Iran's strategic loneliness: From regional overextension to regional embrace?

By Arash Reisinezhad

Editor’s introduction

In September 2022, the death of Mahsa Jina Amini marked a major turning point for Iran. The event sparked lengthy nationwide protests across socio-economic classes and population groups whose demands rapidly evolved from discarding controversial hijab regulations to calls for the overthrow the Islamic Republic. The Iranian government responded with repression, killing over 400 protesters in late 2022 and early 2023, according to human rights groups. 

The Clingendael blog series ‘Iran in transition‘ explores power dynamics in four critical dimensions that have shaped the country’s transformation since: state-society relations, intra-elite dynamics, the economy, and foreign relations. This blog post explores how the notions ‘strategic loneliness’, ‘forward defense’ and ‘gray zone tactics’ have informed Iran’s security posture and regional policies after 1979, and why they are now under review given the setbacks the Axis of Resistance suffered after 7 October 2023.

Iran’s strategic loneliness: What to make of it

The October 2023 war in Gaza marked a major turning point for the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. While Hamas's initial offensive surprised Israel and signaled bold defiance against occupation, its long aftermath produced significant strategic setbacks for the movement as well as the broader Iran-linked resistance front. Israel was able to significantly degrade Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s leadership, military and social infrastructures with US support, and exerted substantial pressure on other Iran-backed groups across the Middle East. The collapse of the Assad government represented another a critical blow to the regional resistance front. In Iraq and Yemen, Iran-linked militias such as Kataib Hezbollah and the Houthis declared their readiness to support Hamas against Israel and the US - with the Houthi even blocking Red Sea shipping – and yet they also faced increasing military and political pressure. Taken together, these developments caused considerable fragmentation and weakening of the Axis of Resistance.

In consequence, the recent period may come to mark a turning point in Iran’s deeply rooted condition and preference for ‘strategic loneliness’. Originally coined and conceptualized by Mohiaddin Mesbahi, strategic loneliness refers to the fact that “Iran has been strategically ‘lonely’ by design and by default, i.e. deprived of meaningful alliances and great power band wagoning.” Put differently, Iran has historically lacked a strategic ally among the great powers at critical historical junctures when its national security and territorial integrity faced existential threats. This condition has been a persistent feature of Iran’s recent geopolitical experience – both before and after the Islamic revolution of 1979. 

However, this condition became more pronounced after 1979, in no small part due to the U.S. embassy hostage crisis. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) further deepened Tehran’s strategic loneliness as revolutionary Iran faced the well-armed and totalitarian Ba’ath regime that enjoyed the backing of both Cold War superpowers as well as their regional allies. Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iran became subject to extensive international sanctions in the 1990s due to its nuclear program and its support for armed groups in the region. In the 2010’s, Iran’s support for Bashar al-Assad aggravated its strategic loneliness even further, although the Astana format also brought new forms of tactical cooperation with Russia and Turkey. Iran’s recent accession to BRICS has yet to cement a durable partnership within the Moscow–Beijing axis, which for now is insufficiently developed to overcome Tehran’s lack of strategic allies.

One should keep in mind that Iran’s strategic loneliness does not mean Tehran is geopolitically isolated. Instead, it means that Iran has often had to resist its adversaries and implement its national security strategies independently. Indeed, its geographical centrality, revolutionary ideology (after 1979) and hostile relation with the U.S. (also after 1979) have intensified Iran’s loneliness, while also keeping the country “busily engaged at the core and crossroads of all major regional and occasionally global issues of significant systemic ramification”. Concisely put, ‘geopolitical isolation’ is a rare condition for a large country situated on the cross-roads of three regions with fifteen neighbors.

Forward defense as the solution?

In this context of strategic loneliness, Iran chose a forward defense posture as core tenet of its foreign and security policy. Indeed, one of the most consequential outcomes of Iran’s strategic loneliness has been the development of its forward defense doctrine. This doctrine emerged as a response to the painful lessons of the Iran-Iraq War, which showcased the dangers of relying solely on defense at the border. Iranian policymakers came to believe that the country's survival required projecting power beyond its frontiers. This strategic imperative stems not only from revolutionary ideology, but also from fundamental geopolitical realities: Iran lacks natural defensive boundaries and dependable strategic allies. As a result, forward defense has become a structural pillar of Iran’s regional strategy—i.e. an effort to secure borders through alliances with non-state and hybrid military and political actors that was later reinforced by the development of missile capabilities, drone warfare and other asymmetric military capabilities. 

