a. The national players

Since the toppling of the Qadhafi regime, and specifically since the escalation in 2014 of violence between the two main warring camps,[11] political authority and territorial control in Libya has been contested and fragmented by a plethora of armed groups. Many armed groups originated in the 2011 revolution, but their number hugely expanded afterwards due to readily available arms and the security vacuum left by regime collapse. The militias that contributed to the fight against Qadhafi were seldom criticised during and in the immediate aftermath of the revolution because of their heroic status as thuwwar (revolutionaries). As a reward for their war efforts the newly established administration handed out generous salaries to revolutionary brigades, which were knighted the new ‘security bodies’. However, subsequent attempts to gather the multiplying militias under a single authority failed, as the governmental umbrella organisations could not mitigate inter-militia rivalries.

The policy essentially created a hybrid security system in which very weak and nascent formal institutions acted alongside much more powerful informal armed groups that received funding and status from the government. Militias further consolidated their power by seizing control over strategic state institutions and assets, including airports, oil facilities, ports and border control, as well as over competing factions in government. From 2013 onwards, armed groups on the government’s payroll began pressing their demands on the government through their hold of strategic assets, for example by blocking oil ports.[12] If a government institution is located in an area under militia control – as is the case for Tripoli – the militia usually issues orders there.[13] Hence the thought that militias would help Libya’s new government govern proved deceptive. Instead, the militias overpowered their political counterparts and began manipulating government institutions to their own ends.

At present, both of Libya’s ‘governments’ heavily rely on non-state armed groups to assert their authority and to safeguard their presence. This has led to a situation in which the authority of government does not extend beyond the area controlled by its affiliated armed group(s). In the West, it has become painfully clear that the GNA in Tripoli can only function at the mercy of the capital’s main militias (the Special Deterrence Force, the Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion, the Nawasi Battalion, the Halbous Brigade (Infantry 301 Brigade) and the Abu Slim Brigade). The four have stabilised Tripoli in the sense that they jointly prevent the rise of other militias in the capital by swallowing up smaller armed groups and pushing out more powerful ones, like the Misrata militias in 2017. This has enabled them to effectively capture key state functions and resources, posing a clear obstacle to any (future) political settlement[14] but also triggering resentment among armed groups surrounding the capital. At the time of this analysis, South Tripoli is the stage for heavy fighting between local militias – and an unstable coalition of interests between militias in Misrata, Tarhouna and Zintan is taking shape, which challenges Tripoli's militia cartel.[15] It is too early to assess the impact of these clashes but it is clear that major militias in Libya’s northwest are seeking to secure their positions and expand their territorial control, which may drastically shake the security status quo in and around the capital.

Similarly, there are different armed groups in the east of Libya, although there Khalifa Haftar could consolidate his and the Interim Government’s positions thanks to his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA is not a national entity but rather a loose coalition of local armed groups that has a powerful unifying function. Without this military backing, the Tobruk-based government is largely toothless, as it lacks mandate and authority. Of all Libya’s ‘national’ actors, the LNA’s area of influence stretches the furthest, covering much of Libya’s east as well as swaths of northwest Libya and the Fezzan province in the south. However, local sources explain that despite the image of control,[16] there are clear limitations to Haftar’s alleged dominance: ‘[It is said that] Haftar is present in the south, but none of his forces are there. These are mercenaries working for him. The same happens in Warshafana. There is a communal defense dimension: everybody is working on behalf of everybody. Occasionally [local forces] affiliate their manpower to one of the political factions. There is no ideology behind it.’[17] Haftar’s power is not uncontested in the territory he claims to control: for example, Haftar was not allowed into Benghazi after the attack on the deputy minister of interior in 2017, because the minister is a member of the powerful Awaqir tribe from Benghazi which opposes the ‘Haftar loyalists’ who were allegedly behind the attack.[18] Similarly, local forces explained to us that, ‘Haftar’s days are over if he ever tries to confront the Warfalla tribe.’[19]

