Insights from the survey demonstrate that municipal councils are only part of the full picture of local governance provision in Libya. Formal governance actors are one among many that have a role in the provision of services, and the boundaries between the various actors are not always clear cut. In practice, solutions in service provision are usually pragmatic, based on personal networks and often bypassing formal governance structures.[48] The situation is compounded further because of municipal councils’ lack of budget, and sometimes jurisdiction, to handle governance affairs in their area.[49] Hence, any attempts to improve local (security) governance ‘top down’, or via formal governance structures, need to grapple with the reality that municipal councils vary in terms of capacity, resources and effectiveness and they usually need to share their authority with other local actors.
Stretching the understanding of how governance is organised locally beyond the municipal councils, however, requires a more bottom-up and in-depth understanding of local governance configurations and the power arrangements that underpin them. It can be argued that each locality deserves a separate political economy analysis of security governance because the organisation of security is directly affected by the networks of actors operating in these areas, their relationships and local interests, and the competing claims to power that co-exist and intertwine. However, despite local variety and complexity, the survey shows agreement among respondents about which actors are considered most legitimate. Respondents overwhelmingly put their trust in formal bodies – the security directorate (87%) and the municipal council (80%) (see figure 8) and say they turn to these bodies for protection. At the same time, respondents describe the formal structures as weak, underdeveloped and ineffective, and some noted that in any case they ultimately need to turn to informal actors to have their needs met.
The survey emphasises that Libyans widely consider armed groups to be the main obstacle on the road to a unified and civilian-led state.[50] Respondents say that armed groups are not only jeopardising Libya’s state-building aspirations, they are also a real security threat at municipal level because of their military strength, involvement in local conflict, and connections to those in power. More than a third of respondents (36%) named armed groups as the biggest security threat in their municipality, directly followed by smuggling groups (32%, see figure 9).[51] As a consequence, armed groups’ local power does not earn them much legitimacy. As figure 8 shows, few respondents (15%) trust armed groups and figure 10 shows that more respondents perceive armed groups as perpetrators of threat (25%) than as protection providers (7%). The survey findings are full of quotes by respondents stating how ‘men with guns’ are an everyday threat. For example: ‘I am a merchant. Robbery by armed groups is the biggest everyday threat to my safety’; ‘At my school [where I am director] the students who are armed are the biggest threat.’[52]
However, as is noticeable from the mix of formal and informal actors involved in security provision, the threat from armed groups is not convincingly countered by one alternative security provider (see figure 11). Only in Tripoli is there a dominant security provider, the GNA, but that prevalence is not reflected in other municipalities.
What stands out from the survey is that, by comparison, most respondents (31%) say it is local actors – formal ones such as the security directorate as well as informal ones such as tribes – that provide security, not ‘national’ actors (GNA, LNA). The findings clearly show that the internationally supported government in Tripoli is perceived as the dominant security provider only in the capital itself, even though current clashes in Tripoli once again prove that it cannot effectively control its affiliated militias. The situation elsewhere (even in municipalities close to Tripoli) is far more mixed. Interestingly, the LNA scores higher than the GNA when it comes to security support: with 75%, the LNA is named as one of the most trusted security providers (see figure 8).
As we have seen, in most municipalities local forces (which include tribal forces) are the main security providers and armed groups are the main causes of insecurity. The survey supports earlier reporting on how, in post-Qadhafi Libya, tribes emerged as a protection insurance policy and mediation service in extreme circumstances.[53] It is important, however, to contextualise the role of tribes in each municipality. In Bani Walid for example, where the only tribe is the Warfalla, the Warfalla Social Council (comprised of tribal notables) coordinates all local affairs. It accepts no orders from central or municipal government and leaves the local security directorate largely powerless. However, Sebha, the ‘capital’ of the Fezzan, has a much more heterogeneous tribal composition and a history of intertribal conflict. There, tribal policing has fuelled local conflict, putting civilians in harm’s way.[54]
Survey findings underscore the influence of tribes at municipal level, particularly in the realm of security, justice and conflict mediation. Tribes can function as a backstop safety net, but the extent to which they can effectively provide protection depends on the homogeneity of their area and as such, the inclusiveness of their support. In places with relatively stable and homogeneous tribal structures, like Ghat and Ghadames, tribes seem to have the ability and local power base to engage in security provision. Respondents from Ghat, which is dominated by the Tuareg, say that ‘[they] trust the tribe because they attempt to fill the vacuum left by the state by providing services and making efforts at conflict resolution and community reconciliation’. In the city of Gharyan, which historically also has a strong tribal character, a respondent identifies the ‘Council of Elders and tribal sheikhs as the most influential actors’. Similarly, a respondent from Ghadames, the oasis town on the border with Tunisia and Algeria, noted that ‘strength and weakness depend on your tribal affiliation’.