Under the Pahlavi’s, Iran’s forward defense doctrine was largely pragmatic, security-driven and aimed at preserving Iran’s territorial integrity within a hostile regional environment. The Shah’s engagement with non-state actors—particularly his support for Iraq’s Kurds—was a calculated geopolitical maneuver without ideological underpinnings. Recognizing the potential for political blowback and regional instability, the Shah ultimately curtailed these engagements once Iraq’s Baath regime conceded regarding the Shatt al-Arab waterway dispute in the Algiers Agreement of 1975.

In contrast, the Islamic Republic institutionalized and ideologically redefined forward defense, particularly after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq that dramatically altered the regional balance of power. Iran perceived both a strategic imperative and an opportunity to expand its influence through ideological narratives of Resistance against Western imperialism and in defense of Shia communities. These ideological foundations provided fertile ground to expand Tehran’s partnerships with non-state and hybrid actors across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. They were mainly constructed and maintained by the Quds Force. For about two decades, it represented a relatively effective form of asymmetric deterrence against the U.S. and Israel. 

But unlike the Shah, who pursued a forward defense with caution and selectively, the Islamic Republic expanded and entrenched the forward defense doctrine despite the sanctions and Iran-phobic discourse it invited (i.e. a discourse that presents Iran as a major threat to the international community and to regional security that evokes an irrational fear of the Islamic Republic). Iran’s regional footprint reached its apex during the Syrian civil war. The cumulative effect of expanding military-political engagement was the overextension of the Islamic Republic. It came to look as if Iran sought to assert regional leadership by leveraging its central geographic position in West Asia. This evolution was viewed as deeply threatening by other states in the region. It also demonstrated how ideological conviction can trump sound geopolitical strategy even in the face of increasingly prohibitive costs.

The limits of forward defense

The logic of forward defense alleviated Iran’s strategic loneliness, but it also introduced significant vulnerabilities to Iran’s national security: 

First, maintaining a complex, non-state-centric foreign policy requires robust and consistent financial resources. While Iran’s partners have effectively diverted direct threats from its borders, the high costs of regional alliances, along with prolonged U.S. sanctions and poor economic mismanagement at home have drained the country’s economic capacity. This undermined the doctrine’s sustainability. Furthermore, Iran has demonstrated a limited ability to translate its hard power into economic or developmental gains. Despite expanding influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Tehran has struggled to convert political-military leverage into tangible financial or strategic dividends. Without transformative influence, Iran ultimately risks eroding the foundations of its regional influence due to the backlash its forward defense doctrine produces.

Second, Iran’s non-state foreign policy has been securitized by both Western powers and regional rivals. Tehran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis has inadvertently positioned it as a central actor in the global discourse on terrorism, and cast it as a perceived threat to regional and international stability. The rise of Iran-phobia, driven largely by Tel Aviv, Riyadh (until recently) and Washington, reflects a campaign of threat inflation based on kernels of truth. Moreover, Iran’s alliances with non-state actors have exacerbated the region’s security dilemma by intensifying the offense-defense dynamic and feeding into a cycle of mutual distrust and escalation. In a region that lacks a comprehensive security architecture, even defensive posturing by Iran is framed as aggressive, which has further isolated it diplomatically and strategically. 

In brief, while Iran’s forward defense strategy has been a functional solution to its strategic loneliness, its long-term viability is in question. The strategy’s financial demands, ideological commitment and political backlash undermine the very security it aims to preserve. For example, one of Iran’s major mistakes was to treat its relationships with non-state actors and partners primarily as tools for consolidating its power in the region rather than as means to disrupt the strategies of its regional rivals. This shift in objective was reflected in Iran’s claim to dominate four Arab capitals—Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sana’a. Today, maintaining forward defense without internal social and economic consolidation risks trapping the Islamic Republic in a permanent need to project power externally that it cannot sustain. 

Iran’s emerging new security doctrine

Since Donald Trump’s became president once more, the security environment of the Middle East has entered a sensitive and volatile phase. The threat of military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities has forced Tehran to reassess its national security policy. As a result, Tehran seeks to manage and mitigate the risk of large-scale conflict by adapting its defensive posture and regional policies.

