range of technologies, the latter three are particularly focused on the development and governance of internet protocols, architecture and naming systems. These organisations closely resemble formal SDOs, having gained comparable status and influence in standards-setting. Indeed, they are increasingly preferred for their faster, more streamlined adoption processes, direct industry involvement and better responsiveness to innovation and market trends. However, voting procedures in quasi-formal SDOs differ significantly from those of formal ones. In these bodies, voting rights are generally based on individual or organisational participation rather than state representation. For instance, in the IETF, decisions are made by ‘rough consensus’ rather than formal votes.[12] At the W3C, votes are usually conducted within working groups where each member organisation typically has one vote, and consensus is encouraged.[13] The IEEE employs a more structured voting process, where individuals participate as members in working groups and vote during various stages of the development of standards.[14] In all cases, active participation and technical contribution are essential for influencing outcomes.

EU and National Standardisation Bodies

Besides international SDOs, standardisation organisations exist at the regional and national levels too. At the European level, European Standardisation Organisations (ESOs) are formal bodies guiding standardisation efforts. One example is the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which contributed to the development of some of the first digital mobile telecommunications standards. The other two ESOs are the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), which develops standards in a broad range of sectors excluding electrotechnical fields, and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC), which focuses specifically on electrical and electronic engineering.

Since its creation in 1988, ETSI has provided a platform for direct industry participation in the standards’ development process. Over recent years, criticism and concerns have been raised about the influence of Chinese and American companies on ETSI’s decision-making. In response, and following recommendations outlined in the 2022 European Standardisation Strategy, governance reforms were introduced to strengthen European oversight via NSBs and reduce the sway of non-European actors within the organisation.[15] CEN and CENELEC allow industry participation exclusively through national standardisation bodies.

Roughly 20 per cent of the standards developed by ESOs result from formal requests by the European Commission to support regulations in the public interest, such as hENs. Once cited in the Official Journal of the European Union, hENs grant a ‘presumption of conformity’ with the corresponding essential legal requirements set out in EU legislation. In practice, this allows manufacturers using hENs to demonstrate compliance more easily and benefit from access to the internal market without undergoing additional conformity assessments.[16]

Voting procedures vary across the ESOs. In CEN and CENELEC, voting rights are held by the NSBs of EU and European Free-Trade Association (EFTA) countries, following a weighted voting system based on population size and pre-determined approval thresholds.[17] In contrast, ETSI operates on a direct membership model, where companies, research institutions and public authorities participate directly. In ETSI, voting is generally conducted on a ‘one member, one vote’ basis within Technical Committees, although some decisions use weighted voting depending on membership category.[18]

At the national level, NSBs are in charge and represent countries’ positions in international bodies. NEN is the Dutch national standardisation body.[19] NSBs identify market needs for standards and typically address these in three ways: by developing new national standards using a technical committee representing relevant stakeholders; by adopting existing international standards; or by participating in international technical committees with national experts to jointly develop standards. NSBs contribute to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI to coordinate their efforts and support harmonised European standards.[20]

This multitude of organisations not only reflects the complex nature of standardisation but also its growing geopolitical importance. Standard-setting has evolved into a competitive arena where standards-makers seek to consolidate their technological primacy.

Figure 2 shows a non-exhaustive graphical representation of the global SDO landscape, with a focus on Europe, the US and China.

Source: Authors’ compilation. Please note that there is a geographical and hierarchical nature to these organisations, moving up from the national level, to the regional level, to the global level.

2.2 From Economics to the Geopolitics of Standardisation

Geopolitical competition plays out in the different governance models used to develop standards. Broadly speaking, the US follows a predominantly market-driven model, where firms shape standards through their global market leadership. The EU is best characterised as a mixed model, combining private-sector input with oversight by public institutions. However, the EU and its Member States have so far struggled to mobilise effectively and significantly private-sector actors to engage strategically in global standardisation efforts. In contrast, through a state-led approach, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plays a directive role in setting and promoting standards.[21] While the US and EU have historically relied on innovation-driven influence, China is the first to implement a comprehensive national strategy to shape global technical standardisation. This assertive model is increasingly viewed as a geopolitical challenge by European and American actors.

