Suggestions for policy | Local security governance in Libya

As this report has shown, local security governance in Libya varies greatly in how it is organised and its extent and effectiveness. There is no single actor involved, and the provision of local governance is influenced by changes in local power dynamics and episodes of local conflict. Security is provided in particular local contexts that are constantly in flux and, in certain areas, very difficult to understand. The question remains what a deep understanding of local governance and security provision in Libya means for international policies aiming to enhance good governance (e.g. those of the EU, which re-committed to its support for Libyan municipalities and local governance earlier this year), as well as to policies that aim to improve living conditions and basic services for Libyans and migrants in Libya.[60]

The findings presented in this report emphasise that, in order to be effective and conflict-sensitive, any policy and programming in Libya requires up-to-date knowledge of local power arrangements and the political economies in which programmes are implemented. Despite an advanced understanding within the international assistance community that what you do in Libya, and with whom, needs to be carefully considered, the risks and dilemmas attached to supporting local governance in Libya through international assistance projects remain. For example, selecting local partners is risky because others may feel excluded; interactions with local armed groups and non-democratic bodies may be required; and working without reference to national institutions is problematic.

A near-obvious principle therefore is that all support for local governance needs to be based on in-depth knowledge of variations between municipalities and regions and between the complexities of local governance structures and the actors and interests involved. This study only scratches the surface of that, and needs to be followed up by up-to-date analysis and ideally more in-depth studies of each locality. Understanding Libya as a collection of local political economies is key: an approach to local governance that works well in a particular town may play out very differently elsewhere. In the fragmented polity of Libya, support easily legitimises and cements the power of certain actors over others. We have seen, for example in Sabratha,[61] how quickly such a disruption of the local power balance can turn violent, adding another layer of conflict to an already fragile status quo.

Building on the findings of the survey used for our analysis, which intended to present a ‘bottom-up’ perspective on security provision, the following principles stand out as needing to be taken into account by every initiative that aims to address the fragmentation of security and improve local stability.

First, although municipal councils need to be supported to exercise their lawful powers, the influence and role of other actors at municipal level should not be overlooked. In the realm of security provision, we have seen that security directorates and informal actors, in many cases tribes, are involved and enjoy considerable legitimacy from the local population. Therefore, it is advisable to stretch the understanding of local governance stakeholders beyond the municipal council to other local security providers that are trusted because they have a role in the protection of citizens. In particular, the areas where informal local actors work with municipal councils deserve our attention and additional research because it is in these areas where the legitimacy of formal structures and the efficiency and local connections of informal structures come together. Existing policy programming to support positive examples of local governance through capacity building may be extended to the realm of security provision as well.
All initiatives to enhance positive examples of cooperation between formal and informal actors in security governance, however, need to include efforts to build a better notion of the public good in society. This is an essential step in moving away from network-based and personal affiliation-driven security provision. As is more often the case in contexts of plural security, formal and informal security providers may put their group interests over that of the public, limiting the inclusiveness of their governance activities. Even when a group is perceived as legitimate, such as tribal actors or security directorates, international assistance should channel efforts at broadening the ‘client base’ of such government providers as much as possible, so that benefits are not seen only by certain sections of the population. This is not only an assignment for security providers but for the wider populace as well, which should be encouraged to enhance social cohesion within communities and build on shared notions of legitimacy in governance.

Second, precisely because supporting local actors can be a risky business if it does not happen in a context- and conflict-sensitive way, international assistance must carefully weigh the practicality argument regarding engagement with non-state armed groups and military governors. It can be argued that in practice, policy programming requires contact and engagement with informal groups that are unaligned with the internationally backed government and which may have dubious track records, in order to achieve tangible results. However, it is advisable that the international community holds on to its commitment to engage with democratically elected civilian bodies and focus its attention on existing security institutions like the security directorates, not in the least because Libyans also want that. The survey for this study shows that a large majority of Libyans puts their trust in these institutions. At the same time, there are areas in Libya where the presence and activities of informal armed groups have improved everyday safety. Similarly, the imposition of military governance in LNA territory is heavily scrutinised but to a certain extent also welcomed by Libyans for its stabilising effect. The survey findings show that the LNA is respected for its role as security provider, not only in the east, and that it in any case ranks higher as a guarantor of protection than the GNA – which still receives the support of the international community. Placing informal (armed) groups on a continuum from positive affiliation with the state to competition with the state is a start; realising that their positions on the spectrum are not fixed is essential. Policy and programming should be focused on incentivising informal security providers to move to more collaborative relationships with formal security providers – preferably placing them under the command chain of formal bodies – and to support formal security structures to perform their function as legitimate arms of the state.

The above relates to a third principle, namely that Libya’s militia culture could only have come into being because of the economic advantages connected to it. We have seen how the post-revolution administration gave armed groups official status and salaries, and how militias have been able to secure major assets for themselves ever since. Therefore, joining militia must be disconnected from economic opportunity. Creating viable alternatives to being part of an armed groups as a form of livelihood provision is important. It not only diminishes the incentive to join, it also alleviates feelings of economic insecurity. Hence, this approach can learn from and be linked to anti-smuggling policies that try to achieve the same effect: providing licit economic opportunity so that criminal activity is less attractive.[62] At the same time, however, attempts to cut the ties between militias and the economy by providing alternatives to armed group membership risks creating new incentives for capturing economic sectors and patronage dynamics. A long-term and comprehensive approach to economic reform is therefore required, as is increased awareness of how the benefits of formal economic opportunities could be appropriated by informal armed groups.

