Ghana: a beacon of democracy?
- Ghana’s December 2024 election will be seen as victory for democracy in coup-afflicted West Africa
- But under the surface the country’s competitive political system is contributing to instability
- Chieftaincy disputes, political vigilante groups and Fulbe marginalization are reinforced by cut-throat competitive politics
- These problems risk becoming entry points for JNIM - an Al Qaida affiliate - that lurks on Ghana’s border
- It is critical that donors and implementors become acutely aware of the risks Ghana is facing
How hyper-political competition increases the risk of violent extremism in Ghana
Ghana postures itself as Africa’s democratic ‘city on the hill’. In 1957, the Pan-African revolutionary Kwame Nkrumah led Ghana’s independence struggle – the first in Sub-Sahara Africa. In 1992, Jerry Rawlings led Africa’s third wave of democratization as Ghana transitioned from a military junta into a fully-fledged multiparty democracy. Over the last two decades, Ghana has had regular constitutional changes of government through elections – the hallmark of a democratic system.
Ghana’s democratic antecedents are considered a truism in conversations with and about the country. Ghana is often seen as a “model for other African countries”, envied for its “stabilizing characteristics” and “increasingly robust electoral processes” that make it a “bellwether state of African democracy”The United Kingdom (UK) home secretary Priti Patel labelled Ghana as “a beacon of freedom and democracy in West Africa” (2022), as did US Vice President Kamela Harris (“a beacon of democracy”, 2023) and the EU’s Foreign Policy Chief Joseph Borell (“a solid democracy and anchor of regional stability”, 2024). In a region beset by coups, Ghana was called a “democratic bulwark” by the United States Institute of Peace in 2023.
However, clouds loom over Ghana. Pent-up political tensions over multiple administrations are developing in the country’s highly competitive political system that permeates many aspects of society, produce political violence and lead to clear losers. Mild authoritarian inclinations—attacks on press freedom, heavy-handed security responses, contested elections and allegations of corruption in political parties—also nib at the foundations of free elections and an open society, albeit to less of a degree than other countries in the region. In addition, violence in the Sahel cast its shadow over Ghana as violent extremists lead one of the most successful but deadly insurgent movements that West Africa has ever seen. These groups increasingly straddle Ghana‘s borders.
Understanding the link between violent extremism and a country’s political system is crucial. The structure of a political system will shape how and which policies a country pursues, including programs designed to counter violent extremism (in both constructive and destructive ways). In Ghana, this connection is further emphasized by the government’s apparent non-aggression strategy to deal with the threats of extremist groups. This highlights the importance of addressing underlying political interests to effectively prevent violent extremism.
It is important to interrogate the “beacon of democracy” notion and de-politized vulnerabilities in Ghana. Just as many of Europe’s problems (cf. around the response to migration and integration) are political, so are Ghana’s vulnerabilities to violent extremism fuelled by its politics. Western policymakers need to be acutely aware of the complexities of the Ghanaian political landscape.
As Ghana prepares for its presidential elections in December 2024 and international donors flock to Accra to stem the spread of violent extremism in the region, it is time to look beyond the facade.
