Reports and papers | 27 January 2026

Managing Crises, Sharing Power: The EU’s Inter-Institutional Cooperation in Action

Key points
  • An expanding EU crisis toolkit: Successive crises have broadened the EU’s crisis response instruments, involving a complex mix of intergovernmental and supranational actors.
  • Effectiveness versus institutional balance: The report assesses whether EU institutions and Member States cooperate effectively in crises without undermining the EU’s institutional and democratic balance.
  • Baltic Sea case - coordination gaps: Suspected sabotage of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea exposes unclear mandates, overlapping responsibilities, and coordination challenges within the EU and with NATO.
  • Commission leadership under constraints: A stronger coordinating role for the European Commission could improve crisis responses, but Member States remain cautious about delegating authority in security-sensitive domains.
  • Belarus and energy crises - regulatory power over scrutiny: In both the Belarus–EU migration crisis and the energy crisis, the Commission relied on its regulatory authority to act swiftly, often prioritising accommodation of Member States over democratic oversight.
  • Conditions for effective crisis management: Effective EU crisis response ultimately depends on political will and mutual trust among Member States, supported by clearer responsibilities, better information-sharing, and safeguards for democratic oversight.

This report delves into the question of whether the various EU institutions and member States cooperate and share competences effectively in times of crisis, and whether they do so without compromising the EU’s institutional balance. To do so, the report compares three intentionally caused crises: the increasing cases of (suspected) sabotage of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, the Belarus-EU border/migration crisis and the energy crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While the first entails a policy area within the security field where the EU has limited powers and where, in principle, Member States take decisions unanimously, the latter two cases entail policy areas where the EU institutions share competences with the Member States. In this way, it is possible to compare different institutional interplays and their impact on the effectiveness of EU actions. Conclusions are based on an analysis of official policy documents, secondary literature, and a series of interviews.

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