Charting Ukraine’s EU Path

Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld contributed to the policy paper 'Charting Ukraine’s EU Path: Engaging with Member States' with a chapter on the Netherlands. This policy paper was originally published by LibMod and Bertelsmann Stiftung. This chapter was written before the Dutch coalition agreement was presented. 

Expert Contributions on Selected EU Member States

THE NETHERLANDS – Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld, Clingendael Institute for International Relations

The Netherlands maintains an engaged yet cautious stance regarding Ukraine’s path toward European Union membership. While it offers substantial support to Ukraine, this backing is moderated by domestic politics and fiscal restraint. Two reservations guide Dutch thinking: first, that Ukraine’s economy must be strong enough to avoid long-term reliance on EU structural funding or distorting market competition; and second, that its voting power within EU institutions should not substantially diminish Dutch influence or financial interests.

Domestic politics, marked by Euroscepticism, fiscal caution, and anti-immigration sentiment, limit unreserved support for enlargement. Still, the Netherlands stands out as the first EU Member State to guide Ukraine in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, combining constructive engagement in Brussels with cautious, guarded rhetoric at home.

A new wind in The Hague with D66’s election victory

The previous coalition agreement between PVV, VVD, BBB, and NSC23 emphasized that “the preservation of national sovereignty is paramount,” committing the Netherlands to a “highly critical” stance on enlargement and rejecting flexibility on the Copenhagen criteria. This marked a departure from the Rutte IV coalition, which described the Netherlands as “strict, fair and engaged”. This harder line reflected domestic anti-immigration sentiment and a narrative depicting the EU as fiscally burdensome to Dutch taxpayers, reinforcing scepticism toward enlargement and constraining support for Ukraine’s EU membership.

The October 2025 Dutch elections may reshape this outlook. D66, the winning party, supports “swift accession for Ukraine” as part of a broader geopolitical vision for the EU, emphasizing the need for internal EU reforms before enlargement. In contrast, the PVV, the second-largest party, continues to oppose any further enlargement. With PVV unlikely to join the next coalition, the new government might adopt a somewhat more moderate stance toward Ukraine’s EU accession.

Shifting public opinion and economic concerns

Public attitudes toward Ukraine’s EU accession, once deeply sceptical, as reflected in the 2016 referendum rejecting the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement25, have softened considerably since Russia’s 2022 invasion. 65% of Dutch citizens now support Ukraine’s EU accession. This shift provides the government with greater political space for constructive engagement, provided that Ukraine’s reforms remain credible and conditionality is preserved.

As a net contributor and member of the “Frugal Four”, the Netherlands evaluates enlargement primarily through its fiscal implications. Ukraine’s size, substantial agricultural sector, and lower income levels raise concerns that accession could increase Dutch contributions to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and cohesion funds, while intensifying competition for domestic farmers. Estimates that Ukraine’s inclusion in the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework could add about €85 billion in CAP payments and €32 billion in cohesion funds sustain Dutch caution.

Dutch farming associations, including LTO Nederland, generally support Ukraine’s eventual accession but call for safeguards and phased access to the CAP to avoid market disruption and unfair competition. Although the agricultural relationship may seem competitive, it has evolved into a structured partnership. During the Second Ukraine–Netherlands Agricultural Dialogue in Lviv in April 2025, both sides discussed the expected effects of Ukraine’s EU integration on European agriculture, including possible pressures on Dutch producers. The joint statement highlighted the need to manage sensitive
product categories while emphasizing that the two sectors can be mutually complementary rather than purely competitive.

Regarding the Netherlands’ official position, the Dutch government presents Ukraine’s EU path as part of Europe’s collective response to Russian aggression, underlining strong political, military, and financial support. At the same time, ministers emphasise domestically that enlargement must remain strictly conditional on measurable progress in the rule of law, governance, and anti-corruption reforms and should not burden Dutch taxpayers. Former Prime Minister Rutte’s remark that “offering EU membership will not help Ukraine now” encapsulates the long-standing belief that geopolitical urgency cannot replace conditionality. Nonetheless, The Hague has encouraged intensified cooperation with Ukraine and other candidates, helping them meet EU standards through targeted reforms.

In Brussels and Ukraine, the Netherlands positions itself as a constructive but principled supporter of Ukraine’s accession. Dutch representatives consistently argue for a merit-driven process while backing practical measures to prepare Ukraine for membership. The annual Netherlands-Ukraine Intergovernmental Conference, launched in Lviv, and the Ukraine-Netherlands Agricultural Dialogue (first held in 2024), illustrate this technical engagement aimed at aligning Ukrainian institutions and sectors with EU norms. These efforts highlight a pragmatic side of Dutch diplomacy that contrasts with the more cautious domestic rhetoric.

Despite these initiatives, national debate continues to revolve around concerns over migration, sovereignty, and financial strain, often overshadowing the Netherlands’ constructive engagement at the EU level. Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp reiterated in 2024 that while “Ukraine is doing its utmost, the Netherlands remains strict and critical when it comes to EU enlargement” (Hart van Nederland, 14 April 2025). Similarly, Rutte dismissed 2030 as a realistic target for Ukrainian membership, insisting that “the question is not when countries are ready, but whether they are ready” (NOS, 5 October 2023). Most recently, Prime Minister Dick Schoof rejected EU chief António
Costa’s proposal to replace unanimity with qualified majority voting for opening negotiation chapters, reaffirming The Hague’s insistence on full memberstate control over enlargement decisions.

While scepticism related to the EU’s internal readiness persist, the government acknowledges the economic and strategic benefits of successful enlargement, citing the prosperity of Central European states as evidence. Ultimately, the Dutch position remains consistent: firm political and financial support for Ukraine, coupled with unwavering conditionality and fiscal prudence, a duality that defines The Hague’s voice both at home and in Brussels.

Policy question – The way forward

First, Ukraine must demonstrate sustained progress on rule of law, transparency, and economic resilience to ensure it can join the single market without imposing fiscal burdens.

Second, the EU, in turn, must reform its budgetary and decision-making systems to make enlargement financially sustainable and politically credible.

Finally, if Dutch leadership were to articulate a clearer strategic narrative linking Ukraine’s accession to national interests – such as security, trade diversification, and the preservation of a rules-based international order – this framing could turn cautious pragmatism into more proactive engagement, strengthening the Netherlands’ influence in shaping the EU’s next phase of enlargement.

Download full policy paper

In addition, a study has been conducted on the public opinion on EU-enlargement in EU countries by Bertelsmann Stiftung.