A final principle pertains to local perceptions and process. The research for this report has shown that no one is better informed on local contexts and local perceptions and attitudes than Libyans themselves. The survey is an instrument to capture experiences with security provision that would otherwise remain hidden. As researchers, we had the pleasure of tapping into a few of Libya’s many community-based organisations that have the ability to align an understanding of the international community on (in) security in Libya with the perceptions and experiences of ordinary Libyans. It is important that the international assistance community tunes in to Libyan community organisations from across the country to harvest their ideas on legitimate security governance. At the same time, it must be aware of the risks attached to following local preferences and a biased approach. In supporting security governance in Libya there should not be an over-focus on specific parts of the country, and there must be a long-term commitment to local partnerships.

Needless to say, even with these principles in mind, there are no easy answers or quick solutions to improving the fragmented security landscape or the effectiveness and legitimacy of security provision in Libya, particularly because each locality would require a different set of policy interventions that are aligned with the local context. Building on the analysis developed in this report and the perceptions on security shared with us by Libyan citizens through the survey, the matrix below is an attempt to capture some practical ideas – including their potential risks – for policy programming at municipal level, contextualised by the level of fragmentation of security in the municipality and the type of security actors involved.

	Tripoli	Misrata	Ghat	Gharyan
Type of governance	Militia	Militia	Tribal (Tuareg Tribe)	Tribal (Arabized and Amazigh Tribes)
Heterogeneity of governance	Fragmented	Homogenous	Homogenous	Fragmented
Context	The GNA’s authority in Tripoli hinges on its affiliated militias and does not extend beyond its area of control.	Officially affiliated with the GNA, Misratan militias exercise heavy leverage over the municipality and the government in Tripoli.	Ghat is a relatively stable Tuareg border town, but the tribe is, to a large extent, cut off from state support and economic opportunity.	Gharyan is in the GNA’s zone of influence but its authority is contested by local tribal (armed) forces. The military council (consisting of several local brigades) effectively controls the municipality.
Security concerns	Militia capture of territory and public institutions and state assets poses an obstacle to sustainable political agreement and legitimate governance. Lack of civilian oversight and formal command structure over armed groups increases the potential for inter-militia conflict and violence. Surrounding groups and interests unaligned with Tripoli’s main militia, threaten status quo and further limit GNA’s authority.	Local armed groups effectively control the municipalities’ territory and local service provision, possibly limiting the inclusiveness of governance and sidelining the elected municipal council. Efforts to extend the GNA’s authority to Misrata are interpreted as an attempt to take away the autonomy of militias. Local forces are involved in armed confrontations outside the municipality.	The tribe enjoys local legitimacy due to its ability to keep the municipality relatively safe, yet it is involved in violent confrontations in other parts of south Libya. Economic opportunity is limited and central government support is negligible. The local economy rides on profits from the smuggling of goods, and affiliation with the GNA is nominal.	Local forces (brigades) united in the military council only recently, and claim to work in tandem but not subordinate to formal security actors (security directorate). Security provision is in the hands of the military council, possibly limiting its inclusiveness to particular groups and networks and bypassing the security directorate. The municipality relies on the GNA for resources and services but local support for the LNA exists as well.
Policy approach	State- and institution building, integration of government-aligned militia in formal structures and under civilian oversight	State- and institution building, supporting local security cooperation and accountability mechanisms, integration of armed groups in formal security structures	Formalising informal authority, capacity building and economic support	Local dialogue, institution- and capacity building, integration of informal armed groups in formal structures
Suggestions for programming	Continue capacity building of central and municipal government to guarantee stronger institutional presence, by putting in place more advanced reporting procedures and support lines between central government and municipal council in Tripoli and throughout the country. Start security sector reform process (under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya) with the ultimate aim of bringing militias under civilian government oversight, but starting with deployment of local forces (including existing militia) in key locations and positions to stabilise the immediate security situation and pilot their alignment with GNA.	Support reconciliation within the municipality between the military council and municipal council, learning from other locally driven reconciliation initiatives (e.g. between Misrata and Zintan). Help build capacities of formal security bodies that are seen as legitimate (i.e. the security directorate) and support integration of armed group members into its ranks. Improve accountability mechanisms for local security and service provision between militia, the municipal council, and their constituents, building on shared notions of legitimacy among population.	Capitalise on the positive role of the tribe by formalising its authority and improving its cooperation with the municipal council. Provide actors involved in local governance with capacity training, particularly on inclusive and accountable governance. Help improve support lines between the central state and the municipality, in order to improve the quality of service provision and to overcome post-revolution marginalisation.	Help improve the relationship between the military council and the security directorate, in order to bring together the first’s influence and the latter’s legitimacy. Coordinate efforts in local security provision, working towards an eventual integration of non-state armed groups into a formal security structure. Promote a local dialogue process between tribal elders, convened by the municipal council, to find common ground on quality and provision of governance and on reconciliation within the municipality. Support the municipal council to exercise its lawful powers, putting in place clearer lines of support and communication between the central government and the municipal council.
Potential risks	The state and militia are not mutually exclusive; enhanced state capacities and strengthened institutions will not automatically reduce the power of militia because of their intertwinement through personal networks and economic dependencies. The adverse may happen: a stronger state could further legitimise and strengthen its affiliated armed groups, and fuel tensions between state-affiliated and non-state armed groups.	Integration of armed groups into formal structures may negatively affect the legitimacy of the latter in the eyes of the local population. Reconciliation efforts may spark renewed conflict over control of the municipality and increase insecurity for local residents.	Cooperation between tribe and state institutions may be perceived as taking away tribal autonomy and as contrary to local political views (nostalgia for previous regime). Central government may not gain legitimacy as long as economic opportunities in the area are lacking.	Integration of tribal brigades into the formal security body (security directorate) may result in a ‘take-over’ of the latter by the members and interests of local brigades, negatively affecting the legitimacy of formal structures in consequence.