Rivalry without enmity: The evolution of Turkish views on Iran

By Salim Çevik, Visiting fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Center for Applied Turkey studies

Editor’s introduction

In September 2022, the death of Mahsa Jina Amini marked a major turning point for Iran. The event sparked lengthy nationwide protests across socio-economic classes and population groups whose demands rapidly evolved from discarding controversial hijab regulations to calls for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. The Iranian government responded with repression, killing over 400 protesters in late 2022 and early 2023, according to human rights groups. The protests of January 2026 both reflected and reinforced the negative spiral of government underperformance and legitimacy, as well as increasing the external and internal pressures on the government of Iran that also characterized the protests of 2022/2023.

The Clingendael blog series ‘Iran in transition‘ explores power dynamics in four critical dimensions that have shaped the country’s transformation since 2022: state-society relations, intra-elite dynamics, the economy, and foreign relations. This blog assesses Turkish foreign policy and security views of Iran. Based on an analysis of evidence for the contemporary period, it concludes that Turkish foreign policy has typically sought to keep unavoidable rivalry – e.g. due to geography and parity - within manageable bounds.

Turkish geopolitical views of Iran

Turkey's view of Iran has long been shaped by strategic duality. Ankara sees Iran as one of its most longstanding regional competitors, but only rarely as an outright enemy. Iranian influence across the Middle East is interpreted in Turkey through a competitive lens. As a result, Iranian setbacks are considered as potential geopolitical openings for greater Turkish influence. At the same time, Turkish policymakers have consistently avoided framing Iran as a threat that must be defeated or destroyed. Iran is typically perceived instead as a rival to be managed and contained. This conclusion is mostly the result of a simple cost-benefit calculation in the sense that Ankara understands that the same structural factors that generate competition also make escalation costly. Understanding this logic requires looking beyond day-to-day diplomacy and examining the deeper structural, ideological and geopolitical factors that have shaped Turkish perceptions of Iran over time.

Turkish strategic thinking about Iran has historically resulted from three overlapping policy frames that together underpin this strategic duality. First, Iran is viewed through a lens of structural parity: a neighboring regional power that cannot easily be dominated and hence must be balanced. Second, and because of this ‘fact’, Turkish policymakers tend to approach Iran through a logic of managed competition. Third, ideological shifts in either country periodically reshape how the two states perceive one another, sometimes turning Iran into a perceived ideological or security challenge for Turkey, and at other times opening space for pragmatic engagement. These frames have evolved over time, but together they have consistently shaped how Turkish political and security elites view Iran and shape policy responses toward it.

Structural parity limits rivalry

Discussions of Turkey and Iran almost invariably begin with a well-known historical observation: the border between the two countries has remained essentially unchanged since the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin of 1639, making it one of the longest-established borders in the world. This is sometimes interpreted as evidence of unusually peaceful relations, which is misleading. What the longevity of the border reveals instead is two neighboring powers that have historically been unable to subordinate one another. Rather than reflecting the absence of conflict, the long-established border reflects the persistence of structural parity between the two states. This balance of power is an enduring structural parameter that shapes the relationship. It continues to influence how Turkey views Iran today.

Structural parity is reinforced by the fact that Turkey and Iran are both post-imperial states with regional ambitions that operate across multiple geopolitical arenas. Their spheres of influence intersect most clearly in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. This has produced a distinctive pattern in Turkish perceptions of Iran that combines suspicion with caution that seeks to avoid open conflict. Unlike Iran's relations with Israel, Turkish Iranian relations have seldom been framed in terms of survival or annihilation. The relationship has instead been characterized by controlled rivalry punctuated by limited periods of pragmatic cooperation. 

The Kurdish question: cooperation under suspicion

In their broader relationship, however, one security issue dominates all others, namely the Kurdish question. Both states have historically been wary of Kurdish political mobilization. As early as the interwar period, this shared concern contributed to regional cooperation frameworks such as the Saadabad Pact of 1937, which brought Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan together, partly with the aim of stabilizing border regions and preventing cross-border insurgencies. Generally speaking, the Kurdish question facilitates cooperation but also creates persistent suspicion. The reason for the former is obviously a shared desire to prevent any form of Kurdish autonomy. A good recent example is how both countries jointly opposed the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum in northern Iraq. Moreover, both countries have at times coordinated security and shared intelligence against Kurdish militant networks in border regions. The source of suspicion is the fear that either country might instrumentalize the Kurdish question to undermine domestic stability in its neighbor. For example, PKK activity along Iran’s borders during the 1990s was at times interpreted in Ankara as an effort to undermine Turkey’s position. Turkish officials have occasionally accused Tehran of providing safe haven to Kurdish militant networks. On balance, cooperation against Kurdish autonomy has however dominated, with the effect that the relationship does not deteriorate into permanent acrimony.

