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Despite the influence of others, the EU is still the most powerful stakeholder in the Western Balkans (Figure 12). Through its membership offer to the region, the EU’s main objective is to bolster peace, stability, democracy, and economic development in the region, as well as to boost its own global security and competitiveness.

Two decades of EU integration have left most of the WB6 firmly tied to Brussels in institutional, economic, and societal terms. Institutionally, the countries closely cooperate with the European Commission, Parliament and several EU agencies. They are advancing on regulatory convergence with the EU’s Acquis Communautaire, thereby tying themselves to key EU policies.

Societally, the WB6 countries are also closely linked with the EU. Although with negative effects in the countries of origin, WB6 citizens emigrate en masse to EU Member States for better economic opportunities. Simultaneously, EU citizens are increasingly discovering the WB6 – notably Albania – as an appealing tourist destination, driving the region’s inclusion into the broader EU public consciousness.[34]

Politically, relations between the region and the EU remain more complex. Both sides often revert to a blame game for the lack of tangible progress on the EU accession negotiations. While technocratically speaking EU integration steadily continues, politically, EU accession negotiations remain mostly stalled. Only in recent months have Montenegro’s and Albania’s negotiations formally advanced, though local stakeholders question the sustainability and depth of the encompassing reform processes. [35]

Political relations with Kosovo have been under strain since June 2023, when the EU introduced temporary measures – such as suspending investments and high-level visits – in response to escalation in Kosovo’s North. This has added to an already complex relationship, marked by the non-recognition of Kosovo by five EU Member States.[36]

For Serbia and BiH (given the position of Republika Srpska), their refusal to align with EU foreign policy undermines political relations with the EU. This has provided the EU with a complex dilemma. While formally pursuing a transformative strategy based on democratic conditionality, in practice the EU seeks to keep the more problematic candidates close for geopolitical reasons. As such, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, short-term stability, as well as economic and geopolitical considerations, have dominated the EU’s overall approach.

In practice, such an approach has translated into tacit support for ‘stabilocratic’ regimes by continuing pre-accession funding and taking on significant interest-based projects in the region such as through the 2024 lithium deal with Serbia, falling short of consistently applying democratic conditionality. Problematically, the EU risks losing the support of more pro-democratic forces in the region. Pro-democratic protests that swept through Serbia in the first half of 2025 bore hardly any EU flags.[37]

It is sometimes argued that a more genuine democracy-driven EU approach could risk alienating Western Balkan governments, and thereby, lead to the geopolitical distancing of their countries. However, this perspective overlooks an important dynamic: distancing from entrenched, ‘stabilocratic’ regimes may open political space for more democratic actors, who are more likely to pursue meaningful and lasting alignment with the EU. While short-term volatility is possible, a transformative approach remains the most viable path to fostering long-term democratic stability in the region – an outcome that would ultimately reinforce the EU’s strategic position.

To achieve such an approach, the EU faces another complexity – uniting 27 Member States, each with its own unique foreign policy vision (Figure 13). This is especially challenging given that, when it comes to enlargement, EU Member States remain firmly in the driving seat due to their right to veto any step in the process.

Open the geopolitical mapping in full-view mode

In practice, Member States in recent years have (mis)used their veto power to stall relations with neighbouring countries over bilateral issues. The most prominent example is North Macedonia, whose EU accession process remains stalled over a bilateral blockade from Bulgaria, with detrimental effects on the country’s overall relations with the EU.[38] More recently, Montenegro has also failed to open a negotiation chapter over a bilateral blockade from Croatia – a country that, as discussed, also interferes in Bosnia’s politics.

The diverging bilateral approaches of EU Member States also continue to hamper Kosovo, which remains unrecognised by 5 EU Member States. Spain maintains the most hardline approach due to its internal political struggle with secessionist forces in Catalonia. Recognising the undermining effects on EU credibility, in 2024 Germany and Slovenia proposed switching to qualified majority voting (QMV) on enlargement but failed to attain the necessary consensus.[39]

Notable is the role of Hungary. The country is an advocate for the fast-tracked accession of Serbia and other WB countries as it seeks to import illiberal political partners into the EU. Hungary closely supports RS President Dodik, thereby aligning with Russia and going against the EU’s support for Bosnia’s territorial integrity. As such, Hungary’s position often hinders effective EU democratic conditionality and conflict resolution efforts towards the region.[40]

However, EU Member State influence is not inherently incongruent with overarching EU goals. The most evident example is the relation between Italy and Albania. Building on historical foundations, the countries’ partnership provides Albania with a strong advocate for its accession to the EU.[41]

All in all, tensions between the EU’s transformative objectives and its geopolitical interests, along with internal divisions within the Union, mean that its policies towards the region are never as straightforward as the formal accession process implies. As such, while the region remains firmly tied to the EU institutionally, political integration continues to be a challenging endeavour.