Street protests in Iraq are a mixture of those driven by political parties and those that are more grassroots in nature. The former are typically an extra-parliamentary tool in which political parties use organised demonstrations to mobilise their base, emphasise particular political messages and put pressure on partners as well as rivals. For example, in June 2018 supporters of the State of Law coalition protested against the Independent High Electoral Commission to have the 2018 parliamentary electoral results released as they were not in favour of a recount.[81] Such politically orchestrated protests are centralised, large scale and frequent. They are relatively effective in getting their messages heard, but this does not mean that their demands are addressed. Often, they are protests against the foreign policies of other states, not in the expectation of influencing those countries, but to show where the sympathies of the protesting party(ies) lie(s), or to put pressure on domestic allies in crafting the Iraqi position on the particular issue. A good example is the 2019 storming of the Bahraini embassy in protest against the conference in Manama where President Trump’s Palestinian peace plan was discussed.[82]

It is the Sadrist party that has perfected the art of political street protest, especially in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square area. The party’s protests tend to be louder and more frequent than those of its political competitors due to the Sadrist movement’s large and loyal base which is capable of mobilising within and outside of Baghdad. The staunch loyalty of his followers allows Al-Sadr to initiate protests through a simple tweet or Facebook post while his political offices across Baghdad and southern Iraq facilitate logistics. Other political parties such as the State of Law coalition and Al-Hikma also mobilise large protests in Baghdad. However, they lack the edge of the Sadrist demonstrators, who have shown that they are willing to turn violent when necessary, such as when they stormed the Iraqi Parliament on 30 April 2016.[83]

In contrast, there are more grassroots-based, street-driven protests that tended to be more scattered and issue-specific and are mobilised through social media. Such protests typically revolved around poor services, high unemployment and inadequate pay (see Table 1). The political establishment has generally responded more meaningfully to such protests because of the short-term opportunities they offer, such as increasing government popularity through quick-fix measures and symbolic announcements or canvassing new constituencies. Grassroots protests have also tended to be supported by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, which gives them moral force, and being seen in sync with his pronouncements offers politicians a chance to ‘borrow’ some of this moral legitimacy.[84] Nevertheless, political responses have fallen well short of addressing the issues these grassroots protests raise,[85] creating an escalating cycle of protests as well as growing levels of repression.[86] The Government’s response improved somewhat under Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi who, in contrast to the reactive attitude of Al-Abadi, met with the Basra local government early on during his tenure (October 2018), appointed Al-Ameri (leader of the Fatah alliance) as special envoy to Basra,[87] and maintains good relations with neighbouring countries to ensure steady electricity connections with Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Table 1
Top-3 grievances as expressed in protests (August 2017 – July 2019, nationwide)

#

Grievances

Incident count

1

Services

(electricity, water, housing, health, sewage, roads, infrastructure)

652

2

Unemployment

279

3

Pay and benefits

206

Source: Based on monthly reports from Ben Robin-D'Cruz, South Iraq Security Reports: August 2017 July 2019, iraqafteroccupation.com

While most grassroots protests were small scale until well into 2018, July of that year was a turning point.[88] It saw accelerating and broadening protests in Basra especially, where summer heat coupled with worsening electricity cuts pushed Basrawis towards larger demonstrations.[89] There is a threefold explanation for these protests. First, there are the practical service delivery failures the province faces, in areas like water and electricity. Second, although Basra is Iraq’s economic (oil) hub, it sees little benefit from its underground riches in terms of its provincial and municipal development. Third, Basra is Iraq’s Shi’a heartland, where most Shi’a political parties have key constituencies and where many Hashd recruits hail from. However, it is marginalised by the same political parties (i.e. the Sadrists, Al-Hikma, Da’wa, Badr and Asaib ahl al-Haq). This creates an explosive mixture. For example, hundreds of protestors stormed a Chinese Oil firm (PetroChina) in Al-Kahla (Maysan) on 13 July 2018; hundreds closed roads around the home of al-Khidir district’s mayor in Muthana province on 16 July 2018; and hundreds of protestors rallied in Umm Qasr on 15 July 2018.[90] As protests grew, their organisation changed from primarily relying on social media influencers who determined the location and date of the protests (like Kadhim Sahlani with 6.5k followers on Facebook) to tapping into tribal networks and civil society organisations to coordinate and represent demands.

