Saudi and Emirati engagement in Iraq
From sectarianism to investment
- Since 2014, Gulf engagement in Iraq has shifted from a sectarian approach to a more pragmatic one focusing on economic and security interests
- As a result, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have successfully built influence through energy, infrastructure and personal ties, despite some resistance
- From European perspective, Gulf efforts that strengthen the Iraqi state and promote economic growth are beneficial and should be supported
The political and economic outreach of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Iraq has intensified significantly in the last few years.
In addition to the relative stabilisation of Iraq’s security situation, the growing engagement of Gulf states can be attributed to the learning process and changing attitudes in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and elsewhere concerning their various failed attempts to shore up influence in Iraq in the post-2003 period. Until the rise and defeat of Islamic State (IS), most Gulf states pursued a heavily sectarian approach to deal with security risks such as next-door instability and Iranian influence. This tended to amount to supporting Sunni political and militant organisations in Iraq’s periphery against the Iran-backed Shia-dominated political centre. However, the ‘defeat’ of IS, the fragmentation and polarisation of the Shia political landscape, and the changes in Saudi foreign policy implemented by Mohamed bin Salman (MbS) enabled a shift in focus to broader economic and security engagement.
This brief aims to interpret and map current Saudi and Emirati efforts to build political, security and economic influence in Iraq and the effects of such efforts on the evolution and stability of Iraq’s current political settlement. An overview of the general Saudi and Emirati strategy towards Iraq since 2017 is followed by a mapping of the main security, political and economic engagement of the two countries after 2020, together with a broad assessment of their effects. The paper aims to contribute to a European re-evaluation of the Gulf states’ strategy towards Iraq. It also assesses the effects of this strategy on the evolution of the Iraqi political system.