Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century

Under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, Russia has developed from a neglected regional power into a self-declared resurgent superpower. The foundation of this forceful come-back of Moscow in the international arena was enormous revenues of oil and gas as a result of fast increasing world prices. Russia's background in the former Soviet Union as well as close ties with the upcoming new powers of China and India served as springboards towards regaining an influential status in the world. Simultaneously, Moscow developed an assertive policy towards the West and unwilling neighbours, culminating in an armed conflict with Georgia.

Reviewing this decade of Russian international security policy, this work analyses major security documents, military reforms and policy actions towards friends and foes, to provide an assessment of the future of Moscow's security strategy. Examples of topics are cooperation with China, CSTO and SCO and an antagonizing relationship with the USA and NATO. Major security issues of Putin and Medvedev have been nuclear deterrence, the CFE Treaty, the US missile shield, energy as power tool and an alternative European security architecture. The August 2008 Georgia conflict serves as a case-study in analysing Russia's foreign security policy.

Considering Russia's security status - measured in internal and external strong and weak points, opportunities and threats in socio-economic, political and security areas - what will this mean for Moscow's external security policy in the longer run? In the coming years Russia is likely to develop into a combined failing and assertive state. Failing, because of deteriorating socio-economic and disintegrating conditions. Assertive, by continuing an anti-Western stance supported by a partly modernized army with limited power projection capabilities. In these circumstances more 'Georgia 2008' type of Russian military action could be expected, in the CIS area, but possibly also further away, e.g. in the Arctic region. Assuming that energy is a primary policy instrument of the Kremlin, clashes are most likely to occur in regions where energy is to be won or lost.

How should the West respond to such a failing and assertive Russia? A dual Western policy, of the traditional type of 'carrot and stick', seems the right approach. On the one hand the stick, a policy of a tough stance, by making clear to the Kremlin what the limits are of its assertive course. On the other hand the carrot, a policy of encouraging cooperation with Russia. Moscow and the West should focus on mutual beneficial and practical projects, for instance around Afghanistan. Differences between Russia and the West are likely to stay. Hence, workable conditions have to be established, since both parties will remain important players in the international arena.

This book will be of much interest to students of Russian politics and foreign policy, European politics and Security Studies and IR in general.