This short report has focused on the question of how the democratic character of Iraq’s political system can be strengthened, including what practical administrative measures are needed to that effect. The preceding analysis has highlighted that the democratic character of the Iraqi state remains a work in progress. This is wholly unsurprising if one considers the deep and recurrent cycles of conflict that the country has gone through since the 1980s, and the fact that its current constitution and government mechanisms were created after invasion and in times of political fragmentation, followed by further violence, civil war and radicalism.
It would be easy to draw the conclusion that application of the Iraqi Constitution needs major revision, electoral law should be reformed, the Al-Muhasasa system discarded, the creation of new cross-sectarian political parties facilitated, and the civil service staffed on the basis of merit. However, while the Iraqi government certainly has an obligation towards its citizens and national development to improve the democratic nature of its rule, institutions and practices, flights of fancy will not do the job.
In other words, while the issues listed are significant and reform is pressing, they cannot be tackled simultaneously, and must be addressed in a way that gives entrenched interests the option of contributing and changing course. This is not because such interests are benign or altruistic, but because their resistance to change could easily trigger protracted violence, such as can be witnessed today in the repression of protests, or even civil war. At the same time, change that is too gradual is unlikely to satisfy the ongoing cycle of protests, or to deliver the improvements in governance that are so urgently required.
In short, there is a fine balance to be struck between the speed and scope of change that a divided country run by an oligarchy of elites can accept and implement. Pressure will need to be combined with patience.[96] What exact balance works is up to Iraq’s social forces to establish: its politicians, citizens, tribes, armed groups, young people, women and religious authorities. Short of violence, coups or revolution, the negotiation and contestation between the interests of such social forces requires extraordinary and long-term processes to be put in place to organise and enable them. These must be complementary to existing procedures and institutions, since it is precisely the problematic functionality of these procedures and institutions that creates the need for an additional impulse.
Against this backdrop, international actors can help by maintaining the moral parameters for the contestation between Iraq’s social forces based on the UN Charter, the International Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant elements of international law to ensure that the rights and dignity of individuals and groups are respected and proceedings are as peaceful as possible. As the guardian of the world’s corpus of moral standards, the UN in particular has a key role to play in both upholding the rights and assuring the safety of protestors to voice their demands, stressing the duty of the Government to maintain public order and hold those responsible for excessive violence accountable.
International actors can also facilitate, rather than influence or determine, processes of contestation between Iraq’s social forces – such as its political parties, elite networks, tribes, ethno-sectarian groups, religious authorities and protestors – by helping to ensure that they are peaceful and well informed. This can be done by, for example:
Providing open and safe discussion spaces. Create (a) well-organised, well-facilitated, safe and informed space(s) for Iraq’s social forces (see above) to discuss and contest political issues in need of change. Topics should be defined by participants but can include concrete challenges such as the functionality of Iraq’s Constitution and its electoral law and broader social issues that have political relevance, such as the role of women and young people in the political future of Iraq. The key is to ensure that such spaces are inclusive, informed by the analysis of approaches and solutions to similar political problems elsewhere, and that they are safe – i.e. that participants can meet and disagree without fear of repercussions. Such spaces do not need to produce or agree solutions – Iraq already has fora for this purpose – but they should stimulate contact, promote rational discussion, increase confidence and develop ideas.
Especially international non-governmental organizations are well placed to undertake this kind of work, preferably of course together with Iraqi counterparts (but note this can be challenging in the current environment). The Beirut Common Space Initiative provides one kind of example[97], but past work in the area of dialogue facilitation by the Berghof Foundation[98] or mediation organizations like the HD Centre or the Dialogue Advisory Group (DAG) can also serve as sources of inspiration.
Develop a better understanding of Al-Muhasasa. Develop a more refined understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the Al-Muhasasa system as it was originally intended, how it works today and how it can, or cannot, serve Iraq in the future. Such discussion should step away from easy condemnation of the practice and take account of the fact that Iraq will remain a highly diverse society characterised by many conflicting interests that require effective – and permanent – mediating institutions and processes. Overcoming the system’s current gender and generational limitations would, for example, already be a major achievement that requires cultural, systemic and party-political changes.
This is a more analytical intervention that should be undertaken by a cross-sectarian, cross-gender and cross-generational team of Iraqi analysts supported by international researchers that provide comparative insights, methodological insights and quality assurance. Such a research team should furthermore be championed, and report to, a board that mixes high-level representatives of Iraq’s main political parties (see Annex 2) with more neutral voices, such as the country’s religious authorities.
Growing leaders. Initiate a cross-sectarian leadership ‘development’ programme that seeks to improve the quality of political leadership and build a shared political vision for Iraq (e.g. via the use of scenario planning)[99] and to increase confidence different segments of Iraq’s social forces, such as its political parties, tribes, socio-ethnic, armed groups and religious authorities.[100] Participants should be a mix of the established order, i.e. leaders from among existing political parties; more neutral, outside voices such as leaders of Iraq’s various religious authorities and tribes; and leaders from Iraq’s protest movement(s). Using the experience of leadership programmes elsewhere, these programmes should also focus on empowering women and youth groups to overcome gender and generational divides.
This is a sensitive intervention that could be initiated by a newly constituted or revamped Iraqi civil service council, college or board. To give it an external impetus in Iraq’s tense political environment, it is best supported by a trusted bilateral partner of the Iraqi government (i.e. another country) with a neutral reputation that works through a non-governmental organization with an established reputation for leadership development, either from the global private sector or in the development sphere. It could be analytically supported by the internationally renowned Development Leadership Program, a global research effort that ‘explores how leadership, power and political processes drive or block successful development’.[101]
Offering examples of difficult political reforms elsewhere. Set up, or ‘task’, a(n) (existing) knowledge centre to examine and share other experiences with large-scale governance reform and political change that offer evidence and examples of key considerations, conditions and parameters.[102] Its work should be guided by asking how tough political reform has been enabled elsewhere and how these experiences are useful to Iraq today. A focus on the Arab world and on countries with similar levels of development and riches would enhance relevance and comparability. Such work should include advice on effective electoral reform strategies, with due attention to political leadership, conducting effective opposition and political party development.
Such an intervention could usefully tie in with the creation of safe spaces for dialogue and enrich these with the necessary reflections and insights. It could be undertaken by a think tank or non-governmental organization from the Arab world (e.g. Lebanon, Turkey or Tunisia) partnering with a Western counterpart to capture both reform struggles in the region and further afield. These would have to work with a range of existing Iraqi research centers such as Al-Bayan, the American University of Sulaymaniyah, MERI and the Al-Nahrain Center for Strategic Studies to distill implications for the Iraqi political context. It should also benefit from UN patronage and support, either via UNAMI or UNDP, leveraging the experience of its Governance Center in Oslo (Norway).
All these initiatives require a local office and strong presence of any international actor wishing to engage in them, a capable local Iraqi partner to work with, and capable staff that speak Arabic, are familiar with Iraqi culture and have knowledge of the political landscape of the wider Middle East. By themselves, such initiatives will not resolve Iraq’s pressing governance problems. But, if undertaken well, they can help the country’s social forces to figure out more comprehensively and more peacefully how to address them.