The limited success of successive post-2003 Iraqi governments in translating the end of a brutal dictatorship into better lives for ordinary citizens has created a profound sense of disillusionment with the political elite.[63] Politicians are commonly thought to abuse their positions for private gain, while neglecting their public duties to improve the country’s economy, security, services, and infrastructure.[64] The disillusionment with the political system was on full display during the May 2018 parliamentary elections. Despite the period of optimism that followed the symbolic defeat of IS, the turnout rate was the lowest since 2005, with the accuracy of the official turnout rate (44.5%) being widely disputed.[65] For example, participation in major Iraqi cities, such as Basra and Baghdad, was probably lower.[66] This suggests that many Iraqis no longer consider elections a possible solution to the array of public policy problems the country faces.[67]

The Parliament, in particular its dominant blocs, have become associated with widespread corruption and ethno-sectarianism. Former Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi was perceived as weak and unable (or unwilling) to challenge influential political elites. This was evident in the 10 months it took to form a cabinet (September 2018 to June 2019). In addition, Mahdi did not manage to fulfill his government programme, which promised better services and more jobs within 100 days. Near daily electricity shortages are a visible reminder of these broken promises.

Another factor contributing to poor government credibility and legitimacy is the unsettled status of the territories disputed between Iraq and the Kurdistan region. After the Iraqi army retook these territories following the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum, many armed groups and political factions have come to operate in the area under the guise of working with, or representing, the Iraqi government.[68] These forces are not unified, but engaged in building their own patronage networks and applying ethno-sectarian rhetoric when it suits them. In short, the pre-IS conflict between Baghdad and Erbil has become more difficult to resolve as the Kirkuk area now features starker multi-sectarian/ethnic competition between political factions and military groups over loyalty and resources.[69] This has several knock-on effects. For a start, the Iraq state is unable to effectively control the territories it retook (for example, Kirkuk still does not have an elected governor).[70] Key administrative decisions are not taken, and public services are deteriorating, and public investment is non-existent. In addition, those parts of the disputed territories without Peshmerga or Iraqi Security Forces remain useful recuperation areas for IS. The group has skillfully exploited this vacuum to conduct hundreds of small hit-and-run attacks, as well as kidnappings.[71]

Yet another factor contributing to poor government credibility and legitimacy is the slow pace of reconstruction and reconciliation in areas formerly held by IS – especially greater Mosul. Two years after its liberation, whatever progress there has been exists mostly on paper. While the challenge is formidable and estimated to require US$40 billion (at a rate of US$1,8 billion a year), even the modest US$560 million allocated in the 2019 national budget[72] suffered from significant leakage in the form of corruption, nepotism and poor planning.[73] For example, some contractors have stated that winning a tender – if one is issued – requires bribing the local director of the reconstruction authority as well as side-payments to several other officials.[74] The process of compensating people for the physical damage to their properties also remains slow and marred by corruption.[75]

In this context, incidents like the ferry capsizing on the Tigris river on 21 March 2019 (causing 103 people to drown due to overloading) rapidly turned into explosive manifestations of public anger and popular frustration with the slow pace of reconstruction and poor government performance.[76] Following the incident and the associated protests, Mosul’s governor was dismissed and a new one elected.[77] However, any positive effect of this prompt response was undone when backroom deals emerged revealing how politicians had manipulated the appointment process, trading consent for personal gain.[78] At the same time, it should be noted that a change of governor hardly presents a solution for the problems of poor administration that beset Mosul and other places. Provincial and municipal bureaucracies remain so thoroughly penetrated by political parties and their affiliates that rent seeking displaces administrative performance and efficiency as core activities.

The final factor that substantially magnified and accelerated popular disillusionment with the Iraqi government has been its non-accommodating and disproportionately repressive response to the protests that have rocked the country since October 2019. While such protests are not new in themselves, their larger scale, greater intensity and the escalating nature of their demands – nothing short of wholesale replacement of the ruling class – posed a major challenge to Iraq’s political establishment. This establishment chose to respond with widespread and lethal repression, leading to an estimated 600 deaths as well as thousands of injured and imprisoned protestors.[79] Only in December, after about three months of protests, did the Iraqi Prime Minister, Abdul Mahdi, resign and only five months later was a new Prime Minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, appointed. Elite resistance to change, lack of government responsiveness and the crackdown against protesters eroded whatever confidence still existed in Iraq’s political system of rule and patronage.[80]