While Basra is a key ‘protest nucleus’ for the reasons mentioned, it is remarkable how grassroots protests have spread to include Baghdad and Iraq’s Shi’a south, Kurdish Iraq, and Nineveh province. In Baghdad and the south, the protests acquired a new character in October 2019. No longer limiting themselves to demanding ‘better basics’ (water, electricity and jobs) they have powerfully voiced a demand for wholesale political change, including the reduction of foreign influence on Iraqi governance (mostly in relation to Iran, also the US), which puts them squarely at odds with the elite networks running the state. The protests of October–December 2019 also featured very high participation rates of both women and young people, who face especially poor prospects in Iraq’s patriarchal political system that expropriates public goods for the private benefit of the elite networks running the state. Unsurprisingly, yet tragically, this triggered sustained repressive violence that resulted in hundreds of protestors being killed, in part at the hands of armed forces that are only partially linked to the Iraqi state. While the resignation of PM Abdul Mahdi represents a clear victory for the protestors, no structural reforms have so far been seriously entertained that can address the limited inclusivity, poor accountability and poor performance of national governance in Iraq. Without a credible alternative political platform, clearer leadership of the protest and resolution of the Iran–US regional stand-off, such measures are unlikely to affect the existing power balance in the short term.[91]

In Kurdistan, over the past few years local grievances have increasingly spilled onto the streets as its citizens feel the material impact of a weakened economy due to the war against IS and the emotional impact of unfulfilled promises, such as the independence referendum of 25 September 2017.[92] These protests have been instrumental in forcing the KDP and PUK to improve their relationships with Baghdad to secure a budget transfer deal that enabled them to re-start paying public servant and Peshmerga salaries in full (2019).

In Nineveh, most grassroots protests have been specific and local. For example, following the ferry accident of 21 March 2019, Mosulawis protested against the incompetence of the provincial authorities en masse once the incident had gone viral on social media.[93] In some sense their demands were met with the dismissal of Governor Naufal Al-Akoub, but the underlying poor quality of provincial administration has been left unaddressed.[94] In fact, protests against the backroom dealing that led to the election of the new governor, Mansour Al-Maraid, were completely ignored.[95] This suggests that if there is sufficient consensus among Iraq’s political parties, popular demands can be ignored.

In short, the growth of grassroots protests indicates that the Iraqi political system suffers from chronic legitimacy and performance issues. Disillusioned Iraqis from Mosul, Baghdad, Basra, and Kurdistan have all protested to obtain better services, more job opportunities, greater accountability of their political elites and better performance of their public administrations. Nonetheless, there has been little cross-ethnic/sectarian cooperation, and this has so far prevented local demonstrations from turning into a larger national class struggle against corruption and the ruling elite.

Ben Robin-D'Cruz, ‘South Iraq Security Report: May 2018’, Iraq After Occupation, link.
Seth Frantzman, ‘Protesters Storm Bahrain Embassy in Baghdad after U.S.-Backed Summit – Watch’, Jerusalem Post, 28 June 2019, link.
Ghassan Adnan and Matt Bradley, ‘Protesters Storm Iraqi Parliament’, The Wall Street Journal, 30 April 2016, link.
Hamzeh Mustafa, ‘Sistani supports the demonstrations in Basra ... and Abadi trying to calm them Asharq Al-Awsat, June 14, 2018, www.shorturl.at/amBKW.
There have been some improvements in service delivery and water supply (though mainly because of heavy rainfall). Also, thousands of extra public sector jobs were created (e.g. within the Ministry of Electricity). See: ‘Prime Minister’s weekly press conference’, Iraq News Agency, 21 May 2019, link; ‘Council of Ministers Resolutions’, Prime Minister’s Office, 12 March 2019, link.
For analysis of the protests across Iraq in October 2019 (Baghdad and the south): Ezzeddine, N. and E. van Veen, A paralyzed status quo: expect more protests and violence in Iraq, The Hague: Clingendael, 2019; see 'also: Ben Robin-D'Cruz, ‘South Iraq Security Report: July 2018’, Iraq After Occupation, link.
Ali al-Aqily, Jassim al-Jabiri, Samya Kullab and Staff, ‘Hadi al-Amiri appointed “czar” of Basra’, Iraq Oil Report, April 11, 2019, link.
This is underlined by the fact that more and more Iraqi’s are willing to make their voices heard. An NDI poll registered 76% of respondents in support of protests, for example (conducted from August to October 2018). See: ‘NDI Poll: Iraqis call on new government for equitable reconstruction, services and jobs’, National Democratic Institute, November 20, 2018, link
John Catherine, ‘Iran cuts off electricity to sweltering Iraq due to unpaid fees: Ministry’, Kurdistan 24, 7 July 2018, link.
Ben Robin-D'Cruz, ‘South Iraq Security Report: July 2018’, Iraq After Occupation, link.
Ezzeddine and Van Veen (2019), op.cit.; Al-Rikabi (2019), op.cit.; Al-Shadeedi, H., No time like the present for democratic reform in Iraq, 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, online, 2019.
It should be noted that the PUK in Sulaymaniyah is relatively tolerant of protests while the KDP in Dohuk and Erbil is not. Generally, protests mostly take place in Dohuk/Erbil to express discontent vis-à-vis Baghdad. The increase in ‘unauthorised’ protests in Dohuk/Erbil is therefore a serious sign of popular dissatisfaction with the KDP.
Kosar Nawzad, ‘Mosul protesters demand ouster of Iraqi governor after tragic drownings’, Kurdistan 24, 22 March 22 2019, link.
‘Iraq's parliament fires governor over Mosul ferry disaster’, Al Jazeera English, 24 March 2019, link.
Video and analysis of protest tweeted by Mustafa Habib, Twitter, 13 May 2019, link.