Ideology, Islam and the shifting threat perception

While competitive dynamics under a structural condition of parity, geographic proximity and cooperation against various Kurdish groups are constant drivers of how Turkish political and security elites view Iran, ideology has periodically reshaped them.

From the 1920s through the late 1970s, Turkey and Iran shared broadly compatible ideological and geopolitical orientations. Both states were engaged in secular nation building and aligned with the Western camp during the Cold War. This shared orientation most clearly reflected in their participation in arrangements such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). 

The first major ideological rupture came with the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. For the first time in decades, the two states found themselves on opposite sides of a profound divide. Iran’s revolutionary Islamic regime contrasted sharply with Turkey’s secular political system, and the divergence deepened throughout the 1980s. By the 1990s, these ideological tensions had contributed to a noticeable deterioration in Turkish perceptions of Iran. For perhaps the first time in the modern period, parts of the Turkish security establishment began to frame Iran as a genuine threat. Iranian revolutionary ideology was suspected of influencing Islamist networks within Turkey, and a broader narrative emerged that associated Iran with armed groups operating on Turkish soil. These perceptions translated into a more cautious and security-oriented Turkish policy toward Iran, including a tighter monitoring of Iranian networks in Turkey and a greater emphasis on limiting Iranian political influence. These perceptions were reinforced by Turkey’s prevailing domestic political climate of the time as the 1990s marked the peak of tensions between secularism and political Islam in the country with the military acting as the guardian of the secular order. In this environment, Iran became a security concern as well as a convenient reference point in domestic political struggles. Islamist movements were routinely accused of being sympathizers, extensions or even agents of Tehran. The Welfare Party, the main Islamist party of the era and the predecessor of the AKP, was frequently subjected to such accusations.

The rise of the AKP in the early 2000s heralded another significant shift. The new party’s foreign policy vision emphasized economic interdependence, pragmatic diplomacy and zero problems with neighbors. The relationship with Iran was gradually de-securitized. Tehran was no longer framed as an ideological threat, partly because political Islam itself was no longer perceived as a destabilizing feature within Turkey’s domestic order. The 2000s were characterized by expanding economic ties and Turkey’s willingness to mediate between Iran and Western actors in disputes over Tehran’s nuclear program. Ironically, the domestic use of support for Iran as a political accusation did not fully disappear during AKP rule. In fact, it has rebounded somewhat as pro-government media and commentators paint the AKP’s Islamist critics with the same brush today as the secular military guardians of Turkey once did with the party, particularly those who challenge the Turkish government’s regional policies from a religious standpoint. Movements and figures that accuse the government of passivity on issues such as Palestine are routinely labeled as Iran-linked or Iran-sympathizing. For example, the leader of the Saadet Party, a fellow Islamist party rooted in the same Milli Görüş tradition from which the AKP itself emerged, recently felt compelled to publicly deny being 'pro-Iranian'. Instrumentalization of the Iranian bogeyman has outlasted the political context that produced it.

The Arab uprisings added yet another ideological layer to this shifting ideological narrative as Turkey and Iran advanced competing models of political order in the Muslim world. Turkey’s leadership promoted what was at the time described as a model of Muslim democracy that combined electoral legitimacy, economic openness and friendly relations with the West, while Iran continued to advocate for a revolutionary model centered on resistance to Western influence. Yet unlike during the 1990s when ideology was the primary driver of tensions, the ideological differences of the Arab Spring period were more geopolitical in nature. Both countries sought to shape the emerging regional order, and their ideological postures reflected different strategic interests as much as opposing normative preferences.

From zero-sum competition to managed rivalry

Turkish-Iranian rivalry in the period after the Arab uprisings became most visible in Syria where Ankara and Tehran supported opposing actors and pursued fundamentally different strategic objectives. Iranian gains were increasingly interpreted as Turkish losses and Iranian setbacks as both wins and opportunities for Turkey. What had previously been a manageable rivalry began to resemble a regional contest for influence. However, even as proxy competition in Syria intensified, this period also witnessed the development of cooperation frameworks between Turkey and Iran. The Astana process, which brought Turkey, Russia and Iran together as guarantors of several Syrian ceasefires, was the clearest example: i.e. a structured diplomatic arrangement between actors who were simultaneously backing rival forces on the ground. However, as Turkey began repairing its relationships with Western and Gulf partners after 2021, underlying competition with Iran resurfaced. The collapse of the Assad government late 2024 illustrated this logic once again: Iranian losses were immediately seized by Turkey to expand its own geopolitical space.