Libya’s third ‘government’, the National Salvation Government (NSG) of Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell, challenged the GNA’s position in Tripoli. The NSG was in fact a continuation of the original parliament elected in 2012, the General National Congress (GNC). The NSG considers Tripoli to be its base and has fought to re-establish its control there, but it no longer controls any relevant institutions and Khalifa’s support base has been waning.[20] Ghwell tried to re-establish local support in 2016 against the GNA – which he sees as a foreign creation – but failed, and in 2017 forces loyal to the NSG (the Steadfastness Front of Salah Badi) were pushed out of Tripoli altogether by GNA-affiliated militias.[21] Even though the NSG’s role as a political actor has run out of credibility, its power base is not irrelevant. The NSG found its support in Misrata, Zuwara and a number of other western cities (including from the Amazigh community). There, frustration with the stranglehold of militias over Tripoli is on the rise, and although the NSG is currently no direct competition to the GNA, current events around Tripoli show that renewed conflict over the capital is never far off.

b. Local security provision

Domestic conflict between ‘national’ actors and their internal divisions has significantly reduced the ability of government authorities to provide basic services for its citizens. As a result, space has opened up for alternative structures of authority and coercion to establish themselves.[22] Across Libya, a plethora of locally based groups has taken over responsibility for providing resources, services and security from the state in areas under their control. This not only expands and consolidates their territorial control, but also contributes to their political recognition by, and in some instances legitimacy from, communities and groups within them. The willingness, and in many cases ability, to govern distinguishes such state-like (armed) groups from bandits or extractive groups.[23] In Libya, the fragmentation of local power and the authority of local non-state (armed) groups has therefore resulted in a situation in which the state and its formal institutions (whether subordinate to Tripoli or to Tobruk) have become only one centre of power among many, and not necessary the most powerful – even though the GNA represents the country at international level and receives international support.[24]

In a militarised context like Libya where armed actors hold local sway, groups that play a role in local governance and security provision can be placed along a continuum ranging from positive affiliation with the state to competition with the state. As well as actors with a clear government affiliation, such as the Presidential Guards in Tripoli, many groups are somewhere in the middle of the continuum: they are not set on directly undermining the state, but have a more ambiguous or less positive attitude vis-à-vis government. This category includes armed groups that display significant power, such as the Misrata Military Council and the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigades. Such groups have profited from the weakness of formal institutions: it has enabled them to carve out a role for themselves in the local power equilibrium and legitimise their existence domestically and vis-à-vis external actors.[25] At first glance, non-state groups in this grey area between positive and negative attitudes towards the state seem best able to ‘assist’ the government in restoring law and order: that is, they can step in where formal security actors like the police and the regular army are absent or unable to function. However, their level of autonomy and lack of accountability negatively affects the state’s ability to fulfil its obligations, including the protection of communities.

The survey findings confirm this. They show that Libyans do not feel safe and that their perception of security has deteriorated since the fall of Qadhafi (see figure 1). A minority of respondents (23%) say they feel completely safe today, compared to 20% a year ago, and only 28% expect their security situation to improve over the course of the coming year. By contrast, an overwhelming 78% of respondents say they felt safe before the revolution, under the Qadhafi regime. Figure 2 shows that people’s perception that under Qadhafi life was more safe (or less unsafe) is felt in all types of municipalities (see box below), regardless of the level of fragmentation of security provision in the municipality.

The survey also explored where respondents feel most safe, and to what extent the number of security providers present in the municipality influences such perceptions of safety. Figure 3 shows that respondents feel the least at risk in their own homes (64%) and their own neighbourhoods (41%). One of the respondents from Gharyan tellingly stated: ‘I am a housewife. I decided to spend most of my time at home so that I am not exposed to threats.’ Survey data show that feelings of insecurity are significantly greater in public places and towards the outskirts of towns. In figure 4 we see that respondents from homogenous municipalities feel more safe to move around in their direct surroundings and public places in their municipality than respondents from fragmented municipalities, where only 13% of respondents says they feel safe in their neighbourhood. One of the survey enumerators stated: ‘There is no real need to differentiate between safe and unsafe neighbourhoods in my town. If I am not careful, they [armed men] will shoot me anywhere.’[27]