The new face of terror: a partnership between kleptocrats, statebuilders and extremists.

The estimated 67 deaths that were the grisly result of the temporary take-over of the Westgate Mall in Nairobi by Al-Shabab immediately revived the global debate on Al Qaeda (AQ) and its offshoots. Viewing this tragic event alongside the current predicament of many Arab countries and peoples easily creates an image of a resurgent radical religious terrorism with a threat of global proportions. The Economist led the wave with its issue of last Friday (27 September 2013) under the graphic header ‘The New Face of Terror’. It deserves a brief, critical commentary because its main recommendation – more Western support for weak governments in countries where terrorism is on the increase - is morally debatable and offers a shaky basis for effective counter-terrorism efforts. In fact, it might do substantial harm.

A simplistic global narrative on terrorism...

Let’s start with the newly emerging global narrative on terrorism. It has four distinct elements: a battlefield, a revived ideology, an armory open for business and a convenient sectarian frame.

Firstly, at the moment Syria offers the battlefield on which religious fighters coalesce and gain experience to wreak further havoc in the global jihad. It continues the line of jihadist engagements like Azerbaijan (1988), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992), Chechnya (1994), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003) and Mali (2012) in unbroken fashion, making the Sinai and South Yemen (e.g. Ansar Al-Sharia) look like minor areas of unrest in comparison. Last week’s rejection of the authority and representativeness of the Western-backed Syrian National Coalition by several Syrian rebel groups provides further credence to such argument. Presumably it indicates a shift to radical groups like Jhabat Al-Nusra.

If Syria provided the battlefield, Egypt vindicated AQ’s ideology. The ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood by the Egyptian armed forces was a straightforward coup d’état that confirmed, certainly for propaganda purposes, the validity of AQ’s emphasis on the need for violent strife to establish the caliphate. Elections can clearly not be relied upon to advance Islamic beliefs by peaceful means. As a bonus, it offers another example of Western double standards given the belated and/or near total absence of official condemnation. It has added insult to injury against the backdrop of consistently marginal Western action to get Israel to stop its program of settlement construction and improve its treatment of Palestinians from a human rights perspective.

Next, Libya and Iraq function as the ‘armories of jihad’ in this narrative. With government authority fragile or non-existent in parts of each country and a monopoly of violence absent, large flows of weapons have reportedly found their way to other hotspots in the Middle-East and North-Africa, such as Mali. In addition, there is a movement of skills and experience of weapons usage from Iraq and Afghanistan to other countries. The appearance of Improvised Explosive Devices in Somalia and Yemen are but examples hereof.

These elements are subsequently fitted into the increasingly popular frame of Sunni-Shia sectarian strife that is ‘engulfing’ the Middle-East. Despite their rather different interests, objectives and factions, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, Iran, protestors in Bahrain and even Yemen’s Al-Houthi movement are cast by some as part of an epic struggle against the Sunni Gulf monarchies and their allies, Egypt, the US and Israel.

… Leads to a questionable remedy…

While such a storyline simplifies a complex world and makes it more understandable, it offers a shaky base for policy, let alone action. This is because its level of lazy generality removes critical global and local issues from the picture. Worse, it leads to dangerous recommendations. For example, on the basis of an analysis similar to the one above, the Economist recommended last Friday: ‘Today, the emphasis should be on supporting weak (and sometimes unsavory) governments in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Niger and elsewhere that are trying to fight Al-Qaeda. Even Kenya and Nigeria could do with more help.’

It is clear after Westgate that an immediate and short-term need exists to contain and neutralize terrorist threats. It is also clear that this may require the use of force, an open debate on whether further shortcuts with civil liberties are merited and working with ‘unsavory’ governments. Yet, this is something quite different from supporting them. In fact, it is unsound advice for three reasons:

