This policy brief has sought to disentangle the gordian knot of Western Balkan geopolitics. It has made clear how in the region global geopolitical fault lines are reflected in regional dynamics and vice versa. Whether it is the growing rift between Russia and the West, the changing role of the United States, the regional interests of Türkiye, or the Chinese political and economic agenda, they all affect developments within the WB6.
What is clear is that major powers have strongly diverging viewpoints and interests on the region’s disputes, governance, and geopolitical future. Such divergence is mostly visible in the rift between the EU, NATO, and US on the one hand, and Russia and to a lesser extent China on the other. Russia remains able to act as a spoiler for the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region, holding the potential for destabilisation through its connections with Serbia and Republika Srpska in BiH. The role of the US, traditionally closely aligned with the EU, has in recent months become much more unpredictable, posing (potential) challenges for both EU and NATO engagement.
Apart from these major powers, a web of regional and local powers, including EU Member States, pursue their own interests in the region, adding to political complexities. In all of these relations, personalist governance, meaning involvement from leaders like Orban, Putin, Xi, Meloni, Erdogan and Trump, has risen in importance.
This poses major questions and challenges for the EU and its Member States. First, EU conflict-resolution and state-building efforts towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo-Serbia are undermined by the diametrically opposed position of especially Russia, which provides local leaders with a counterweight to EU diplomatic clout. Second, the effectiveness of EU conditionality is undermined through the availability of Chinese, Turkish and GCC economic offers, which are based on divergent standards and come with corruption risks. Local leaders have learned how to reap benefits from multiple sides, thereby undermining EU standard-setting power and, ultimately, EU integration efforts. And third, EU internal challenges, including diverging approaches from its own Member States, notably Hungary, undermine the EU’s decisiveness and transformative potential.
Based on this analysis, we make the following recommendations for the EU and its Member States:
A geopolitically conscious EU
The EU could adopt a firmer stance against Russian interference in the Balkans. It could make it clear to especially Serbia and Republika Srpska that continued non-alignment with the EU’s foreign policy is unacceptable, linking it to the withholding of EU financial support. The EU could further assist other WB countries in shielding them from Russian malign instruments, for example in the disinformation and cyber domains.
The EU would do well to highlight the negative effects of the emerging Chinese presence in the Balkans. While win-win situations can be accomplished, the EU will need to point out to its Western Balkan partners when Chinese engagement exploits regulatory weaknesses and deepens divergences with EU standards. It could follow up such statements more assertively through imposing negative consequences or offering appealing alternatives. As such, the EU’s own investment offers towards the region need to remain competitive and attractive.
The EU could adapt its policies to a potential shift in the United States’ approach towards the Balkans. The EU and European NATO members would thereby especially need to prepare themselves for playing a larger role in the security field, e.g., be ready to replace US troops in the KFOR mission in Kosovo, ensuring that a potential void is not filled by other powers.
The EU should carefully observe Türkiye’s role in the Balkans. Unlike all others, Ankara has fostered largely positive relations with all six countries. It could increasingly become a strong political force in the region at the expense of the EU. In response to Türkiye’s cultural diplomacy in the Balkans, the EU would do well to showcase, through investments and public diplomacy, how EU integration can serve to protect and bolster cultural and religious communities and their traditions. Türkiye’s involvement in KFOR and EUFOR Althea offers a basis for security cooperation with the EU and NATO in the Balkans, albeit with continued awareness of Türkiye’s specific strategic interests in the region.
An effective EU approach towards regional disputes
The EU could better account for overlapping interests in the Balkans in tailoring its approach towards the Kosovo-Serbia dispute. It would be beneficial for the EU to try and further reduce the leverage of other actors, e.g. through expanding diversification efforts to replace Serb energy dependencies on Russia. Such assistance could complement more restrictive measures to foster constructive engagement from the countries. In the end, the EU would need to make a balanced win-win offer, though in the short-term, smaller trust-building steps could provide a way forward. In this context, the EU would do well to lift its temporary measures on Kosovo.
On Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU should seek to act as a united front vis-à-vis the country’s territorial integrity. EU Member States and institutions can more strongly and openly disagree with Hungary and Croatia which pursue an agenda that is incongruent with the EU’s overarching objective for a civic, multi-ethnic, and democratic BiH. The EU institutions could consider imposing stricter rule of law conditionality to that extent. This could also make way for a fiercer EU response to secessionist steps undertaken by the Republika Srpska leadership.
A coherent and effective EU enlargement policy
While geopolitical momentum has served to bring EU attention back to the enlargement process with the WB6, the EU needs to remain wary of an overly geopolitical push that is at the expense of its transformative ambitions. The EU could therefore enhance its democratic conditionality by siding with democratic forces in the candidate countries and more effectively confronting democratic backsliding. While such an approach risks distancing ‘stabilocratic’ elites, it does not irrevocably compromise the countries’ overall geopolitical alignment. Conversely, such an approach may represent the best opportunity to foster an inherently stable and democratic Balkan region that could strengthen the EU upon potential membership.
The EU and its Member States could take steps towards a more integrated enlargement approach which would prevent single Member States from capturing the accession process for their unilateral interests. While shifting towards qualified majority voting in the intermediate stages of the accession process could be helpful, a solid political response by EU Member States and institutions towards unconstructive Member States would be most effective.