To begin with, Iran’s gray zone tactics—a method of operating between war and peace to contain regional rivals—have undergone transformation. This approach, long centered on indirect power projection through Iran’s non-state partners like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, allowed the country to exert influence while avoiding full-scale confrontation. Following the degradation of these networks, Iran’s ability to engage in wholesale gray zone tactics has decreased. Instead, Tehran appears to be shifting toward a "smart, limited and selective gray zone approach". "Smart" in the sense that it focuses more on information warfare, cyber operations and psychological influence;"limited" because its operational reach will no longer span the entire Middle East but will be more targeted; and "selective" in choosing specific fronts or moments that serve strategic signaling or deterrence purposes. While gray zone tactics remain part of Iran’s forward defense doctrine, they will be more adaptive, technologically driven, and geographically restrained.

Moreover, while Iran’s reliance on non-state partners remains a significant component of its regional posture, it also seems this approach has been downgraded. The heart of Iran’s national security doctrine is increasingly centered on deterrence through advanced military capabilities—especially missile and drone technology—rather than through non-state warfare. This strategic evolution is reflected in the rise to prominence of General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh of the IRGC Aerospace Forces after the assassination of from General Qassem Soleimani who epitomized Iran’s extraterritorial influence through non-state partners. Hajizadeh’s command instead highlights a growing emphasis on technological deterrence and hard power capabilities within Iran’s borders. 

In addition, if ongoing nuclear negotiations fail to reach an agreement, Israeli strikes against Iran could accelerate Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. However, the talks may also shift the nature of Iran’s nuclear orientation towards civilian use. While hardliners in Iran argue that nuclear weapons are essential to effective deterrence, it is important to recognize that the Supreme Leader has long emphasized a different foundation for Iran’s nuclear program. Namely one rooted not in military deterrence, but in national pride and self-reliance, that is to say that for Ayatollah Khamenei Iran’s nuclear program symbolizes the country’s sovereignty, scientific progress, and resistance to foreign domination. This vision presents the program as a manifestation of independence, not a military tool. However, an Israeli military strike could shatter this mental frame by strengthening hardline voices and validating their claims that only a nuclear arsenal can truly secure Iran against foreign intervention. 

Furthermore, Iran’s increasing focus on regional rapprochement, especially with Saudi Arabia, represents a major shift in Tehran’s national security policy. This is no longer a mere tactical move to relieve pressure or manage crises—it reflects a strategic recalibration in Iran’s approach to regional order. Several underlying trends support this shift:

• Iran perceives that its own regional position has weakened. In turn, Saudi Arabia sees less threat from Tehran.
• Tehran and Riyadh have a shared interest in managing escalation in the face of Israel’s rise as regional hegemon.
• The growing ambition of Turkey under Erdoğan creates a new axis of influence that both Iran and Saudi Arabia must account for.
• Crown prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 compels Riyadh to maintain regional stability rather than confrontation.
• Saudi Arabia’s own rebranding efforts—from exporter of radical religious ideology to modernizing economic hub—align better with a cooperative rather than conflictual relationship with Iran.
• Iran’s economic vulnerability and need for foreign investment provide a strong incentive to de-escalate and integrate regionally. 

If successful, Iran–Saudi détente could mark a more regionally driven, less securitized balance of power that is anchored in mutual pragmatism. An important aspect of Iran’s regional rapprochement is its intention to participate in and benefit from large-scale infrastructure investments in the region. The twin aims here are to mitigate the damaging effects of external sanctions and project power through economic integration and regional cooperation.

Finally, the United States’ downgrade of its Middle East policy has opened a strategic window for Tehran. This downgrade is motivated by Washington’s pivot to China, energy security and the political costs of escalation. It signals to Iranian decision-makers that Washington may be amenable to a recalibrated relationship. Within this context, détente emerges as a salient concept in Iran’s evolving national security strategy. Much like the Nixon-Mao rapprochement of the 1970s, certain factions within Iran — particularly among pragmatists and elements within the technocratic elite — view a strategic thaw with the United States as a means of maintaining sovereignty while alleviating economic pressure rather than as capitulation. 

These interconnected factors reflect a gradual, yet deep transformation of Iran’s national security strategy with profound ramifications for its regional policy. Each factor points to a recalibration of Tehran’s geopolitical posture—away from rigid ideological orthodoxy and toward a more pragmatic, albeit still contested, foreign policy orientation. Crucially, these shifts must be understood in relation to the most critical domestic issue currently shaping Iran’s domestic and foreign policy calculus: succession. As uncertainty looms over who will rule the Islamic Republic in the post-Khamenei era, debates over strategic direction have intensified. In this context, the evolution of Iran’s strategic identity is not merely a reaction to external pressures, but a reflection of deeper anxieties and ambitions surrounding the future of political authority in the Islamic Republic.

Read earlier blogs in this series