Research
Articles
Still selling the treaty to the skeptical Dutch
For a while now, the main talking point about the Lisbon treaty has been the ways in which it differs from its predecessor. The Dutch rejection of the constitutional treaty gave the government leverage during the subsequent negotiations, which The Hague then used to demand substantial changes to the new treaty. They wanted it to be clearer about which areas would remain national competences and which would be vested in the Union. They also wanted the treaty to include accession criteria for new member states and to be called something other than a "constitution".
It turned out to be a sound negotiating strategy. The Hague hailed the outcome of last June's political agreement on the treaty as a success and said Dutch diplomacy helped save Europe from becoming a "super state".
Early signs from the Dutch parliament indicate that the process of ratification could be relatively smooth this autumn, and that intricate coalition politicking could be enough to avoid another referendum.
Indeed, there are several elements of the Lisbon treaty which should please Dutch members of parliament. Hitherto they have been largely preoccupied by the topic of subsidiarity. But the new treaty offers plenty of scope for national parliaments to contribute to substantial political choices on new European policies. There is also the potential for more effective coalition-building with other national parliaments across Europe.
There are other innovations in the new treaty which might counteract the voters' euro-scepticism too. The EU's new foreign minister and its permanent president could give a more human face for Europe and help dispel its technocratic reputation. The fact that the new treaty puts an end to national vetoes on some areas and creates high hopes for collective action in others, including climate change and foreign policy, may also come as a pleasant surprise for some. Dutch industry could, for example, become a front runner in the EU's new carbon emission trading system.
The Dutch government cannot however afford to relax just yet. The Netherlands was initially reluctant towards a fixed European Council presidency and the new EU diplomatic service. With the practicalities of both of these initiatives now under discussion, the Dutch delegation will have to keep a sharp eye on proceedings at the European level.
More work also needs to be done to improve the current European scheme for inter-parliamentary cooperation and to make the new "orange card" system work. Under this Lisbon treaty, legislation proposed by the Commission could be struck down if a majority of national parliaments oppose it and national governments or members of the European Parliament agree. The Dutch parliament, meanwhile, needs to reconsider its consent procedure for draft justice and home affairs legislation now that EU decisions in this field will be governed by co-decision rules.
Back home, the Dutch government still faces a yawning divide between the views of the political elites on European integration and those of the population at large. The electorate remains critical and holds national politicians to account for their actions in Europe.
As a medium-size member state of some 16m people, the Netherlands has limited diplomatic capacity and political clout in the EU. Its government deserves credit for its negotiating stance in the run up to the Lisbon treaty, and its success in achieving its demands without becoming isolated or ignored.
Future Dutch influence will require The Hague to target its efforts on a limited number of strategic interests. Setting these strategic priorities will be a politically volatile exercise as the country's political model of consensus and compromise is poorly suited to picking clear winners and losers. Right now, the first priority of the Dutch government is to steer the Lisbon treaty safely through the parliamentary waters.