Iraq’s emergent democracy stands at an important junction. The continuing intensity of the protests that have rocked Iraq since early October 2019 shows that its citizens are only too aware of this. Moreover, the necessity of going through three government formation attempts to install a new prime minister and cabinet after the resignation of Adil Abdul-Mahdi in December 2019 suggests that Iraq’s political elites are conscious of the precarious state of ‘their’ democracy as well. Although, so far, with the intent to block rather than enable reform.
From this junction, one road leads to further entrenchment of an oligopoly of interconnected and foreign-linked elite networks. It would see Iraq slowly join the region’s more authoritarian states in all but name. Another road – the high road – leads to rejuvenation of Iraq’s democracy. It creates greater political inclusivity in gender, generational and ethnic-sectarian terms, improves accountability and produces more effective public policies that will allow Iraq to progress as a nation. Both paths will be long, winding and hazardous. Democracies tend to develop through crises during which politically influential elites forge painful, imperfect and partial compromises, whether piecemeal or radical. From this perspective, Iraq’s current problem in pursuing the high road is that its political elites have largely united to maintain the status quo with the support of at least some of their constituents, while grassroots protests clamour for change, supported to some extent by the country’s Shi’a religious authorities in Najaf.
On the upside, Iraq’s tentative democracy has survived several civil wars amid a wave of regional authoritarian retrenchment. Its elections continue to matter, contestation between political parties remains intense, there is less sectarian rhetoric and acknowledgement of the need for democratic rejuvenation is growing among citizens and some politicians. Yet, the current governance mechanisms and practices – both formal and informal – of Iraq’s democracy do not, on balance, produce the public policies and public goods the country needs in order to accelerate its national development.
On the downside, several problems block the change that is needed to take the high road. One issue is the yawning gap between the paper stipulations of Iraq’s decentralising constitution and the practical reality of its much more centralised rule. Another problem lies in the informal Al-Muhasasa practice, the system that upholds a sectarian quota-based allocation of government jobs and resources, reduces accountability and creates a closed system of elite rule. A further problem is the deep penetration of the civil service by political parties for their own gain, sometimes to the point that administrators and party members are difficult to distinguish. Yet another problem is the fact that Iraq is governed by a number of elite networks that centre on groups and individuals that may or may not hold formal positions. Such networks tend not to be accountable, fuse operations across different strategic domains (politics, economy, security…), privatise public goods, and maintain a closed system of political representation. A final part of the problem is the strong external links that many Iraqi political parties – especially their leaders – have, and which at times overlay domestic priorities with foreign ones, particularly in times of regional tension.
Consequently, accelerating Iraq’s national development requires governance improvements at different levels. First, the mechanics that make its system of political representation and democracy tick, need adjustment so that formal rules and informal practices become better aligned with each other. Also, more meaningful political competition requires more substantial incentives for political parties to compete on the basis of credible policies that serve Iraq’s national development and expose them to greater electoral accountability. Second, Iraq’s political elites and its political culture need rejuvenation and generational change on a non-sectarian basis. The current closed patriarchal mechanism of circulating the same cast of older politicians with appreciable vested interests needs fresh air in the form of new ideas, groups and individuals. The recent appointment of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi can be considered a cautious step in this direction, albeit not necessarily with the objective of breaking the existing mold. Third, Iraq’s country’s public administration needs reform in ways that create more space for competence- and rule-based governance that is oriented towards citizen priorities.
This report largely focuses on how international actors can help address the first point, i.e. strengthening the democratic mechanisms of Iraq’s political system. From this perspective, one contribution that they can make is to facilitate (not influence or determine) processes of contestation between Iraq’s social forces (its political parties, elite networks, tribes, ethno-sectarian groups, religious authorities and protestors) about the hierarchy of systemic reform priorities for the country’s political system, and the balance between the speed, scope and feasibility of their implementation so that such reform can be undertaken as peacefully and as well-informed as possible.
Examples of initiatives that can be appropriate include:
Providing open and safe spaces to discuss and contest key political problems such as reducing corruption, economic diversification, the use of coercive capabilities, Kurdish-Arab tensions or US versus Iranian affiliations throughout Iraq’s political elites, and in particular what mechanisms are necessary to resolve them
Developing a better understanding of how an Al-Muhasasa type system can support both the quality and inclusivity of governance in a diverse society that is fragmented along ethnic-sectarian, gender and generational lines
Growing future leaders through (a) cross-sectarian leadership ‘development’ programme(s) to improve the quality of political leadership. Such a programme should work both with candidates from the existing political elite and with ‘opposition’ and professional elites, while ensuring adequate generational representation
Providing examples of how difficult political reforms have been introduced elsewhere and what successful reformist electoral strategies have looked like in other countries, paying attention to the quality of political leadership, and the development of political parties and effective opposition.
The conclusion contains more detail on the practicalities of such initiatives, i.e. who could do what with whom and with what tools. By themselves, such initiatives will not resolve Iraq’s pressing governance problems. But undertaken correctly, they can help Iraq’s social forces in figuring out how to address them more comprehensively and more peacefully.