State of Law Coalition under Nouri al-Maliki (25)

(main party: Da’wa; part of the Al-Bina bloc)

This coalition won more than 90 seats in 2010 and 2014, governed for 8 straight years, and has the deepest reach into Iraq’s civil service and public finances. During its final years, Al-Maliki and his party faced multiple corruption accusations and lost a third of Iraq’s territory to IS. Although Al-Maliki won the 2014 elections, political opposition and Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s refusal blocked a third term. Al-Maliki has since repaired some of his relationships with Iraq’s Sunni and Kurdish politicians, most Sunni parties have joined Al-Bina and relations with Masoud Barzani (KDP) have been normalised.

Muttahidoon under Osama al-Nujaifi (14)

(affiliated with the Reform and Construction Bloc)

Al-Nujaifi previously served as Speaker of the Parliament and Vice President. Hailing from Mosul, he was once the most notable Sunni politician. However, he lost credibility over the IS occupation of Mosul (governed by his brother at the time). Al-Nujaifi has close ties to Turkey. His party ran with Al-Khanjar, but the coalition collapsed when the two leaders joined different blocs after the 2018 elections. Al-Nujaifi recently criticised the exclusive decision making in the Reform and Reconstruction bloc, threatening to disassociate his party from it (the 14 seats are shared between blocs).

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Kosrat Rasul and Barham Salih (18)

The PUK is based in Sulaymaniyah province and influential in the Kurdish areas of Diyala and Kirkuk. Because it can work closely with other Iraqi actors, it is perceived in Baghdad as more pragmatic than the KDP. This enabled the party to maintain Iraq’s presidency (Barham Salih). The PUK has positive, historical relations with Iran, including sitting at the heart of oil, fuel and goods smuggling. The party also supports the PKK, although this has decreased under recent pressure from Turkey. While the PUK tolerates opposition parties in Sulaimaniyah, it maintains a strong grip over the security apparatus.

Fatah Alliance under Hadi al-Ameri (47)

(part of the Al-Bina bloc)

The Fatah Alliance is the political branch of the Al-Hashd al-Sha’abi (PMF). The Alliance used its credentials from fighting ISIS to obtain a decent result in the 2018 elections andfor political and financial gain in the form of reconstruction contracts, local security budgets, governor positions and ministerial posts. It has close ties with Iran (Al-Ameri fought with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war).

Al-Wataniyah Alliance under Ayad Allawi (21)[118]

(part of the Reform and Construction bloc)

Allawi established his political base and reputation during the period of relative peace in 2004–

2005 when Allawi served as Prime Minister. The Alliance lost influence after winning the 2010 elections but continues to be Iraq’s prominent secular political entity. Since 2014, Allawi has served as Deputy President. Allawi’s relationship with Iran, Arab neighbours and the US is unclear.

The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) under Masoud Barzani (25)

Established in 1946, the KDP has become Iraq’s most prominent Kurdish Party with influence extending beyond the KRI (e.g. via the Kurdish National Council into Syria). The [Iraqi] Kurdish ethnic struggle is at the heart of the KDP’s rhetoric. The KDP also ran the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum. As a result, tensions and a lack of trust characterise KDP relations with the Baghdad political elite. The KDP is on good terms with both Turkey and the US.

Alliance Towards Reform (Sairoun) under Muqtada al-Sadr (54)

(part of the Reform and Construction Bloc)

Sairoun is a national alliance of mostly Shi’a candidates and the Communist Party. It prioritises fighting corruption and appointing independent technocrats while also preserving its interests, such as control over Najaf Airport. Muqtada al-Sadr is the most popular religious leader among low-income Iraqi Shi’a. He has a strong ability to mobilise his supporters on the street. Over the last few years he has become more nationalist in his discourse.

The Arabic Project under Khamis al-Khanjar (14)

(part of the Al-Bina bloc)

A wealthy Sunni businessman with regional interests, Al-Khanjar recently re-established his position among the Sunni leadership and rebuilt his relationship with Al-Maliki after earlier accusations of treason and corruption. He has also developed a good relationship with the KDP. His history of working with Hussein’s sons and supporting IS by labelling them as ‘Sunni resistance’ hamper his political standing somewhat. The 14 seats are shared with Muttahidoon.

Al-Hikmah Movement under Amar Al-Hakeem (19)

(part of the Reform and Construction bloc)

Al-Hakeem maintains a nationalist discourse (not Shi’a). Benefiting from his family’s religious credentials, he is one of few politicians that criticise the PMF and maintains good relations with Kurds, Sunni, Iran and Iraq’s Arab neigbours. Basra’s governor, the former Minister of Transportation and the Director of Iraqi Airways were part of/close to Al-Hikmah. All three were accused of corruption.

Al-Anbari is Our Identity under Anbar Mohammed Al-Halbousi (6) (part of the Al-Bina bloc)

Mohammed al-Halbousi established this party following his relative success as governor of the Sunni province of Anbar. His positive attitude towards Iraqi-Iranian relations facilitated his appointment as the Speaker of the Parliament. Al-Halbousi cooperates closely with Al-Malki and the Al-Hashd al Sha’bi leadership.

Victory Alliance (Al-Nasir) under Haider Al-Abadi (42) (part of the Reform and Construction bloc)

Al-Abadi won the fight against IS and conducted a nationalist campaign but failed to bring about better governance and services. His tough response to the Kurdish referendum alienated the Kurds, while his association with the West reduced his popularity among Iran-affiliated Shi’a politicians.