An interesting feature of the development of Iraqi national politics over the past decade-and-a-half has been the growing party-political fragmentation of its different ethno-sectarian groups. The US invasion of 2003 was followed by a Kurdish-Shi’a political takeover of national-level governance around 2005. On the one hand, the PUK and KPD teamed up and made themselves useful to the US, gaining quasi-autonomy over the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in the process. The mix of their unity and autonomy turned them into essential coalition partners in Baghdad until the 2018 elections, fulfilling a role akin to that of ‘kingmakers’. On the other hand, key Shi’a parties, such as Da’wa and ISCI, did the same at the national level and captured the central government as a result, with Da’wa providing all prime ministers until 2018. This loose Kurdish–Shi’a alliance dominated Iraqi politics until 2014–2018, when Al-Maliki’s removal from office, Da’wa’s internal split, Al-Sadr’s ‘transformation’ into a more ‘Iraqi politician’, and the rise of Shi’a parties based on the Al-Hashd al-Sha’abi fragmented the Shi’a political landscape, just as the Kurdish independence referendum ruptured Kurdish unity in 2017. All the while, Iraq’s Sunni political parties essentially went from one phase of fragmentation to another. These trends are discussed in greater detail below.

Iraqi Kurdistan: Once allies in Baghdad, the PUK and the KDP sink into acrimony

Fragmentation within the Kurdish political landscape can historically be traced back to the 1975 emergence of the PUK as a breakaway faction from the KDP and the Kurdish civil war of the 1990s. The 2017 Kurdish referendum is only the most recent manifestation of the lingering animosity, although it did forcefully rupture the tactical PUK-KDP alliance that had existed since 2003. The referendum was a KDP-led initiative that did not enjoy support across the Kurdish political spectrum. Yet, its national-emotional appeal ensured that other Kurdish parties, leaders and intellectuals struggled to criticise both its occurrence and its timing. Most Kurdish political parties shared the drive for independence and recognised the KDP’s ability to push the plan through, but substantial disagreement existed over the timing and the approach. Nevertheless, the ‘not now’ campaign failed to gain sufficient popular support. Holding the referendum proved to be a costly mistake as the Iraqi Security Forces and the Hashd retook Kirkuk and the majority of the disputed territories on 16–17 October 2017, areas that the KPD and PUK had themselves opportunistically retaken from IS between 2014–2017. In the PUK-held areas, Peshmerga forces withdrew before the arrival of the ISF, suggesting that the party was aware of the ISF advance, while minor clashes occurred between KDP Peshmerga and the ISF. To some observers, this implied that a deal had been negotiated between Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah.[103]

After this episode, the KDP accused the PUK of collaborating with the ISF and betraying Kurdish interests.[104] In the event, the developments of October 2017 were just the first in a new cycle of tensions between the PUK and KDP that continues to this day. These tensions have manifested themselves in the parties pursuing different electoral strategies (for example, the PUK ran in Kirkuk during the 2018 elections, the KDP refused to do so), disagreeing to create the usual Kurdish coalition to compete in the national elections and their lack of agreement on the allocation of key positions in Baghdad and Erbil.[105]

Tensions between the PUK and KDP escalated even further in September 2018, when Kurdistan held parliamentary elections in which the KDP won more than 50% of the vote. The PUK also performed relatively well, managing to win the elections in its stronghold, Sulaymaniyah, despite existing tensions, political competition and a debatable governance track record. Agreement on the nomination of ministers and allocation of key positions within the KRI was only reached in April 2019.[106] In a surprising about-face, the PUK subsequently boycotted the 28 May parliamentary session that sought to elect a new president for the KRI.[107] When this process nevertheless went ahead, the PUK subsequently participated in Nechervan Barzani’s inauguration ceremony and agreed to implement the earlier KDP-PUK arrangement to divide government positions.[108] In short, it appears that if the stakes are high enough, the PUK and KDP remain capable of pragmatically working together to preserve their influence and interests despite their increased mistrust.

Majority rule: Shi’a parties compete over Iraq’s leadership[109]

Despite their shared belief, Iraq’s Shi’a are far from politically united. Their parties compete vigorously with one another, using historical legacies, religious differences, leadership charisma and other available means to increase their share of the vote – and power. Apart from Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, who is politically ‘quietist’, nationalist and promotes a ‘good governance’ agenda, no Shi’a political or religious leader can claim influence across Iraq’s entire Shi’a population. Religious figures with a strong political profile, such as Al-Sadr, have a substantial impact on political issues that unite the Shi’a community, but their influence is limited where opinions differ. Despite such competition, Iraq’s Shi’a are dominated by a limited number of individuals and families that have consistently upheld their influence over Iraqi politics (this is comparable to the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the Barzanis and Talabanis).

The majority of Iraq’s Shi’a political parties were united in their opposition to Saddam Hussein. The main ones – such as Da’wa, ISCI and the Sadrists – were relatively homogenous under strong leadership during the 1990s, but became more fragmented towards and directly after the end of Saddam’s regime in respect of issues such as the desirable level of influence of leaders in exile versus those at home (e.g. the Sadrists), the demerits and merits of pacifist versus quietest approaches to politics on the part of the Shi’a clergy, and the role of Iran in Iraqi politics.[110] Most Shi’a politicians in exile returned to Iraq after the US-led invasion of 2003. The patron-client relationships between these politicians and the US and/or Iran evolved over time to accommodate domestic agendas and objectives and became more pragmatic (and correspondingly less ideological). Competition between Shi’a political parties also intensified during this period. The split of the Badr organisation from ISCI, the Al-Fadhila party from Al-Sadr and Asaib ahl al-Haq from Al-Sadr in the second half of the 2000s all offer instructive examples. Actors like Muqtada al-Sadr and Abdel Aziz al-Hakim were able to leverage their inherited status as prominent religious leaders and/or their family influence to increase their political legitimacy and authority.