It is, firstly, morally unjust. In a number of the countries mentioned, the government isn’t part of the solution. It’s part of the problem. Examples include Nigeria, Iraq and Yemen. Decades of theft of oil revenues that belong in the public purse, combined with marginalization of the north of the country and its heavy handed response to Boko Haram, make Nigeria’s government at least in part responsible for the radical and violent acts that now plague it. A few thousand miles east, the government of Nouri Al-Maliki appears to be playing a game of divide and conquer with Iraq’s Sunni minority with the apparent aim of politically sidelining them. Assassinations and suppression are tools commonly used. This strengthens the hand of AQ, which is also a Sunni inspired movement (it admittedly overplayed its hand during the US presence in Iraq as the Sunni Awakenings movement demonstrated, but it has learned from this experience). Yemen’s government, although engaged in a National Dialogue that may yet produce more positive results, has done very little to address 25-40% unemployment and half its population going hungry over the past decade, and is partly responsible for fuelling at least three conflicts. Its practices and cynical use of the terrorist threat have created grievances that in part explain the success of Ansar Al-Sharia and AQ in the Arabian Peninsula. In Somalia the war on terror stills pays the salaries of government soldiers and militia groups co-opted to fight Al-Shabab with little consideration of the long-term impact of such initiatives. In short, these governments have, at least indirectly and in part, contributed to the problem of terrorism. This makes it critical to be very clear about what kind of support is meant, under which conditions and how short-term gains stack up against the risk of doing harm in the long run. 

Secondly, it is risky. The governments of a few other countries singled out by the Economist for more support have recently been elected in a context of violent strife or long standing social divisions. This renders their legitimacy fragile. Examples include Mali, Libya, Somalia, and, arguably, even Kenya. Supporting such governments will endow them with more resources than they would otherwise have. These resources will not necessarily be mobilized in the service of peaceful dialogue with the opposition or competing power centers. State building by its very nature includes the consolidation of power within a central grouping of elites. Especially in Somalia great circumspection is necessary to prevent Western aid from distorting the incentives for peaceful state building favoring some groups over others and undermining more essential efforts towards political stabilization. But even Kenya faces legitimacy challenges that could easily be undermined by stronger counter-terrorism cooperation – think of the ongoing proceedings at the International Criminal Court and the creeping criminalization of its state.

Thirdly, such a remedy emphasizes double standards. Stressing the need of working with countries like Mali, Yemen and Somalia underplays the need for important third parties, mainly the US and the Gulf States, to re-examine the role they play in constraining and promoting terrorism (the Economist recognizes this in part). In much of the Arab world, US policy and actions are an important part of a narrative of grievance, oppression and double standards. This is mainly because of its perceived unconditional pro-Israel stance, but also because of its drone strike policy (e.g. Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia) and support for authoritarian governments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the basis of, presumably, lingering Cold War logic and energy politics. The shale gas revolution has not yet altered this logic in the face of Iranian obduracy and the civil war in Syria. In fact, progress on the Palestinian issue might well be one of the more productive counter-terrorist measures that the US can undertake. The Gulf countries face a different challenge. A quick look at Freedom House and GDP rankings illustrates how they gloss a lack of political freedom over with economic wealth and largesse. Relatively strong connections between governments and religious establishments legitimize this situation (arguably, Wahhabism is as much a state-sponsored religion as Saudi Arabia is a religion-sponsored state). Yet, this also feeds a narrative of oppression and grievance that terrorist groups can exploit, not to mention the many rumors of Gulf-financing for such outfits.

… That needs to be complemented by a few missing links

In short, it is likely that supporting countries with poor governance track records to fight terrorism puts the cart before the horse. Improving their governance, which will require much more peer pressure, Western policy coherence and local compromise than is the case today, will arguably do most to reduce terrorism. In addition, a number of global factors that, directly or indirectly, perpetuate terrorism deserve a long and hard look by Western countries. This includes, for example, addressing glaring levels of inequality and the consistently broken promise by most OECD countries to dedicate 0,7% of their Gross Domestic Product to development, reviewing the conditions of access to global trade, reconsidering restrictions on migration and overhauling the supply-side focused fight against drugs, a major source of finance for terrorism, completely. A mere focus on closing local spaces for radicalization will just see it move to another zone of lesser control. However, the trouble is that none of this will mitigate any short-term threats. But the answer to that certainly does not have to be more support for ‘unsavory governments’.