Rivalry without enmity: Turkey faces the war on Iran

In the years leading up to the American Israeli strikes of 2025 and 2026, Turkey found itself in an increasingly ambivalent position regarding Iran’s regional footprint. Israel’s sustained campaign against Iranian partners across the region — Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and beyond — produced hesitation in Ankara. On the one hand, the erosion of Iran’s regional network created openings that Turkey could exploit. The collapse of the Assad government was the most visible example: Iranian setbacks in Syria cleared space for Turkish-aligned actors to move in, making Turkey one of the most consequential external players in the post-Assad order. On the other hand, Turkey grew increasingly uneasy with the broader dynamic that Israeli military operations were producing, namely the normalization of large-scale strikes across multiple countries. Israel’s emergent posture as the regional military hegemon also sits uneasily alongside Turkey’s own vision of regional order. While the gains from Iranian weakness were real and welcome, they also resulted in a regional environment that Turkey finds increasingly threatening. 

When Israel launched its June 2025 strikes against Iran, Turkey opposed them. The calculus had shifted: there was nothing for Turkey to gain from direct strikes on Iran while it had good reason to condemn unchecked Israeli military reach. Turkish politicians and commentators began noting with concern that prominent voices in Israeli policy circles had started framing Turkey as a future target, casting it as a new Iran in the region. However detached from strategic reality such rhetoric may be, it found a domestic audience in Turkey and added a new dimension to Turkish security perceptions. Israel's demonstrated air superiority over Iran has sharpened existing anxieties about Turkey's own vulnerabilities — particularly the relative weakness of its air force and air defense systems, gaps that have accumulated over the past decade. Such anxiety has given new impetus to ongoing negotiations over F-16 modernization with the United States and Eurofighter procurement from Europe. Turkey's domestically developed fighter jet KAAN has also become more prominent even if it cannot provide a near-term solution. While Turkish political and security rhetoric have not yet translated into concrete security measures, it has accelerated conversations about what is needed.

The US Israeli attack on Iran of 28 February 2026 brought tensions in Turkey’s long-standing approach to Iran into focus. Ankara had worked with several regional actors to prevent the escalation, but once the war began it adopted a carefully calibrated position. Turkey opposed the strikes and warned that they risked further destabilizing the region. At the same time, Turkish officials were careful to avoid aligning themselves with Tehran, emphasizing that Iran also bore responsibility for the deterioration that had led to the conflict. The result was a posture that signaled clear opposition to the war while maintaining political distance from Iran itself.

What concerns Turkish policymakers is a collapse of government in Iran. Turkey shares roughly 500 kilometers of border with its neighbor and would be a primary refugee destination. Iran has around 95 million inhabitants. It needs to be recalled here that refugees from Syria, a country of 25 million, left lasting marks on Turkey’s economy and social fabric. A comparable crisis from Iran would be of an entirely different magnitude. Economic disruption, energy supply risks and new security pressures along Turkey’s eastern border compound the picture. A collapse of state authority in Iran could also reopen the Kurdish question in new and unpredictable ways. Recent discussions in Washington and Israel about arming Kurdish groups inside Iran have raised the alarm in Ankara even further, reinforcing fears that a breakdown of the Iranian state as we know it could trigger a new phase of Kurdish militarization along Turkey’s eastern frontier. For these reasons, Ankara’s views a stable rival, even a troublesome one, as preferable to a chaotic neighbor. 

This is why Turkish views of the war cannot be reduced to either principled opposition or quiet opportunism. They reflect the same tension that has defined the relationship for decades. Iran is a competitor, but it is also a regional power whose destabilization would generate problems that Turkey itself would ultimately have to manage. The result is a policy that is not built on a clear preference for Iranian strength or weakness, but on an effort to keep an unavoidable rivalry within manageable bounds. However, this does point to a structural limitation in Turkey’s approach. By seeking to preserve room for maneuver between accommodation and containment, Ankara has long occupied a position not unlike that of several Gulf states: anchored in Western alliance structures while maintaining pragmatic channels of engagement with Iran. This approach is understandable but also limits the ability of Turkey to influence the regional context in which Iran’s role is currently being redefined.

In hindsight, one can ask whether a more sustained regional engagement with Iran, particularly by Turkey and the Gulf states, could have reduced pre-existing sources of tension earlier on and on a more regional basis. Such an approach would have required framing Iran not only as a geopolitical competitor, but also as part of a regional security order that should be shaped through regional dialogue. Whether such a framework could realistically have emerged remains an open question. Yet its absence has enabled a situation in which the ‘Iranian question’ is shaped by extra-regional military and strategic dynamics rather than by regional security arrangements. It is likely that Turkey and other regional actors will have to live with consequences that they had only limited capacity to shape.

Read all earlier blogs in this series