Coalitions between Shi’a parties at the time of the 2005 and 2010 elections were unstable and mainly aimed at winning the vote, carving up public authority and resources, or responding to an imminent threat. Simply put, these coalitions were mostly opportunistic and aimed at acquiring power – not exercising it. In addition, the quality and stature of the leaders of their respective political parties – such as Al-Sadr (Sadrists), Al-Maliki (Da’wa), and Al-Hakim (ISCI, later SCIRI) – proved crucial for party political coherence and electoral success. In turn, intra-elite relations strongly influenced alliance formation and durability throughout this period, with significant Iranian influence behind the scenes. Because coalitions were not based on shared political ideology/programmes or negotiated policy agreements, and because leadership relations were often conflictual, these coalitions fragmented rapidly after electoral successes, undermining the quality of governance in the longer term. However, regardless of their differences and fragmentation, Shi’a political parties were able to remain united temporarily in the face of external/internal threats to their collective influence, especially if called upon by their religious leaders.

Between 2010 and 2014, Al-Maliki (Da’wa) was able to consolidate his power via increasingly authoritarian and exclusionary means. His coalition emerged victorious in both the 2010 and 2014 parliamentary elections as his opponents proved unable to translate their numerical advantage into political power due to infighting, and because of Al-Maliki’s astute divide-and-conquer tactics that fused state with non-state resources to maintain his rule. It was only the capture of Mosul by IS in June 2014 that unified the divided opposition and enabled it to oust Al-Maliki. The latter was forced to step down and Haider al-Abadi (also Da’wa) was sworn into office. Replacing Al-Maliki with Al-Abadi remains at the root of the fragmentation of the Da’wa party, which has monopolised the premiership since 2003, especially as Al-Maliki remained Secretary General of the party. In addition to the fragmentation of the Da’wa party after 2014, Ammar al-Hakim also split from ISCI by creating the Al-Hikma Movement.

Al-Abadi managed to maintain his job during four long years of warfighting without a significant political base of his own, but this came at the price of being unable to govern beyond defeating IS – an interest all Shi’a parties shared. The growth of corruption, absence of public services, deteriorating quality of administration and his problematic relations with both the Hashd and Iraq’s Kurds had a negative impact on Al-Abadi’s 2018 electoral campaign. This facilitated another rift in the Shi’a political party landscape so that the 2018 elections saw Al-Ameri (heading the Hashd-based Fatah Alliance), Al-Sadr (Sairoun) and Al-Abadi (Al-Nasir with parts of Da’wa) emerge with comparable results (between 42–50+ seats), while Al-Hakim (Hikma movement) and Al-Maliki (State of Law coalition with parts of Da’wa) took second-place positions (between 19 and 25 seats respectively).[111]

Internal strife and marginalisation continue: Sunni parties become accessories

Division among Iraq’s Sunni factions has been a constant feature of the country’s national politics for the past 16 years. There were no notable Sunni political parties or opposition groups before 2003. Furthermore, unlike Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurds, the Sunni parties and movements that emerged after the US-led invasion had no unifying objective. While the Shi’a strove to undo their political marginalisation and capture power in Baghdad, and the Kurds championed their ethnic struggle, Iraq’s Sunni political forces remained negatively associated with the ancien regime.[112] The disarray of the Sunni political party landscape reduced their participation in national governance, which was further worsened by Al-Maliki’s sectarian and authoritarian policies. This practice was continued after 2014 in the military sphere when the PMF Committee – dominated by armed groups with ties to Iran – prevented the formation of effective and/or sizeable Sunni fighting formations that could have leveraged their IS battlefield credentials in the 2018 elections in the same way that Iran-affiliated groups did.[113] Although the Sunni fill the role of Speaker of the Parliament and ‘take’ two or three ministries (one of them always being the Ministry of Defence), they have nevertheless been sidelined by Shi’a and Kurdish political parties for all practical intents and purposes. One reason why Sunni political fragmentation persists is that many Sunni political leaders have only small constituencies that they have been unable to increase. This translates into limited influence at the national level. Another reason is that many of their leaders have sided with Shi’a and Kurdish politicians and alliances to advance their own personal interests rather than those of Iraq’s Sunni population.

The selection process for the position of Speaker of the Parliament that followed the 2018 election illustrated how the lack of unity marginalises Sunni representatives. Iraq’s Sunni parties fielded nine candidates for the country’s highest legislative position – nearly one per party.[114] None was able to gain sufficient support across the Sunni political spectrum, with the result that Parliament failed to elect a speaker during its first session, violating the Constitution. It was only then that Al-Maliki – as leader of the Al-Bina coalition – intervened, with Iranian blessing, to support his Sunni ally, Mohammed Al-Halbousi. Al-Halbousi subsequently secured the position with the support of Shi’a and Kurdish votes. Moreover, the episode split the Sunni National Axis coalition into two camps.[115] One camp is now headed by Al-Halbousi, who was able to gather enough parliamentarians around him to reestablish the ‘Sunni Forces Alliance’, while another is grouped around Khamis al-Khanjar and Ahmed al-Jabouri.[116]