The aftermath of the 2018 Iraqi elections – which saw a low voter turnout, a recount due to persistent accusations of fraud and a 10-month delay before a fully-formed government commenced its duties – showed how vulnerable Iraq’s democracy remains to elite capture. It also demonstrated the persistence of a sectarian system for allocating government jobs in which horse-trading over key positions and portfolios is institutionalised and subject to factional as well as personal interests. Incidentally, the cabinet formation by Prime Minister-designate Al-Kadhimi in April 2020 illustrated a similar dynamic. At the same time, however, the 2018 elections saw parties conducting a more issue-based electoral campaign – albeit without proposing much by way of solutions – and adhering to a more nationalist discourse. They also featured intra-Shi’a splits, which create scope for more cross-communal politics.[1] While these developments are in the early stages, they could be signs that Iraq’s fragile democracy is ‘coming-of-age’.
Nevertheless, the growth of street protests across Iraq in 2018/19 indicates broad popular dissatisfaction with government performance now that the fight against Islamic State (IS) no longer consumes all political focus and public resources.[2] By ransacking the party offices and premises of the government, political parties, and groups that are part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the protests are essentially accusing the country’s entire political class. They have made it abundantly clear that the population of a rentier state with plenty of public revenue (mostly from oil production) is fed up with the unequal distribution of these proceeds, deteriorating standards of living[3] and the wholesale plunder of the public coffers.[4] While some protests used to be instigated by the same political parties that compete in Parliament, the waves of protest that started in early October 2019 do seem to be propelled by a groundswell of popular discontent.[5]
In addition, the fact that Iraq’s political elites only managed to agree on a new prime minister and a new government on their third pass[6] – in the face of a Covid-19 health crisis, a plummeting oil price and a defunct national budget as well as a resurgent Islamic State – indicates how fragmented Iraqi national politics have become, how deeply elite interests have entrenched themselves into the country’s governance structures and how polarizing the US – Iranian standoff has been for Iraq. In short, the ‘whack-a-prime-minister’ period of February to April 2020 mostly illustrates that current attitudes, interests and alliances to rule of Iraq’s political elites no longer serve the interests of many of its citizens.[7]
The above notwithstanding, in the regional context of deepening authoritarianism – consider Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates – Iraq’s emergent democracy has stood out for having survived three successive civil wars since 2003, including the fight against IS.[8] The country’s elections are vigorously contested, its once-dominant political party (Da’wa) had to relinquish its hold over Iraqi politics during the 2018 elections, and political dissent has not been as brutally repressed as in Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.[9] Nonetheless, the violent government response to recent protests in Baghdad and southern Iraq highlights the fragility of Iraq’s democratic transition.[10]
This short report focuses on the question how the democratic character of Iraq’s political system can be strengthened, including what practical administrative measures are needed to that effect. While we leave the larger – but essential – topic of public sector reform to another paper, we hope that the analysis below can help Iraq’s democracy transition gradually to the next stage of its development.
At about 16 years old, Iraqi democracy bears a resemblance to an adolescent facing key life choices. How should it respond to inadequate governance; significant reconstruction and reconciliation problems; meagre economic growth; a historically low oil price that already played havoc with the national budget and will soon ruin the Treasury; the growing remnants of IS; inadequate basic administration and a shortfall in essential services? Whether adolescence leads to delinquency or maturity depends in large part on whether Iraq’s democracy can rejuvenate its game rules. This needs to include closing the gap between its (on paper) federal, decentralised constitution and the centralised rule that exists in practice. Such reform is likely to decrease political party fragmentation, enable new political voices to emerge that transcend ethnic-sectarian, gender and generational divides,[11] reduce the impact of the Al-Muhasasa system on the business of government, empower local governance and improve the quality of (local) administration.[12]
To arrive at its recommendations, the report starts with a short reflection on the political legacy of Iraq’s ‘Saddam Hussein era’ before discussing, in turn, the problem of elite inclusivity, the 2018 elections, growing disillusionment with the output performance of Iraq’s adolescent democracy and the growth of popular protests throughout the country.
It might be useful for readers unfamiliar with Iraqi domestic politics to take a look at Annex 1 (The fragmentation of Shi’a, Kurdish and Sunni politics in Iraq) and Annex 2 (An overview of Iraq’s main political parties) before embarking on the main analysis.