The differences between governance models to develop standards matter. Standards-setting has ramifications across a wide range of domains, as standards structure the economy and technical characteristics of each and every domain they cover. Over recent decades, largely unnoticed, technical standards have been a driving force behind globalisation. As well as ensuring the safety and interoperability of products and services, standards facilitate international trade by reducing transaction costs and providing unified frameworks to prevent market fragmentation. Originally designed to maintain quality in particular sectors, standards have evolved to regulate safety and become regulatory tools that establish the ‘rules of the game’ for economic actors.[22]

The harmonising nature and regulatory influence of standards were reinforced by the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, signed in 1994 by over 130 nations under a World Trade Organisation (WTO) Treaty. The TBT Agreement advanced the internationalisation of standards by encouraging WTO members to base technical regulations on them. While the Agreement does not make standards themselves legally binding, it promotes their use in domestic regulation.[23] Furthermore, the agreement established a framework enabling WTO members to challenge another member’s technical regulations, if perceived as unnecessary obstacles to trade, through the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. While the WTO does not create technical standards itself, it promotes the use of internationally agreed standards to reduce trade barriers and ensure fair regulatory practices.[24]

Although the benefits of standards and international harmonisation for trade are well recognised, critics often highlight their potential negative impact on innovation. Standardisation may limit alternative approaches, potentially stifling the emergence of new and improved solutions. It may also create barriers to market access and foster lock-in effects.[25] The QWERTY keyboard layout is often cited as an example of status quo bias, where a non-optimal de facto standard persists because of high conversion costs and user familiarity, despite the potential availability of more ergonomic designs.[26]

However, this represents only one side of the story, as standardisation can also provide a significant foundation for innovation and progress. A notable distinction exists between national and international standards. Studies suggest that, in a globalised economy, national standards tend to restrict innovation, whereas international standards foster it.[27] While both types of standards incur compliance costs, international standards help to reduce the costs associated with commercialising an innovative product across multiple markets, because they reduce or eliminate the need to adapt products to differing national specifications and certification procedures. This streamlining allows firms to scale faster, access global supply chains more efficiently and avoid duplicative compliance burdens.

In fact, the relationship between technology standards and innovation is best understood in how they mutually impact each other in the short and long term: developing standards prepares the markets, while missing standards can close them. In the short term, standards help to set expectations, compatibility and guidelines that enable new technologies to enter and grow in the global market. Without these standards, innovations might struggle to gain acceptance, slowing or even preventing their adoption. In the long term, established standards shape the direction of innovation, guiding development along certain paths and sometimes restricting it in others.

Five Power Dimensions of Standardisation

A country’s technological leadership significantly shapes its influence in international standardisation. This is illustrated by the shifting balance of power from traditionally dominant actors like the EU, US and Japan to emerging players like China.[28] Moreover, the creation or revision of standards results in ‘winners and losers’.[29] Standards are a source of power that stretches in various dimensions, as Figure 3 shows.

Source: S. Lüdtke’s compilation, based on Tim Rühlig, The Shape of Things to Come: The Race to Control Technical Standardisation, 2021.

First, there is an ideational dimension. Standards influence global reputation and soft power, shaping perceptions of technological leadership and values. This is exemplified by debates around China’s ‘New Internet Protocol’ proposal in 2019, which sparked international concerns over surveillance and digital governance. Standards also raise ethical implications, especially in areas like data privacy and state control.

Second, standardisation has a legal dimension. Standards serve as benchmarks for non-tariff trade barriers, affecting over 80 per cent of global trade.[30] They are frequently referenced in national regulations, providing legal certainty and ensuring compliance across jurisdictions.

Third, there is a political dimension. Technical standards create long-term dependencies and lock-in effects, which may have serious geopolitical consequences. Set against this context, China’s Digital Silk Road initiative has raised national security and strategic concerns. With its government push, Huawei positioned itself at the forefront of 5G infrastructure rollouts in countries like South Africa, Indonesia and Cambodia.[31] Cybersecurity standards are another critical area, with emerging technologies like quantum-secure communication posing both risks and opportunities.[32]

Fourth, there is an economic dimension. Standards influence trade by harmonising regulations and reducing technical barriers, as divergent product standards remain a major obstacle to international commerce. They also affect costs, including patent licensing fees and compliance expenses. Companies that fail to establish their technology as a global standard face adaptation costs to comply with dominant alternatives. The German standardisation body DIN notes that standards foster efficiency and innovation, contributing to broader economic growth.[33]

Fifth, there is a technological dimension. High-tech standards drive innovation by enabling collaboration among experts and aligning with cutting-edge research. They improve the market success of new technologies and are closely tied to Standard Essential Patents (SEPs), which influence licensing models and industrial policy.[34] Companies that lead in standards-setting can not only avoid adaptation costs but also earn royalties from SEPs – enhancing both competitiveness and their economic advantage.[35]

Ownership of core technologies also confers strategic power in standardisation, particularly from a security perspective. Developers of a technology have detailed knowledge of its workings – including potential vulnerabilities. Once a technology becomes an international standard, it is widely adopted across borders, giving the original developers potential insight into flaws that could be exploited to undermine the security of others, raising serious national security concerns. Although not directly related to standards, this concern underpins the bans or restrictions imposed by the US and several European countries on equipment and digital infrastructure from Chinese companies such as Huawei, ZTE and Alibaba.

The following section explores China’s rise in the past decade as a standardisation power along these five dimensions. Its expanding technological prowess, together with its state-led model, have helped to reshape the rules of the standardisation game.