This report aims to provide an insight into how the fragmentation of power in post-Qadhafi Libya has shaped different local security governance structures across the country, and how these are perceived and experienced by ordinary Libyans. Security is the most basic service that Libyans require and is seen as a prerequisite for restoring stability and for extending the presence and improving the effectiveness of governance in Libya.[1] But in the absence of a unified and effective central government, alternative informal power settlements have taken shape across the country, and these have begun to provide the core functions that the missing state should assume. Such forms of local governance stem from the fact ‘that local communities are not passive in the face of state failure and insecurity, but instead adapt in a variety of ways to minimize risk and increase predictability in dangerous environments’.[2] In many areas of Libya, the ‘state’ is present through its formal institutions but has to share authority, legitimacy and capacity with informal local powerbrokers such as tribal[3] elders, military councils and militias. Security governance is in the hands of a mix of political, armed and social actors with distinctive local roots and interests and with various levels of authority, legitimacy and effectiveness.

Recent years have seen growing international attention focused on how governance is organised locally in Libya. Decentralisation of government competencies is a logical reaction to the political deadlock at national level.[4] Even though national elections have appeared on the horizon and international diplomatic efforts to unite the warring parties continue,[5] since 2014 when the conflict in Libya escalated, the country has become the arena of two competing ‘governments’, of which only one receives official international recognition. In 2015, representatives of Libya’s rival political factions (i.e. the House of Representatives and the General National Congress) signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) under the auspices of the United Nations, thereby creating the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj. The GNA, which was intended to be a unity government, has been based in Tripoli since March 2016 but is, in effect, overpowered by a military administration, the Interim Government, which is based in the eastern city of Tobruk. The Interim Government is led by Aguila Saleh and the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar. The GNA has also been challenged by a shadow government in Tripoli, the Government of National Salvation (GNS) of Khalifa Ghwell, although this is now virtually defunct. All claim to be the legitimate rulers of Libya and deny each other’s legitimacy, making any national political action plan to lead Libya out of the political crisis an ambitious undertaking at the very least.

Establishing a unified central government and pacifying Libya through good governance is further complicated by the fact that locally de facto authority is in the hands of a patchwork of armed groups and coalitions,[6] many of which pursue their own local interests. Any national-level political agreement needs to trickle down to largely independent local actors, who are usually armed and whose primary concerns are often unrelated to agreements made by national political and international stakeholders.[7] The power of armed groups is so far reaching that even the GNA’s authority in Tripoli rests fully in the hands of several militias who nominally support the GNA but abuse their power over it to influence its decisions, appropriate its resources and appoint their own in its ranks of bureaucrats.[8] When it entered Tripoli in 2016, the GNA could only do so because of the support of local militias with which it had to strike a deal beforehand. However, despite the influence of armed groups within the capital, the government and its armed affiliates are unable to assert their power beyond Tripoli because they would bump into a different set of local (armed) power brokers and their vested local interests. In essence, Libya is a collection of city-states, each with its own internal politics, sovereign areas and ‘militaries’. Against this backdrop, it is questionable whether election results and a still-to-be formed national government will ever be accepted by actors on the ground.[9]

For some areas of Libya, the national political crisis resulted in an effective cut-off from state authority and resources, particularly in remote areas far from power centres in the north. Economic stagnation, a crushing liquidity crisis and the division of key state institutions between eastern and western administrations have minimised state budgets and severely limited the ability of the government in Tripoli to pay salaries and provide services. Even now that oil production is almost back to pre-revolution levels, economic waste due to corruption, embezzlement and criminal capture of state resources is rampant, payment of local bureaucrats is absent or below standards, and Libyans’ standard of living has remained abject.[10]

The analysis in this report explores how Libya’s conflict-ridden transition out of dictatorship, the enduring absence of effective state control, and the localised nature of formal and informal authority structures across the country have shaped security governance at municipal level. It specifically looks at how protection and security are organised and provided, and by whom. However, rather than providing an analysis of local actors, their relationship with the state and an assessment of their ability and willingness to govern, this report instead offers an exploration of citizens’ experiences and perceptions of local security, and the extent to which they appreciate, or not, local groups’ ability to provide such security. To grasp such grassroots perspectives, this report is based on a household survey of security provision conducted in various municipalities (see box below).

This report starts with a sketch of the political context of (in) security in Libya after the fall of Qadhafi. Section 2 goes on to discuss the main characteristics of security provision in Libya today. Section 3 presents key insights into local security governance gained from the survey. The report concludes by setting out key principles and suggestions for international providers of assistance in their efforts to address the fragmentation of (in) security in Libya and to provide support for local governance structures in an effective way and for the benefit of the Libyan population.

This report draws from a perceptions survey at household level (stratified convenience sample) conducted in Libyan municipalities in the first half of 2018. Through a combination of open and closed questions, 144 respondents were asked about how safe they feel, what actor(s) provide them with security and protection in their area, and to whom they turn for local security needs. Because of the sensitivity of the questions, respondents participated anonymously. In each municipality, the survey was conducted in a window of two weeks.

For a full description of the methodology, see Annex: Methodology brief.

The survey is ongoing and is intended to feed into municipality-specific and up-to-date information on security governance from a wide range of municipalities across Libya. The survey findings presented in this report come from Tripoli, Zawiya, Ghadames, Ghat, Gharyan, Aziziyah (Warshafana region), Sabratha and Misrata. All data, including incoming data from other municipalities, is published here.

Statements at Libya International Peace Forum, Tunis 6-7 September 2017.
Ken Menkhaus, ‘Government without Governance in Somalia Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping’, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2007, p. 75.
It must be pointed out that the term ‘tribe’ is not uncontested. It lacks consistent meaning and carries different historical and cultural assumptions. Acknowledging potential sensitivities, this report uses ‘tribe’ because it is most frequently used in the case of Libya – and by Libyans themselves. For further reading see for example: Chris Lowe, The Trouble With Tribe, Teaching Tolerance, 2001: link
Tamsin Rutter, ‘The EU cities helping Libya’s local authorities provide vital public services’, The Guardian 2017: link
At the end of 2015, a roadmap for creating a unified Libyan government, the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) was signed under the auspices of the UN. In March 2016 the Presidency Council (PC) of the Government of National Accord (GNA) moved back to the capital, Tripoli, where it has been struggling to assert its authority ever since.
After the revolution, Libya counted 100 to 300 armed groups. By 2014, their number was estimated at 1,600. Libya: Militias, Tribes and Islamists, 2014, p. 7: link
Floor El-Kamouni-Janssen and Kars de Bruijne, Crisis Alert 3 Entering the Lion’s Den: Local Militias and Governance in Libya, Clingendael, 2017, p. 2: link
Wolfram Lacher and Alaa al-Idrissi, Capital of Militias: Tripoli’s Armed groups Capture the Libyan State, Small Arms Survey, 2018: link
Al-Hamzeh al-Shadeedi. Are the next Libyan elections doomed to fail?, Clingendael, 2018: link
Libya, World Bank, 2018: link. In 2017, Libya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was USD 50.98 billion. By comparison, in 2010 it was at USD 74.77 billion. After four years of negative growth, 2017 saw a GDP expansion of 55%. Libya GDP 1990-2018, Trading Economics: link.