The last quote implies that the ‘tribalisation’ of governance and security can also negatively impact local security and social cohesion if access to services (protection) is restricted to those from certain families, clans and tribes. A respondent from Gharyan points out, ‘I work as a nurse in a health clinic. The family members of patients [from local tribes] are a big threat for the clinic and for us. They may threaten us when we stop treatment of a patient who can no longer be saved.’[55] Particularly in fragmented municipalities with a tribal character, such as Gharyan, tribal affiliations provide protection but it is potentially a non-inclusive form of service delivery at the same time.
When looking at types of insecurity experienced, the survey shows that respondents from more homogenous and tribal municipalities experienced less intrusive types of insecurity: for instance, no experiences of murder and punishment of opponents were reported in Ghat and Ghadames. A respondent from Gharyan stated in the survey: ‘Mixed neighbourhoods are particularly unsafe, but neighbourhoods dominated by one tribal actor are relatively safe.’
Compared to findings from municipalities that are homogenous in terms of security provision, figure 12 shows that in municipalities where the security realm is fragmented (e.g. Tripoli, Zawiyah and Sabratha) more intrusive types of violence are experienced. This is likely to be the case because in areas of fragmented security provision, citizens have been confronted with open and fierce competition between armed groups.
However, the survey shows that respondents living in municipalities where security provision is fragmented do not necessarily feel less safe than those in areas where the security polity is homogenous (see figure 2). On the contrary: survey data support the idea that in Libya there are municipalities where a fragmented security landscape produced a sense of order and stability: survey findings show that 62% of respondents in fragmented (militia-held) municipalities feel safe compared to 40% in areas controlled by tribal actors (see figure 13). This may be explained by the fact that tribalism and militia culture are intertwined and that recent waves of heavy fighting involved tribal actors (notably around the southern city of Sebha, for example). But more than anything, it underscores the need to contextualise data. The survey includes a sample from Tripoli (from January-February 2018) which has a very particular security landscape. Before the current round of fighting, militias in Tripoli stabilised the immediate security situation for local residents, even though the same militias are widely seen as a security problem (see box ‘Tripoli: organised fragmentation’).
Tripoli was included in the survey sample and counts as a fragmented security polity. A number of militias dominate the city’s territory (and increasingly state institutions and the bureaucracy) leaving the government powerless. However, at the time of the survey (early 2018), Tripoli was no unstable patchwork of armed groups constantly fighting each other. Since 2016, the city has been carved up into marked areas where particular armed groups have exclusive control (see map below). The boundaries of areas of control are clear for all and violent clashes have mostly occurred at the fringes of the city or when an armed group oversteps the boundaries that are in place. For citizens, this situation of organised fragmentation has significantly improved everyday security. This clearly shines through in the survey findings. However, current fighting in and around the city makes clear how delicate this status quo really is and that fighting by the same militia may lower residents’ feelings of relative security.
Legend:
Pink – Special Deterrence Forces
Blue – Al Nawasi Battalion
Green – Abu Saleem Brigade
Purple – Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade
Orange – Mobile National Forces
Grey – Disputed
Yellow – Al Baqara and Al-Kani Battalion (Tajoura)
Source: Source: Al-Marssad
Survey findings demonstrate that Libyans experience different interrelated and mutually reinforcing threats that cut across different aspects of their lives, highlighting the interface between security and development. Even though the survey used for this study focused on security threats, other forms of threat commonly cited by survey respondents included economic insecurity, limited access to basic services, and health insecurity. Or, as a respondent from Ghadames put it: ‘I need protection from all types of threats and violence.’[58]
Recognising the full spectrum of types of insecurities and the security challenges faced by Libyans today, a gap opens up between perceptions of insecurity and the incident-based reality of security in Libya. Most respondents say they are exposed to severe safety threats in their direct environment, even though Libya ranks as a low-intensity conflict country. Indeed, analysis of conflict events shows that violent incidents and fatalities in Libya steadily decreased between 2011 and 2017 (although the decrease was slowed down by the escalation of violence in 2014, see figure 14). Yet 79% of respondents have experienced or seen destruction and loss of property and 59% identified murder as a direct threat to their security (see figure 15). Or, as a respondent from Zawiyah put it: ‘There is no safe place in our municipality since the city is controlled by armed groups. A simple tension may result in gunfire.’[59] Such findings demonstrate the volatility of the situation in many areas and the consequent need to contextualise survey data. Above all perhaps, it underlines the impact that conflict and the actions of armed groups can have on communities and the importance of factoring in local perceptions in all attempts to improve local security.
