Another type of actors to have also found their way to the Balkans could be described as missionaries: countries seeking to expand their influence through strenghtening cultural and religious ties. The Gulf states and Türkiye are key examples. But one should not be fooled – behind such religious and cultural influence lie key political and economic interests.

Figure 10
Türkiye's influence on the Balkans

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Türkiye's influence on the Balkans.

Driven by a firm belief that global balance of power shifts necessitate more Turkish regional strategic autonomy, Türkiye positions itself in the Western Balkans as a key partner, blending religious and economic engagement with geopolitical and security objectives (Figure 10).[29] President Erdoğan’s personalised governance enables swift bilateral engagement and makes him a welcome guest among Balkan leaders.

Given that the country represents the biggest market in the region, Türkiye’s economic focal point in the region is Serbia – to the disappointment of the other Balkan countries. For those, Ankara’s strongest emphasis lies in promoting political, cultural, and religious ties. Such soft power, especially through the Diyanet, Ankara’s chief religious directorate, has been welcomed by but also invited suspicion among the WB6’s Islamic communities, wary of increased foreign influence that would undermine the traditional balance between the region’s Islamic institutions.[30]

Figure 11
The Gulf Cooperation Council relations with the WB6

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The Gulf Cooperation Council relations with the WB6.

Türkiye also pursues its own geopolitical agenda geared towards asserting its regional autonomy, and more implicitly, towards securing partners in its rivalry with Greece. This is evident in its military agreements with nearly all of Greece’s neighbouring countries. The country is further expanding its security footprint through joint military training and arms cooperation, including on the proliferation of drones in amongst others Kosovo.[31] Türkiye’s recognition of and support for Kosovo has not withheld the country from developing a solid pragmatic political and economic relation with Serbia.[32]

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, present themselves in the Western Balkans primarily as economic actors, seeking investment opportunities in amongst others the real estate sector (Figure 11). Like Türkiye, the GCC countries also channel resources into religious projects, including the construction of mosques, religious schools, and cultural centres for Islamic communities – especially in Kosovo and Albania. While these initiatives promote soft power, their religious engagement has prompted caution among Western Balkan leaders – especially in Kosovo – who are wary of importing more conservative religious currents.[33] Unlike other international actors, the GCC countries hardly play a role vis-à-vis regional disputes.

See Nienke van Heukelingen & Bob Deen, “Beyond Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ policy,” Clingendael Policy brief, January 19, 2022, 2.
Jahja Muhasilovic, “Turkey’s Faith-based Diplomacy in the Balkans,” Rising Powers Quarterly, December 2018.
Middle East eye, “Turkish Bayraktar drone sales to Kosovo spark anger in Serbia,” July 20, 2023.
Giorgio Cafiero, “Turkey and the Intractable Serbia-Kosovo Dispute,” Trends Research, December 20, 2023.