3D 'The Next Generation'
Lessons learned from Uruzgan for future operations
The report finds that, although different focus group participants have different ideas on the definition of the 3D approach and take different positions towards it, there is a general broad understanding of what it is, and a belief that coherence is in principle positive. The research shows how the concept of the 3D approach, pushed by Dutch the parliament in order to gain broad support for the mission, evolved on the ground and how it gradually increased the coherence of the policies and actions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and a number of NGOs. The year 2008, in particular, was a turning point following increased civilian presence in the field. The report attempts to map the type and degree of coherence between the different organisations and finds that, within the 'broader 3D approach', there were many different forms of interaction between a number of organisational units. Each interaction had its own distinct issues and its own level of coherence. Moreover, the level of coherence differed according to the level at which it took place - strategic or headquarters versus operational or field - and changed in most cases towards more cohesion during the mission.
The report shows that there were many coherence strengths in the mission in Uruzgan, but also that there is room for further improvement in future missions, and dilemmas and pitfalls to avoid. It is remarkable that, despite a relatively long list of weaknesses and threats, in the end general opinion is that the comprehensive approach has a future. This can partly be explained by the overriding importance attached to the strength "The whole is more than the sum of its parts". Moreover, a significant number of weaknesses and threats in fact underline that further coherence is needed, and that the 3D approach as used in Uruzgan was not coherent enough. All these positive perceptions should not, however, bury a number of potential serious pitfalls to further coherence in a future Dutch comprehensive approach. Some of these pitfalls can be addressed and avoided. Others are unfortunately inherent to further coherence and remain dilemmas that have to be faced in the design and implementation of missions.
Finally, the report distils five factors that determine the success or failure of comprehensive approaches: business economy (cost-benefit factors); institutional factors (whether mandates, goals and objectives are complementary or shared), organisation cultural factors (whether those involved have common values and views); environmental factors (the context in which the conflict is taking place); and individual factors (the chemistry between the personnel involved). The more these factors are dealt with and the better they are lived up to the greater the chance of success.
